Al-Ghazzali
on
REPENTANCE
Being a Translation of Book 31 of Ihya' Uloom al-Din
Revival of Religious Sciences
of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali
Translated with an introduction
M.S. STERN
PREFACE
The project goal is the presentation of Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali's teaching
on repentance as rendered in his encyclopedic Revival of the Religious Sciences (Ihya' 'Ul"m ad-Din). The
presentation is made in two parts.
Part
One consists of introductory remarks designed to provide a background against
which al-Ghazzalis teachings on repentance can be viewed. Specifically, it
includes a short account of the idea of repentance in early Jewish and
Christian traditions; a discussion of the Koranic notion of repentance; a
biographical sketch of al-Ghazzali; an outline of the content and purpose of the
Revival; a treatment of al-Ghazzali's conception of salvation; and,
finally, a profile of al-Ghazzali's position on a number of basic theological
issues which are both intrinsically bound to his explication of repentance and
generally illustrative of his religious and
pedagogical stance.
Part
Two consists of the translation of the Kitab
at-Tawba which is the thirty-first book of al-Ghazzali's Revival.
A
Many have had a part in the completion of this work. I would especially
like to acknowledge those whose contributions were most significant: Deans
Finlay and Lobdell of the University
of
Above all, I wish to acknowledge those without whom this work would have
been inconceivable.
The late Professor G. E. von Grunebaum was a paradigm of humane
scholarship; he is missed. Professor Moshe Perlmann, a teacher par excellence
and a righteous man; he be constantly before my eyes. And, last but not least,
my wife and partner, Sydell Stern; kind, patient and insightful, she nurtures my
mind and my soul. These three have provided personal and professional models for
me to emulate. I pray that I might prove worthy of each. To them, with gratitude
to the Almighty, I dedicate this book.
CONTENTS
Preface : ........................................................................................................
v
Part
One: Introduction ................................................................................
1
Part
Two:
Translation of Book XXXI of the
Ihya'
'Ulum ad-Din ................................................................
29
Appendix A: ............................................................................................
133
Appendix B: Index of Persons Mentioned .........................................
137
Bibliography:............................................................................................
139
Notes: ..........................................................................................................
143
PART ONE
I
By
the beginning of the seventh century, when Muhammad was beginning to preach to
his new community of believers, repentance had already become a fundamental
concept in both Judaism and Christianity. Both of these religious traditions
assert the existence of a personal God, the reality of sin and its consequences
and, perhaps most importantly, man's freedom both in his ability to commit and
overcome sin. Thus man was seen as a moral being capable of breaking away from a
negatively valued past and reforming. Furthermore, this conversion is highly
valued as a basic virtue and a permanent condition to spiritual accomplishment.
The Hebrew noun teshubah
('repentance') is mishnaic in origin
(i.e., post-biblical) but the same radical in its verbal form (shub)
is quite common in the Hebrew Bible. Aside from its denotation 'to turn'
or 'to return' in a physical sense,2 there is a parallel usage
indicating a spiritual or moral conversion. In
fact, there are two-such usages common, especially in the Latter Prophets.
One such usage finds
There are, in fact, two main
currents to the idea of repentance in the Hebrew Bible. Firstly there is the
ritualistic or cultic system by which man seeks forgiveness through sacrifice
and displacement of guilt .8 This aspect is best exemplified in
the ritual.enjoined for the Day of Atonement.9 Secondly there
is the moral and ethical conversion especially emphasized by
the prophetic sections of the Bible.10 These two currents should not,
however; be viewed as totally independent elements. The ritual and ethical
are intimately related in the biblical conceptions of sin and repentance. Indeed
this synthesis becomes one of the fundamental aspects of later rabbinic
teaching.11
Finally,
the Hebrew Bible views repentance as a process involving both man and God.
Linguistic usage to this effect has already been cited. The prophets, however,
put this usage together in such a manner as to indicate that the return by man
is the factor under whose initiative God's return is triggered. Clearly, then,
the biblical tradition views God's forgiveness and grace as a response to
man's obedience.12
The
Hebrew Bible does not, however, present a single comprehensive conception of
repentance. Indeed one sees in this regard the variation of attitude and
situation faced by the various biblical authors. The inconsistencies inherent in
the biblical texts are, moreover, carried over to some degree into the rabbinic
texts of the talmudic period.13 It is only in the medieval era,
especially in the work of Maimonides, that consistent and comprehensive
treatments of the topic are to be found. It can be said, however, that most of
the major elements of the rabbinic conception of repentance are already
mentioned in the talmudic literature. The talmudic sages were clearly aware of
the biblical inconsistencies and the lack of systematic topical treatment may,
in large measure, be due to the nature of talmudic literature itself.14
It
is evident, nonetheless, that repentance had become a basic feature of rabbinic
piety. The religious poetry of the period, an increasingly important liturgical
resource in the post-Temple period, is marked by a high frequency of penitential
themes.15 Further, the word teshubdh
(repentance) becomes, at this time, a technical theological term, indicating
a more intense concern for and treatment of its nature and characteristics.16
The significance assigned repentance by the talmudic sages is so great that it
is credited with having been created prior to the physical world. 17 Attributed
to it are special life-giving and redemptive powers.18
Repentance is, furthermore, viewed as a potent form of righteousness.
Consequently, at least some authorities see the penitent as more virtuous than
the sinless man.19
So
valued was the penitent in the rabbinic tradition that only his relative
virtuosity compared with the unblemished could be questioned. In the Greek
philosophical tradition this was not the case. Aristotle, for example, deals
with the concept of `repentance as cure in his Nichomachean Ethics. He does
not, however, view it as a virtue. The good man is not given to repentance.20 When the two lines converge in the work of Philo21
repentance is introduced into the hellenistic philosophical tradition as a
virtue.22 It would seem that the rabbinic view of man's fallibility
and repentance were already so basic within pre-Destruction first century
Judaism that Philo did not hesitate to disagree in this matter with the ancient
masters.
In early Christianity, as
portrayed in the New Testament, repentance becomes an urgent and pervasive
theme. Even before Jesus' advent, John the Baptist, sensing the imminence of
Judgment, calls for immediate repentance.23 This call is taken up by
Jesus who often explains the major purpose of his ministry as being the
repentance of sinners.24
This concept of repentance (metanoia)
is developed into far more than a turning away from sin. It becomes rather,
a complete change of the total spiritual personality.25 Paul
describes this in mystical language as a crucifixion and coming again to life.26
With Jesus' death, repentance, as the key to salvation, seems to be replaced by
faith 27
Yet, as faith was understood it differs little, in process, from repentance.
Repentance is man's turning away from sin, faith is his turning to God. The
shift can be understood as an adjustment from the intense expectation of an
imminent Judgment to the acceptance of the possibility of a prolonged interval
between the present and the realization of the Kingdom.
This change, from repentance
based on eschatological expectation to repentance based on the demands of
normative piety, is an important process. It parallels, in many respects, the
changes which are discernible in the teachings of Muhammad after the founding
of his community in Medina.28 Perforce, the warning, BUT UNLESS YOU
REPENT YOU WILL ALL SIMILARLY PERISH,29 has a different intensity
after Jesus' death. In the following centuries, through to the emergence of
Islam, Christian theological treatment of repentance never goes beyond the New
Testament ideas. In fact, with the increasing involvement of the Church in the
sacramental process of penance, of which repentance was considered a part, the
intensity of the original concept is often lessened.30
In Christianity, however, as
in Judaism repentance is highly valued and the penitent, fulfilling, as it were,
Jesus' ministry, is considered God's joy. The New Testament parables of the lost
sheep and the lost coin are even more emphatic than the rabbinic texts in
lauding the virtue of the penitent even against the sinless.31 Thus
is the positive emphasis on repentance in Judaism and Christianity at the
beginning of the seventh century.
II
Tawba is the Arabic
equivalent to the Hebrew teshubfh. It
is a loan word borrowed, in its basic verbal form (taba), from Aramaic. It does not have the physical denotation
of the biblical shab but does
parallel its religious signification.32
In its verbal forms the
Koranic taba occurs both in an
absolute form33 or with one of two prepositions, i1a34
or 'ala.35
Use of the last mentioned preposition indicates, without exception, that
the verb's subject is God. All other instances of the verb refer to man as
subject. There are three nominal deviatives each meaning repentance or
conversion: tawb,36
matab,37 and tawba.38 The
active participle occurs twice39 and there is an adjectival form,
tawwab,40 which refers
to God in all but one case. 41 In all, the word taba or its derivatives occur eighty-four times in the Koran.
The frequency and periodic
distribution of this usage would seem to have some significance. Of the eighty
four instances in which this radical is encountered, only nineteen are
unquestionably of the Meccan period.42 Of these nineteen only one is
a verbal form with the preposition 'ala43
Further, none of the adjectival forms predate the Medinian period. The
adjectival tawwab usually appears
in tandem with the adjective rahim.44 Such a double adjectival arrangement with rahim
occurs in the Meccan period but never with tawwa..45
It seems clear that the Koran is asserting that God plays an active role in tawba
but this idea is developed and stressed only relatively late in Muhammad's
prophetic career. In fact, it would seem that whatever process is meant by tawba,
a clear and decisive definition of which is not to be had in the Koran, it
was taught in the Meccan period but not stressed or developed until after
Muhammad's move to
Taba and its
derivatives are not the only words used in the Koran to indicate repentance. Rajaa,
a word meaning return in both physical and religious contexts, is used.46
This word has not, however, become a legal or theological idiom and its
religious signification would appear to be a simple extension of its literal
meaning. Derivatives of aba47
and the fourth verbal form of naba48
are found in the Koran and do, moreover, occur frequently in later
literature.
In the context of the later usage, Hujwiri
differentiates the three terms by reference to those who are repenting and their
spiritual state at the time of penitence. Taba
refers to the repentance of the ordinary man; anaba,
the repentance of the elect; and aba,
the repentance of the elite, those who have attained the degree of divine
love.49 It does not necessarily follow that this represents the
Koranic usage but it is reasonable to assume that Muhammad did, in fact, use
them to denote different aspects or categories of repentance.
Muhammad
was, in
The
Koran does not offer a precise definition of tawba.
It is clear, however, that tawba represents,
at its most basic level, an abandonment of sin and a reorientation to a life of
obedience.55 It follows, then, that there must exist an awareness of
having sinned and a feeling of remorse which moves one to turn away from sin.
Repudiation of sin, however, is not sufficient. The Koran often juxtaposes tawba
and the pursuit of righteousness.56 It is not clear whether the
latter is a part of the process of repentance or consequent to it. Whichever is
the case, however, man's hope of divine forgiveness requires such a conversion.
Repentance
is a requisite, although not necessarily determining, condition to the
salvation of the sinner.57 Furthermore, the Koran posits a special
relationship between the penitent sinner and God. If man repents and turns to
God (ila), God repents over man ('ala),
turns to him and, perchance, will forgive him. God, moreover, places special
value on the penitent and loves them.58 One can conclude, therefore,
that while the process of tawba is the
repudiation and abandonment of sin, its purpose is the reconciliation of man to
God. That the one could follow the other becomes intelligible only by
understanding the Koranic conception of sin.
The Koran, in accord with
its general character, does not elaborate a systematic theory of sin. There are,
however, frequent references to sin, its consequences, and its possible
forgiveness. From these references it is possible to construct an outline of the
Koranic concept of sin.59
Sin
is a breach of moral norms. The Koran, standing by itself, does not present a
comprehensive moral code. It does, however, assert a moral sanction, God. When
man commits an indecent act it is to God that he must turn in seeking
forgiveness.60 This religious orientation stands in sharp contrast to
what was, fundamentally, a socially sanctioned, conservative and pragmatic
moral standard in pre-Islamic pagan Arabia.61 This assertion of a
religious orientation, which infers that sin alienates man from God, is further
augmented by the very concept of repentance. Sin's cure lies, at least in part,
in turning to God. The assumption that in sinning man has turned from God is
clear. This concept, while clearly present in the Koran, is not as fully
developed as it later becomes in al-Ghazzali's
writings. It is, in this regard, interesting to note that the term ma'siya,
which denotes disobedience and rebellion, is used frequently by al-Ghazzali to
signify sin. In the Koran it appears only twice and in both cases relates to
disobedience to a prophet.62 An additional indication of this
orientation is to be found in the. references to atonement. The Koran does not
provide for, any specific atonement ritual such as is to be found in Judaism.63
It does indicate, however, that good deeds atone for sin. The fact that it
specifies certain ritual observances, i.e., the correct execution of prayers, as
efficacious can be attributed to the underlying assumption that sin is
fundamentally an offense against God.64
Sin also entails damage to
the perpetrator. Man, in sinning, falls short of his own potential. To express
the concept of sin the Koran uses, among other terms, words derived from the
radical Kh-t'.65 This radical indicates stumbling or falling short
of target.66 The Koran indicates, moreover, that a man who accepts.
God's morality perceives in sin an effacement of self. Thus, for example, Moses
says: 0 MY LORD, I HAVE WRONGED MYSELF (zalamtu
nafsi).67 For Muhammad, sin effects more than subjectively
discernible damage. Sin also leads man to hellfire, barring him from the
rewards set aside for the righteous.68 But, unlike the concepts of
sin and justice in some other traditions,69 the Koran asserts the
lack of necessity in God's executing punishment.70 The concept of
uncontrolled and unwilled Fate is lacking.
The Koran refers to a
differentiation between major and minor sins.71 It is not clear,
however, which sins are included in either category or by what criteria they are
to be differentiated. The classification of sin according to intensity,
reference and effect is the product of later stages in the development of
Islamic law and theology. The elaboration of a theory of sin, and the tangential
questions suggested by such an elaboration, constituted one of the major
elements in the controversy out of which Islamic orthodoxy emerged.
III
Abu
Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazzali was born in the year 1058 in or around Tus, a town in
northeastern
Al-Ghazzali was orphaned at an early age, and according
to his father's will, he was placed in the care of a family friend. He and his
brother were given a traditional education in the religious sciences and
a1-Ghariili then followed an educational course leading to certification as a jurist and theologian ('alim). Given the mobility of students in that milieu, it is
not at all unusual that he travelled to Nishapur in 1077 to study under
al-Juwayni, a leading jurist of the age. He remained there, studying and
teaching, until his mentor's death in 1085.
When al-Juwayni died,
al-Ghazzali joined the entourage of the Seljuq vizier Nizam al-Mulk. He remained
with the vizier until Nizam appointed him to a professorship at the Baghdad
Nizamiyya college in July of 1091. He continued in his professorship for four
years until his spiritual crisis led to his resignation and withdrawal from
public life in 1095.74
AI-Ghazzali,
in the Deliverance,75 described
his unrelenting search for certainty and truth. This quest, which al-Ghazzali
states led to his crisis, brought him to study the four major intellectual and
spiritual approaches of his day: theology, philosophy, Isma'ili authoritarian
instruction (ta'lim) and Sufism. Yet,
a critical analysis of his work and behaviour must lead to the conclusion that
his crisis, and therefore his conversion, needs to be viewed as personal,
immediate and nonacademic.76
What caused the eruption of
al-Ghazzali's crisis? Authoritarian instruction does not seem to have been an
acceptable personal option. When he refers to it, he is totally polemical.
Sufism, on the other hand, was not a new experience. The family friend, in whose
care he had been placed as a child, was himself a sufi.77 Rather,
al-Ghazzali's crisis flowed from his increasing disenchantment with his
colleagues in
Al-Ghazzali spent the next
ten years in retirement. Part of the time was spent in
His undertaking of renewed public duties is indicative of
the direction in which his penitential search led him. The answer to his
previous worldliness was not in withdrawal but rather in reorientation, and in
a way, intensification of his pedagogical work.81 His sensitivity to
the responsibility of the 'ulama' class
brought him to realize that a `return' on his part necessitated his working
towards a general return, and therefore, a revival of the religious sciences.82
Al-Ghazzali's
influence on the development of Islam is both significant and multi-faceted.
He helped to reintroduce the element of fear into the service of God. His work
in the areas of philosophy and theology brought these disciplines a clarity that
made them available to and treatable by the greater number of Muslims. In fact,
though his interests and foci changed after 1095, he remained throughout his
life a doctor of the Law. His later work, as exemplified in the Revival, was as significant to his theology as his earlier efforts.
He also created a framework within which sufism attained an assured position
within Orthodox Islam. These, moreover, are only some of his important
contributions.83
Nonetheless,
the above are only contributing elements in the ultimate importance of
al-Ghazzali to Islam. Above all he was a religious teacher and guide who felt
and exhibited an overriding concern for his fellow believers. His greatest
strength lay in his ability, as literary artist and teacher, to project his
concern and involvement in the spiritual condition of his age.84
Al-Ghazzali,
as noted, was a very prolific writer. His works cover almost all the major areas
of Islamic religious thought.85 The Ihya'
'Ulum ad-Din, Revival of the Religious
Sciences, an encyclopedic work that was written over a period of years
beginning with his departure from Baghdad in 1095, is his magnum opus. While not
written in a personal or confessional style, it represents the fruits of
al-Ghazzali's years of spiritual development and sufi travelling. It is a
vibrant work frequently using anecdotes and parables.86 It is
characterized, as is most of his writings, by the use of emotional as well as
rational persuasion, a mark of his pedagogical style and skill.87
Its
intended purpose is to fundamentally redirect the attitude of the believer. In
his Beginning of Guidance, al-Ghazzali
declares that his Revival attempts, by
increasing the fear of God and the believer's awareness of self, to decrease
the appetite for this world and increase the desire for the life to come. The Revival
will acquaint the Muslim with the internal aspects of piety which will
lead to the opening of the supernal realm.88
Al-Ghazzali divided the
believers into two main categories: the `vulgus' ('awamm) and the elite (khawass).
The `vulgus' is the intellectually and spiritually limited masses, usually
possessed of imitative faith (tagiid). Of
the sciences of the hereafter they should be restricted to the practical
sciences ('ilm al-muamala).
The elite is that group of believers which is intellectually and spiritually
capable of revelatory faith. They are initiated to the science of vision ('ilm
al-mukashafa. 89 Many
have concluded that al-Ghazzali taught a 'double truth': an exoteric doctrine
for the 'vulgus', and a higher esoteric truth for the elite. Professor LazarusYafeh
has ably shown that such was not the case. For al-Ghazzali there was only one
truth. As an accomplished and skilled pedagogue, however, he realized that
different people have varying capacities for understanding. Al-Ghazzali,
therefore, advocated limiting the amount of the singular truth taught,
according to the capability of the student to absorb and comprehend it.90
AI-Ghazzali, as becomes one
who considered himself primarily a teacher and spiritual physician, usually
inclined to the theory that a man's rank was subject to his own will and effort.
Given this position, the division of believers loses its rigidity. Most, if
not all, of those who are to be reckoned part of the `vulgus' could raise
themselves to the elite class. It would seem, in fact, that al-Ghazzali
considered such endeavour to be each man's duty.91
For
whom, then, did al-Ghazzali write the Revival?
Wilzer asserts that he Revival was
written for the 'vulgus'. She bases this assertion on the repentance terminology
used in the Kitab at-Tawba. According
to Hujwiri's definitions, the appropriate terms for the repentance of the elite
would be aba or anaba,
neither of which is used hereby al-Ghazzali. Since al-Ghazzali treats only
Tawba, defined by Hujwiri as the repentance
of the masses, she concludes that the Kitab
at-Tawba is wholly exoteric.92 This position, however,
ignores that fact that, despite disclaimers, al-Ghazzali struggles in the Kitab
at-Tawba, as in other books of the Revival,
with concepts that belong to the areas of knowledge reserved for the
initiated.93 This apparent contradiction can only be resolved by
reference to al-Ghazzali's fluid concept of the 'vulgus' and his graded approach
to the revelation of the one truth. There are believers, not yet of the elite
but who are capable of being guided to that Path by means of an awakening to
some of the divine secrets. These people are led gradually to a fuller and more
comprehensive knowledge of the truth. It is to this group that the Revival
is directed.94
The Revival is
divided into four quarters, each of which consists of ten books. The first
quarter opens with a book dealing with knowledge and learning. It is here, at
the very outset, that al-Ghazzali sets out the indictment of the `ulama'.
The remainder, of this first quarter deals with ritual observance (e.g.,
prayer, fasting, alms, etc.). The second quarter deals with the regulation of
personal and social aspects of life (e.g., eating, marriage, livelihood,
etc.). In the first half, al-Ghazzali deals with the usual legalistic aspects of
religious life common to the literature of the 'ulama'. The second half
deals with traits of the spirit and character. The third quarter treats the
negative traits against which man must strive. These include anger, pride, the
evil of the tongue and the like. The fourth and last quarter undertakes the
exposition of positive traits and their acquisition. It examines patience,
asceticism, contentment, self-examination and such as these. This second
section is clearly sufi and not unlike many non-Muslim devotional manuals.95
It would be wrong, however,
to see the Revival as consisting of
two separate strands: the legalistic and the mystic. One of al-Ghazzali's most
significant characteristics is his blending and harmonizing of these two
previously divergent lines. There were, before his time, observant (i.e.
orthodox) sufis. Some of these were also members of the 'ulama' class. Yet, to
some, orthodoxy must have seemed mere conformity, while with others the two
lines were compartmentalized and, therefore, separate. The external observance
exists on one level, and the internal, pietistic search on another. For
al-Ghazzali, however, the external and legalistic observances of Islam are the
very basis for the internal mystic search. Islamic practices were, for him, the
means of drawing near to God and preparing for the life to come.96
Indeed, just as al-Ghazzali sought to give deeper content to the religious life
of the mechanically pious, he also showed great concern to remove the strongly
entrenched indifference to the religious commandments from among the mystics.97
All of al-Ghazzali's studies
and experiences are reflected in the Revival. He, like the mystics before him, found in the Koran, the
Tradition, and the literature of law, the first seeds of a moral-religious
approach.98 Yet he never turned away from them. He continued,
throughout his career, to draw from these sources and to refine their concepts
in light of his mystic studies and experiences. He further clarified them by
struggling with the ideas presented by the major movements (e.g., mutazila,
kalam,
philosophy, etc.) of Islamic civilization. Much of the success that the Revival
enjoyed in bringing together once divergent lines of tradition can be
attributed to the unity which al-Ghazzali himself brought to his work.
Repentance, as might be expected, is treated in the last
quarter of the Revival. In fact, it is
the first book of the fourth quarter. Al-Ghazzali, no doubt, viewed repentance
as the most basic and requisite process for attaining positive spiritual
qualities working towards the goal of salvation. In many ways his treatment of
repentance typifies the totality of his teachings as explicated in the Revival.
IV
The
goal of life, for al-Ghazzali, is the attainment of salvation.99 To
the uninitiated Muslim, God, the highest spiritual entity, forms with man a
personal moral community.100 The fulfillment of this relationship,
one in which God is the Master and man the slave, is at Judgement. In the
hereafter, the temporal locus of Judgment, God is manifested in the absoluteness
of His mastery, and man in the totality of his subservience. If man is granted
salvation, he is vindicated in judgement and awarded the rewards of
Al-Ghazzali did not
consider Fear, an element promoted both by the Koran and the early ascetics, to
be of no value. For the 'vulgus', whose faith is imitative and whose
understanding is limited, it is as effective a means to salvation as is
possible.102 For the gnostic (arif ), however,
fear can only be a preliminary stage which is overtaken by the stage of Love.
Such a man does not seek the pleasures of
In some mystic traditions the ultimate goal of man's
search is to become one with God.104 This objective was, within the
monotheistic tradition of Islam, unacceptable. The gulf between God and man
cannot be bridged. Yet, for al-Ghazzali, man could, indeed should, strive to
attain knowledge of God.105 This knowledge, the search of which
becomes man's true purpose and vocation, is not intellectual ('ilm)
(although intellectual knowledge is an important factor in the search for
higher states). Rather, the sought after knowledge is intuitive and experiential
(ma'rifa).In experiencing this knowledge man finds God. Through this
illumination the gnostic achieves a portion of the divine substance.106
The traditional terminology
for God, in this context, is mahbub (Beloved).107
For al-Ghazzali this was a most apt term. If a man truly finds God as his
Beloved, he will seek naught save that knowledge that will allow him to draw
nigh and enjoy the bliss of proximity.108 Gnosis (ma'rifa)
and Love (hubb) always go together.109 For such a lover the only
true salvation is being near to God. The only damnation to fear is that which
bars man from God's presence.
This
idea, that the greatest bliss is proximity to God, is not unique to the mystical
tradition of Islam. Indeed, it is to be found in the Koran110 as well
as the talmudic tradition.111 Yet, in those sources the expectation
of intuitive knowledge or experience of God's presence is projected solely in
the context of the hereafter. Maimonides, for example, who asserts that
knowledge of God is man's prime duty, is discussing an intellectual
phenomenon.112 When he asserts the bliss of Encounter (i.e., the
equivalent of ma'rifa) as the reward of the righteous, he clearly is talking of
the rewards of the hereafter.113 The mystics, al-Ghazzali included,
understood this experience to be attainable, through ecstasy, in this life.
Indeed, it is only through gnosis that man can, in this life, gain a clear and
direct image of the life to come.114
What
role, then, does this world (dunya) play in
al-Ghazzali's concept of salvation?
This
life, which is called the World of the Material and the Evident ('alam
al-mulk wa-sh-shahada),compares to the
hereafter, called the World of the Hidden and Transcendent (alam
al-ghayb wa-l-malakut),as sleep compares to the waking state. The literal
form of a dream cannot yield a knowledge of the true state of things. Truth,
however, can be revealed by the proper interpretation of the content or meaning
of a dream. Thus, in this life, man is limited in his apprehension of the true
state of things in the hereafter by his ability to properly interpret the
parables and allegories presented him by prophecy. Man, can directly experience
and know God only by gnosis (ma'rifa).115
This too, however, is strictly limited. Man, because of his very nature,
cannot achieve perfect and lasting gnosis in this life.116 So long as
man's state of morality and knowledge is imperfect, a condition whose
inevitability will be treated below, he cannot aspire to salvation, i.e., full
knowledge of and proximity to God, in this life. Salvation is only to be found
in the hereafter.117
This
life is an antechamber to the hereafter.118 Al-Ghazzali is wont to
refer to the tradition which asserts that this world is a field for the
cultivation of the hereafter.119 Man's life in this world plays a
preparatory role in which he can assure for himself either salvation or consignment
to damnation. The possibility of achieving some measure of gnosis in this life
allows man to foretaste, as it were, of the saved state in the hereafter. He can
then be in a position to appreciate the rewards of the good life.
The
relationship between this life and the hereafter is, in al-Ghazzali's thought,
much more complex than just an antechamber leading into the great hall. Man, he
asserts, will experience nothing new in the hereafter. Man receives, in the
hereafter, only as he has provided himself in this world. If man wishes to find
salvation in the hereafter, he must struggle to achieve gnosis, salvation's
foretaste, while still in this ephemeral life.120 This concept is
very similar to the one expressed in the rabbinic dictum which states that only
he who has prepared on the eve of the Sabbath will eat on the Sabbath.121
The parallel is very apt. In the rabbinic tradition, the Sabbath is spoken of as
a foretaste of the life to come.122
It
is of interest to note that al-Ghazzali posits, in this regard, another parallel
between this life and the hereafter. In different contexts he calls his reader's
attention to the fact that the Master of both worlds is one and the same and,
furthermore, that His order (sunna) is constant.123
In trying to thus connect this world and the hereafter he is not saying that
both are exactly alike. Such would be grossly inconsistent with his projections
on the nature of the hereafter. He is saying, however, that there is a
continuity between the two worlds. One can in no way dissociate the effects of
man's life in this world from what he can expect in the hereafter. Thus, while
the nature of man's life in the hereafter is unique, its roots and causes are to
be found in his temporal existence.124
Al-Ghazzali,
finally, views this world not merely as a preparation for the hereafter, but as
a test.125 This world (dunya)
is the prime cause of sin and, therefore, man's alienation
from God. This world is not intrinsically evil but, if man begins to live it
for its own sake, it will lead him to perdition. For al-Ghazzali all sin can be
traced to a man's finding excessive delight in the pleasures of this world.
This life should be valued only. for its functional use in aiding man to achieve
salvation. Al-Ghazzali does not advocate extreme asceticism. Such behaviour, in
his view, makes man as much a slave to this world as its opposite. Rather, man
must learn to use this world to meet his primary goal and be prepared to
renounce that which is neither useful nor desirable to that end.126 This
moderate asceticism should not be confused with the denial that al-Ghazzali
prescribes for individuals as self-castigation for specific sins. If an
individual finds himself so attracted to an aspect of the temporal world that
it is leading him to sin, he should renounce it even though, for most men, it
would be permissible.127
In sum, therefore, this
world (dunya)
is a preparation for the hereafter. It is a test of
man's worthiness and, in fact, a context within which he can gain a foothold on
or preclude himself from salvation. Salvation, however, belongs to the
hereafter. Only in the hereafter can the success of man's efforts in this life
truly be validated.128
What is man that this life
becomes a test and thus threatens his salvation? Al-Ghazzali sees man as being
endowed, as part of his basic nature, with two hostile forces: appetite and
intellect. They are not, however, equal or co-temporal. These forces develop
progressively as man grows older. The first to develop are the impulses leading
man to desire the delights of this world. Only later, over a span of some
thirty-three years beginning at age seven, does the intellect develop as a
control on the appetites. Its function is to limit man's devotion to the mundane
and direct him to knowledge of God and, thereby, to salvation.129
Al-Ghazzali considers the
unbridled pursuit of one's appetites as the basic road to alienation from God,
i.e., sin. It follows, then, that with a person's appetites developing before
the formation of the intellect, sin is inevitable. Even after the intellect has
emerged it requires many years of development before it fully matures. If the
appetites are allowed to gain control, the development of the intellect may be
stunted and it may never reach full maturity. In such a case sin becomes
impervious to conquest as well as inevitable.130 This view of sin's
inevitability in man is shared by both later Christianity and Judaism.131
The view, moreover, that man's moral position is strongly affected by the
development of his impulses during his early years is reflected in the biblical
tradition132
Man's appetites and
impulses, according to al-Ghazzali, also develop progressively and sequentially.
First, man develops an animal disposition. Then he moves on to a predatory, a
satanic, and finally, an egotistic disposition. Each of these stages,
separately and in combination, leads man to different traits, and therefore, the
tendency to different sins. At the first stage a man might sin by robbery. At
the last stage his sin might consist of tyranny over his fellows. Just as a
man's intellectual growth may be retarded by the force of his passions, so might
his intellect limit the development of sinful tendencies. A1-Ghazzali asserts,
therefore, that each person will have a proclivity to a different set of sins.
This subjective factor is, for al-Ghazzali, as teacher and spiritual
physician, of great significance.133
Al-Ghazzali
maintains that man is created with a sound heart (galb
salim). Furthermore, only a person who, at the end of his life, presents
himself to God with a sound heart, will be granted salvation in the hereafter.134This
position seems to indicate that man starts life with salvation assured and
must only insure that he does nothing to forfeit it. Yet al-Ghazzali also
asserts that sin is not an act that counters man's natural disposition. Indeed,
sin is inevitable. Moreover, in the parable of the conquering king, the parable
by which al-Ghazzali explicates the various states of the hereafter, he has a
specific classification for the likes of the feeble-minded and the children;
those who are, for various reasons not under their control, beyond obedience
or disobedience. Al-Ghazzali does not assign them to Paradise. They are not
rewarded with salvation, neither are they condemned to hellfre.135
The sound heart which brings salvation is, for al-Ghazzali, only such a heart as
has become pure through refinement.136 Al-Ghazzali's position that
every man is born with a sound heart would seem to indicate his conviction
that every man has, in his very nature and constitution, the potential for
attaining salvation. Notwithstanding the inevitability of sin, no man is
inherently evil. This understanding is consistent with al-Ghazzali's statement
at the beginning of the Kitab at-Tawba that
total evil is not the nature of man but of Satan. The nature of man, he asserts
there, is to sin but afterward to return to good through sincere repentance.137
Each man has the potential to return the heart God have him in trust, refined by
his deeds, and thereby worthy of salvation.
In light of the above it is pertinent to note that al-Ghazzali did not
accept the concept of infallibility ('Lsma).138
In the biographies of the Prophet (sira) and in Koranic exegesis (tafsir)
there exists a tendency, much akin to rabbinic Midrash, to create a more
perfect personality for the faith's model. This led to a widespread acceptance
among Sunni dogmatists of the concept of prophetic immunity from sin and
error. Among the shi'a, of course,
infallibility was attributed to the imam to a greater degree than to the
prophets.139 In al-Ghazzali's view no man is free of sin, it is a
part of man's fundamental make-up. Al-Ghazzali, in many of his writings, makes
clear his attitude of opposition to this basic aspect of Shi'ism.140
Furthermore, as regards the Sunni tradition, in discussing the requisite
qualities and attributes of the community's leadership he explicitly denies
infallibility as a requisite.141 In fact, al-Ghazzali advocated, for
pedagogical purposes, the public discussion of the prophets' sins and their
consequent punishment.142 All men are fallible but they are also
given the potential to overcome the weakness of their nature and achieve
salvation.
The
ground of sin is the pursuit and love of the mundane world. Such pursuit diverts
man from the search for the hereafter and leads to the loss of salvation. The
nature of sin is disobedience and its effect is the alienation of man from God.
The specifics of any particular act of sinning are important in the process of
correction but are irrelevant in defining the act-as sinful. It is the
disobedience to God, in whatever form it is manifested, that removes one from
proximity to God.143
It
has already been noted that man's nature, combining appetites and intellect,
make his sinning inevitable but also provides the wherewithal for overcoming the
consequences of sin and achieving salvation. This comes through the intellect's
gaining control over the appetites. The intellect masters the appetites by
gaining knowledge and leading to gnosis. When it fails, totally or partially, it
leaves the man with active appetites and ignorance (jahl),
and such a state leads inexorably to sin. Knowledge, then, is the key to
avoidance of sin.144
Belief,
according to al-Ghazzali, is of two types. Firstly, there is the belief in God,
His attributes and deeds. This belief belongs to the category al-Ghazzali refers
to as the science of revelation ('ilm
al-mukashafa). To be lacking in such faith is to be left with sheer unbelief
and, therefore, perdition. It is the root of all belief and knowledge without
which there can be no other. Secondly, there is the belief, termed faith (iman), in the practical duties and states of man's heart.
This al-Ghazzali refers to
under the heading of the science of behavior ('ilm
al-muamala). This belief is equated, in al-Ghazzali's writings, with
knowledge. If one's belief in the practical sciences is defective, therefore, he
is ignorant. Ignorance, again, is the condition that brings man to sin. It
follows, then, that a person may indeed sin while still being a believer. A
defect in the latter belief does not necessitate a defect in the former.145
Al-Ghazzali
understood, however, as did others in the Christian and Jewish traditions, that
sin is an inner process of disease and decay.146 Continuing
sinfulness, which of itself is a defect only in the context of the practical
sciences, must, little by little, erode the belief in the science of revelation.
Eventually, if sin is left unchecked, the erosion of basic belief will lead to
spiritual death, the loss of the heart.147 If one loses the heart, of
course, salvation is precluded. In this context al-Ghazzali is fond of using the
parable of the mirror. Man's heart is like a mirror which was originally brought
to a high polish (i.e., man is born with a sound heart). If he sins he allows
vapour and filth to encrust itself upon the surface of the mirror. If this
process is not controlled and reversed the metal becomes so dull as to preclude
the possibility of reburnishing. Once the mirror begins to dull it must
immediately be cleansed and polished. Thus, a man, after sinning, must proceed
forthwith to attain the knowledge that counteracts the dulling effect of
ignorance and defective faith; if not, the course of the decay will proceed
apace.148 This process of correction is, of course, repentance. It
emerges from the confrontation between knowledge and ignorance. This
confrontation, rooted as it is in human nature, is constant and enduring. Thus
repentance is a life-long obligation flowing from the imperfection of man.149
In
pre-Islamic
The
centrality of the pious life in obedience to the divine commandments was
challenged by the proponents of sufism. The mystics believed that perfection and
salvation could be achieved only by the search for knowledge and experience of
God. Worship, on its various levels, was to be defined by its utility in the
quest for the unitive state. Many of those traveling on the mystic Way developed
an indifference to the observance of the commandments. They viewed the
commandments, all normative piety, as a lower form of spirituality designed for
the uninitiated masses. Al-Ghazzali sought to inculcate the mystics with an
appreciation of the basic importance of obedience to God through the
commandments as an ongoing requisite of salvation.152
Maimonides, representative
of many medieval thinkers, in this regard viewed the religious commandments as a
means by which man, through control of his bestial impulses and the discipline
of virtue, could perfect himself, morally and intellectually. Having thus
perfected himself, man would be prepared for the ultimate knowledge of God. This
knowledge, for Maimonides, was philosophical.153 After attaining to
this perfection the commandments are no longer functional.154
Al-Ghazzali's position is, to a great extent, parallel. The purpose of the
commandments is to help man master his appetites, educate himself in virtuous
living, and deepen his religious experience. Al-Ghazzali does not, however, view
the intellectual knowledge of God to be the highest objective. Man's goal is
knowledge, intuitive and experiential. In this world such experience is only
attainable through deeds of obedience. Observance of the commandments, then,
lead to knowledge ('ilm). This knowledge further refines his deeds which allow
him to experience gnosis. Man's nature, furthermore, is such that there are
always forces working to dull the surface of his heart. The result, for the
pilgrim (salik), is a continuous
need for further commitment to the pursuit of obedience through the observance
of the commandments. Moreover, the higher a man is able to reach in his
knowledge, the more he is able to infuse his observance with depth of intent. In
the `way of the hereafter' the proper observance of the commandments require the
combination of knowledge and action ('ilm
In
sum, then, salvation is to be found in the experience of God the Beloved. It is
a constant state attainable only in the hereafter. It must, however, be
cultivated in this life which is a proving ground of man's worthiness. Man's
nature is such as makes sin and ignorance, the seeds of the disease of the
heart, inevitable, but it is also such as allows him, through observance of the
religious commandments, in an increasingly refined and deepened manner, to
expand his knowledge of God. The continuing combination of knowledge and
obedience, counteracting ignorance and heedlessness (ghafla), permits his
attaining a measure of gnosis, the foretaste of salvation. This foretaste is
itself a credit redeemable in the hereafter.
V
During
the early formative years of classical Islam there emerged a number of debates
whose development and resolution were decisive in forming the body of doctrine
that became accepted as orthodox.156 Among these was the debate over
the individual and communal consequences of sin. The Koran indicates that sin
leads man to hellfire.157 The questions that arose, in this context,
concerned which sins or types of sin are those that result in damnation and,
following such a determination, what status does one sinning in such a way
have within the community of believers.
The Koran differentiates, as
to punishment or forgiveness, between two groupings of sin: grave (kabira)
and minor (saghira). This can be seen in the verse: IF YOU AVOID THE HEINOUS
SINS THAT ARE FORBIDDEN YOU, WE WILL ACQUIT YOU OF YOUR EVIL DEEDS AND ADMIT YOU
BY THE GATE OF HONOUR.158 Thus it follows that minor sin does not, of
itself, carry the punishment of hellfire. The people of Hell are those who
commit grave sins. The ensuing debate concerned itself, then, with the immediate
and ultimate disposition of such as commit sins considered grave.
The
khariji sectarians believed, to
use Watt's terminology, in the `charismatic community'.159 Salvation
was tied into membership in the community of believers which alone was the
source of the people of
The
mu'tazila, like most other Islamic
groups, did not concur in this attitude toward a salvational community. They
held that one who commits a grave sin is neither a believer nor an unbeliever.
Rather, he occupies an intermediate position (manila
bayna 'I-manzilatayn). Their outlook, as with most other early Islamic
theologies, was more individualistic. They did concur with the kharijis,
however, that the consequence of grave sin is eternal punishment.161
A
third group, important for the emergence of the orthodox view, was the nurji'a.
They believed that the status of the grave sinner, both as to his being a
believer and his ultimate fate, were matters that could not be judged by men.
They were questions best left for God at Judgement. Man should, to be considered
a believer in this temporal setting, make the profession of faith. This latter
consideration evokes the question of the relative importance, as regards man's
ultimate disposition, of faith versus works.162
The
orthodox position, as articulated by al-Ash'ari and his school, posits that all
unbelievers will be assigned to eternal damnation. Those attaining the status of
believer, however, have done so as a result of their profession of faith and not
as a result of their works. If a man has faith, if he accepts the Islamic creed,
he will gain entrance to Paradise. The ashari
school did not ignore the effects of sin. Indeed, many may be purged in the
fires of Hell for a time. Ultimately, however, all who profess the faith will be
saved.163
Al-Ghazzali's
position is, of course, very close to that of the ashari
school. He does, however, refine this position in light of his understanding
of both belief and sin. Polytheism (shirk),
which is unbelief in the sphere of the revealed sciences, precludes pardon
and condemns the unbeliever to perdition, eternally. If, on the other hand, a
person is a believer he is assured of salvation.164 If the man dies a
sinner, a defect in the practical sciences, he is punished with hellfire for a
time. Only the sound heart is accepted by God. If the surface of the heart is
dirtied, it must be cleansed by fire. After death the only fire is that of Hell.
In such a case the function of hellfire is purgative. After the heart is
restored to its purity, entrance to some level of Paradise is effected.165
In this there is no real difference from the ash'ari position. However, al-Ghazzali's understanding of sin, as
previously expounded, is much more sophisticated. It is difficult for a man to
continue in sin without an erosion of his belief in the revealed sciences. There
is an intimate relationship, that of root and branch, between the areas known as
faith and works. It is difficult for al-Ghazzali to envision a man persisting
unrepentant in sin and remaining uncorrupted in faith. These two are not easily
divisible.
Furthermore,
while profession of faith is sufficient to preclude exclusion from the community
and temporal punishment as an unbeliever, al-Ghazzali is emphatic that
ultimately it is of no avail if it is only verbal. Al-Ghazzali believes that it
is beyond human competence to judge the veracity of another's profession of
faith. Also, he does not believe that a man's faith can, in this life, be
confirmed or denied by his sins. All of these judgments are beyond human ken.166
God, however, will indeed make these judgments.
Al-Ghazzali
does not consider the community as the basic reference for or source of
salvation. In line with the Koran, al-Ghazzali is committed to an
individualistic approach.167 Each man stands for judgement as an
individual. Also, each person's struggle for salvation must be based on his own
strengths and weaknesses as an individual.168 Al-Ghazzali, as Islam
in general, does not present an institutionalized atonement procedure as might
be found in Judaism and Christianity.169 Public confession is
neither required nor encouraged except in the case of social offense.170 Indeed,
since sin is derived from the pursuit of the appetites, the specific development
of which varies from individual to individual, the quest for integrity of faith
and works must differ from one person to another. The convenantal relationship
in Islam is between the individual Muslim and God .171
In rejecting the community
as the source of salvation al-Ghazzali does not lose sight of the societal
environment in which man lives out his temporal life. Ignorance, for example,
can only be removed by the spread of knowledge. As God entrusted the people's
education to the prophets so it falls to the lot of.the learned doctors, the
prophets' heirs, to continue this work.172 Yet, in terms of
ultimate responsibility each learned doctor will be judged as an individual, as
will his charges. His communal work is a personal obligation imposed by his
level of knowledge or appointed position173 That all men have social
responsibilities for which they are answerable to God is attested to by the fact
that injustices against one's fellows are also transgressions against God and
are breaches of the belief in the practical sciences.174 The
community is not the source of salvation but rather it is, by divine will and
command, an area of responsibility in which man can pursue either obedience or
disobedience.
There is another interesting
element in al-Ghazzali's treatment of sin. Sins, according to
al-Ghazzali, may be measured in two ways: objectively or subjectively.
Objective assessment may be made by recourse to the Law. Yet, this alone would
be an insufficient measure. Al-Ghazzali insists that the measurement of a sin
must take into account the spiritual level (i.e. knowledge and perception) of
the sinner. The transgression of an ignoramus is not the same violation as the
identical infraction perpetrated by a learned doctor.175
Incidentally, the social or communal stature of the sinner, as well as the
attendant publicity of the sin, are also important variables. The learned
doctor, for example, is a model whose public actions will be emulated. A sin he
commits publicly could lead others to sin. He would then be doubly culpable.176
In
discussing the division of sins into those grave and those minor, al-Ghazzali
has recourse to a number of different standards based on the legal tradition. He
is able, finally, to indicate that some sins are definitely known as being
grave, others as minor, while some are in doubt.177 Yet, in
continuing his analysis he introduces a subjective element asserting that a
minor sin may become grave notwithstanding its status according to the objective
sources of tradition through a person's persistence or faulty attitude.178
A
determination of sin is based on a code of morality whose violation is an
offense against God. The mu'tazila conceived
of an autonomous morality which followed from rational premises. Al-Ghazzali
rejects this conception out of hand. It is evident from the aforementioned that,
for al-Ghazzali, the ethical is secondary to the religious. Revelation is the
sole source of morality.179 The basis of that morality is God's command.
Sin is no more and no less than rebellion against God.180 This does
not mean that Reason has no function in al-Ghazzali's system. To the contrary,
even the sciences of the hereafter are categorized by him as rational sciences.181
Nonetheless, al-Ghazzali is insistent that morality is revelatory.
If
there is a little of the paradoxical in al-Ghazzali's attitude as regards
Reason, such is not unique. There are a number of areas in al-Ghazzali's
treatment of repentance that seem paradoxical. It may well be impossible to
explain these beyond indicating that al-Ghazzali did not consider the Revival
as directed to those to whom the whole truth might be exposed. Some things
are mysteries, knowledge of which is reserved for the initiated. Yet, in
introducing this work, it would seem useful to at least treat an example or two
of the mysterious in the Kitab at-Tawba.
VI
One
of the most fundamental and contested issues in the formative years after the
establishment of Islam was defining the implications of the prophet's assertion
of God's omnipotence. An early and basic question that emerged from this issue
pertained to a determination of man's basic nature. Does man act as a free agent
or are his actions predetermined by God.
The khariji movement, influenced to no small degree by their political
philosophy and goals, were among the earliest advocates of the free will
position.182 They were followed in this by the mu'tazila.183 On the other extreme were many in the
traditionalist camp who, feeling that the assertion of human freedom impinged
upon the absoluteness of God's omnipotence, upheld a position of pure and total
determinism.184
Al-Ash'ari, reflecting the
orthodox position, affirmed the determinists' position while adding that man was
nonetheless responsible for his actions. He explained that God creates all of
the component elements that lead to an action and then man chooses the act into
which he is compelled. While the act is totally of God's creation, man
acquires it (kasb, iktisdb). This
formulation is quite obscure, proverbially so.185 Yet it is clearly
an attempt to reaffirm God's absolute freedom while preventing fatalistic
indifference to proper moral behaviour. Man's subjective feeling of choice is given
formal status while, at the same time, there. is a recognition of God's acting
out His will through men. This conception is foreign to Jewish thought as it
is, in general, to Christianity. There does, however, exist a similar idea in
the New Testament.186
This
conception is echoed by al-Ghazzali. Man, he says, is compelled into that choice
that is his. He goes to great length to show how God creates the various
sequential elements that lead man into acting in a predetermined manner.187
Yet, al-Ghazzali also promotes ideas that do not seem to harmonize with this
position. The very idea of repentance implies man's ability to choose and act
upon that choice. In fact, al-Ghazzali asserts that the ability to turn from
evil and correct one's mistakes is a fundamental characteristic of human nature.
Al-Ghazzali, moreover, states that God does not require of man more than
that of which he is capable. If so, God's commanding man presupposes his ability
and volition. Finally, al-Ghazzali often emphasizes the ability of all men, at
least potentially, to raise themselves to the ranks of the saints, prophets, and
angels.188
The
basic paradox inherent in the various writings of al-Ghazzali on this subject is
explicitly rendered in his presentation of the parable of the blind man and the
elephant. In this parable of Buddhist origin, al-Ghazzali tells of a group of
blind men who examine, by touch, different parts of an elephant in order to
ascertain its nature. Each man, having felt a different part of the animal,
describes the nature of the animal differently. All of the men spoke
truthfully, yet none of them was able to encompass, in his description, the
totality of the animal. Thus, says al-Ghazzali, those who take the positions of
determinism, acquisition (kasb), and
free well, have each stated a part of the truth but, if taken singly as
embracing the totality of the truth, each position is only a distortion of
reality.189
Al-Ghazzali,
the teacher and spiritual physician, had, it seems, a basic functional
commitment to the position that man has the ability to make choices and act
freely. He also understood that creation's order, as well as man's own previous
actions, limit his freedom. The elements requisite for any choice must also
exist. Moreover, al-Ghazzali no doubt felt the need, as did those before him
(e.g., al-Ash'ari), to protect the theological integrity of God's omnipotence.
Man is required to understand that nothing can be accomplished, even for the
gnostic ('arif ), without divine grace.190 Yet as dependent as
man is on God, he is not simply a vessel or automaton. He does, in a real sense,
have the ability to exercise choice (ikhtiyar).191
Man,
especially such as for whom al-Ghazzali wrote the Revival,
should be, left with the mystery and paradox unresolved. It was, for
al-Ghazzali, a mystery in pursuit of which the unenlightened would stumble and
which the illumined are forbidden to reveal.192
The
debate about man's free volition was intimately tied to two other issues: Order
and Justice. Do defined causes beget constant and predictable results. Most of
the early Muslim theologians, in the context of their attitudes on the question
of God's omnipotence, were atomistic in their view of the world. There does not
exist a necessary cause-effect relationship. Rather, each moment is a fresh
creation and expression of divine will. If man stands witness to the fact that a
particular cause has always resulted in the same effect, he cannot, with
certainty, project this as having a bearing on the next instance of that cause.193
Al-Ghazzali rejects this
position. Happiness or misery in the hereafter are directly attributable to
man's actions, good or bad. In fact, this causal relationship can be reduced to
the lowest measurable degree. The scales of judgment are tipped to salvation or
perdition even by the weight of an atom. His parable of the conquering king,
which was cited previously, is eloquent testimony to this belief in causality.
Each man's station in the hereafter, as in the newly conquered territory, is
defined directly by the measure of his service or disservice. Again, in a different
context, al-Ghazzali indicates that a person's fate is decided, in the minutest
detail, by the quantity, duration, and intensity of his faith and works.194
This is not an insignificant statement of fact. The acceptance of the reality of
this causal order was, in his view, the very foundation of the belief in the
divine origin of the commandments and the revelation (shar).195
This
causal order does not relate to the hereafter alone. Remaining in the moral
sphere, al-Ghazzali viewed all calamity in this life as being a consequence of
sin.196 Al-Ghazzali also viewed the struggle for moral correction to
be a natural outcome of the maturation of the intellect. If the intellect is
allowed to develop, it will naturally confront the appetites and induce man to
repentance.197 According to Obermann, moreover, al-Ghazzali feels
that acceptance of repentance is necessary in the sense that the very act of
repentance results, causally, in the effects of acceptance (i.e. purification of
the heart).198
The
mysterious element is raised by al-Ghazzali in treating the ideas of God's mercy
and wrath. At times a man will be granted salvation or condemned to hellfire
when all the apparent causes point to a different result. The condemnation of
an apparently righteous man or the saving of an evil one would argue for the
lack of order and causality. Al-Ghazzali, however, emphatically asserts that
there is always a cause even, as in such a case, if it be hidden and secret.
These hidden causes (asbab hafiya),
however, that result in mercy or wrath are not comprehensible through the
rational sciences.199 While there exists a causal order, it is God's
order (sunna) and as such it is comprehensible only through revelation.
The other issue was that of Justice. There is order in
creation, can this order be termed equitable. The Mu'tazila held, as one of their two most basic propositions, that it
was part of the very nature of God that He be just and, according to some of
their theorists, act in man's best interests. Thus they could speak of justice
being an obligation of God.200 Al-Ash'ari was convinced, no doubt, of
God's being equitable. This concern is probably one of the motives for his
struggling with man's responsibility in the face of the doctrine of determinism.
Yet, he could not reconcile the idea of obligation with God's omnipotence, a
concept that assures absolute freedom of will.
Al-Ghazzali follows and elaborates al-Ash'ari's position.
Is God just? His response is a resounding affirmative. God does not reward evil
or punish obedience. Man's actions are requited with absolute equity.201
There exists almost infinite variety, among men, in the quantity and quality
of their obedience or disobedience. God, then, prepares innumerable levels
both in
Al-Ghazzali's
low valuation of formal theology might, through these examples, be more readily
understood. He felt that theology might be useful to treat the doubts of the
spiritually sick, but it could not be a tool of the healthy seeker of God.207
God, ultimately, cannot be known, as the philosophers would have it, through the exercise of
reason and intellect. God, as His order, is beyond human comprehension. The
knowledge that al-Ghazzali would have the believer seek is the intuitive knowledge that
comes solely through the experience of and proximity to the living and
omnipotent God. Only in this manner, through illumination, can the mysteries
be uncovered. The totality of the single truth in which al-Ghazzali believed
could not even be taught, objectively, by
VII
Repentance
was a concept accepted and valued in both Judaism and Christianity. It was an
integral part of Muhammad's message. In al-Ghazzali, however, repentance is
given added dimensions and significance. Repentance is not only the means of
overcoming the consequences and influence of a sick past, it is the
first step towards a healthy future. Given man's nature, and the ordeal of
this mundane existence, it is also a continuing part of man's quest for
salvation.
Many
of al-Ghazzali's insights and teachings can be seen in the earlier traditions of
Judaism and Christianity. To a large degree, also, al-Ghazzali drew directly
from earlier Muslim sources, traditional and mystic.209 The unique
contribution that was al-Ghazzali's remains his mastery in two areas. Firstly,
he possessed in his own person, the vast and variegated knowledge that was
classical Islam. He was Koranic devotee, theologian, jurist, student of mystical
theory, and defender of orthodoxy locked in debate with sectarianism and
philosophy. He possessed this knowledge and integrated it into his own spiritual
life and quest. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, he was a master pedagogue.
He was devoted to his fellow believers and was, because of his belief in the
idea of renewal dedicated to sharing his quest.
It
is in this light that we proceed to al-Ghazzali's Book
of Repentance.
TRANSLATION OF BOOK XXXI OF THE
IIJYA' 'ULUM AD-DIN
[2]210
THE BOOK OF REPENTANCE
Which is the first book in
the Quarter of Salvation of the Book of the
Revival of the Religious Sciences
IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE
Praise
to God, with whose praise every book is prefaced; with whose invocation every
discourse commences; by whose praise the people of felicity shall abide with
ease in the abode of recompense; and by whose name the wretched are consoled,
even if the bar is set down before them, and they are separated from the
blissful by a portaled wall; inside thereof Divine Mercy obtains, while outside
Divine Chastisement proceeds.
We
turn unto Him in penitence, convinced that He is master of all masters and
originator of all causes. We look to Him in anticipation, knowing Him to be the
King, compassionate, forgiving and disposed to accept penitence. We blend dread
with hope, not doubting that while being forgiving of transgression and
receptive to repentance He is also stern in inflicting punishment.
We
pray for His prophet Muhammad, God bless him, and for his family and companions,
211 a prayer that will
rescue us from the terror of the place whence one will look down on the day of
resurrection212 and will
secure for us nearness to and safe refuge with God.
But
to proceed; Repentance from sin, by recourse to the Veiler of vices, Knower of
secrets, is the starting point for the followers of the spiritual path, the
capital of the successful, the first step of the aspirants, key to the
straightening of the bent, the prelude of the selection and election for those
who are brought close to God; and for our father Adam, God bless him,213
and all the other prophets. How appropriate it is for children to emulate their
fathers and ancestors. It is small wonder if a son of Adam sins and does wrong,
a disposition which one who transgresses may recognize as a hereditary trait.214
For who resembles his father and does no evil? But if the father is
restored after failing215 and is revitalized after aging, let the
emulation of him be at both poles, of the negative and the positive. Adam has
been smitten with remorse, filled with repentance over his past deeds. Anyone
who follows him as a model of sinning [only], and not in penitence, has
stumbled.
Devotion
to pure goodness is a trait of the angels close to God. Devotion to
uncorrected evil is the nature of devils. But, return to good after stumbling in
evil is inevitable in human beings. The devotee of absolute good is an angel
intimate of the King [who is] Judge. The devotee of evil only is a devil. But he
who rectifies evil by returning to good, is, in truth, human. So, in man's
nature there is a duality of disposition, two traits joining in him.
Every human being verifies
his relationship with the Angel, Adam or the Devil. The penitent, by keeping to
the definition of Man, truly proves that he is related to Adam, whilst he who
persists in iniquity is proving that he is related to the Devil. Confirmation of
relationship to the Angels, [3] however, by dedication exclusively to the good,
is beyond the realm of possibility. For evil is firmly kneaded with good in the
nature of man, and it cannot be refined except by one of the two fires: of penitence,
or of Hell. Burning in fire is necessary to purify the human essence of the
Satanic pollution.216 It is up to you now to choose the easier fire,217
and to be prompt in embarking on the lesser discomfort before the choice is
withdrawn to give way to the inevitability218 of either Paradise or
Hell.
Since219
repentance holds such a place within the faith, it must be put first in the
Quarter of Salvation with explanation of its true nature, requisites,
motivation, manifestation and benefit, the difficulties barring it 220 and
the remedies facilitating it. This will become clear by discussing four
pillars.
The First Pillar: On
the Nature of Repentance.
Explication of its
definition and true character; that it is obligatory, at once, for all men,
under all conditions and, if properly carried through, accepted.
The Second Pillar: On
the Context of Repentance (i.e. transgression).
Explication of sin's
division into venial and mortal sins, some toward one's fellow-man others toward
God; how higher and lower states [in the hereafter] are distributed according to
good and evil works [in this life]; the circumstances amplifying the venial
sins.
The Third Pillar: On
the Requisites and Perseverance of Repentance. How past iniquities may be
corrected, and
transgression atoned; the categories of men221
according to their perseverance in repentance.
The Fourth Pillar: On the Stimulus spurring Repentance and the way of Treatment for the
Dissolution of the Knot of Persistence.
The
goal of the exposition concerning these four pillars will be attained by God's
will.
THE FIRST PILLAR: ON THE
NATURE OF REPENTANCE
Explication of Repentance
and its Definition
Repentance
is a concept consisting of three successive and joined elements: knowledge,
state [of remorse] and action. Knowledge is first, awareness second and action
third.222 The first necessitates the second, and the second
necessitates the third, in accord with the continuity of the divine regimen in
matters temporal and spiritual.
As
for knowledge, it is the realization of the magnitude of the sin's harm and its
being a barrier between man and the divine. If he realizes this with utter and
decisive certainty, overwhelming his heart, this realization will stir a
heartache on account of the Beloved eluding him. For the heart, whenever it
perceives the withdrawal of the Beloved, is pained. If the withdrawal be through
man's own action, he is regretful of that alienating behaviour. Such grief of
the heart over behaviour alienating the Beloved is called Regret.
When
this anguish becomes overpowering, another inner state is induced, termed
volition and aspiration towards [new] behaviour connected with the present,
the past, and the future. Its connection with the present consists of the
repudiation of the sin with which he was entwined. For the future, it involves
the determination to abandon forever the sin which causes alienation from the
Beloved. With regard to the past, it entails correction of what was omitted by
[doing] good and performing [the omitted act], if it is susceptible to [such]
restoration.
Thus, knowledge is
prerequisite and is the starting point of these blessings. By this knowledge I
mean faith, and certitude. To have faith is to accept as true that Sins are a
deadly poison. Certitude consists of the assurance of the acceptance of this
truth, the removal of all doubt about it and finally its mastery over the heart,
so that whenever the illumination of this Faith shines upon the heart it
produces the fire of Regret. It, in turn, will bring forth anguish as the heart
perceives, through this illumination of the light of the faith, that it has
become veiled from its Beloved. As one who was in darkness and on the verge of
ruin, and, with the dispersal of clouds and the rending of a veil, the
illumination of the sun shone and radiated upon him,223 and he saw
his Beloved. Then the flames of love burn in his heart and these flames flare up
in his will to rise to correct his ways.
Knowledge,
Regret, and the intent connected with abandonment [of sin] in the present and
future, and correction of the [sin perpetrated in the] past are three successive
concepts within this process. The term Penitence (tawba)
refers to this totality. Frequently, the term Penitence is used for the
concept of Regret alone, as if making knowledge a precondition, and
abandonment a result and later consequence. It is in this sense that the Prophet
said: Regret is Repentance,a for Regret is void of knowledge
which [4] necessitates and evokes it, and of determination which follows it.
Regret is surrounded at both ends, by its result and its cause.
In
this sense it is said, about Repentance as such that it is the melting of the
entrails as a result of previous offense for this exposes to sheer agony. It is
therefore said: /It is a fire raging in the heart, a fissure within that does
not heal/. With respect to the meaning of Abandonment as an element of
Repentance, it is related: It is the casting off of alienation and the start of
fidelity.
Sahl
ibn 'Abd Allah al-Tustari224 has said: Repentance is the change from
reprehensible acts to commendable acts. This can be accomplished only in
solitude and silence, eating from that which is allowed [i.e., earning an
honest livelihood]. He seems to have pointed to the third element of Repentance.
The sayings about Repentance
are innumerable. Yet, if you have understood these three aspects in their
junction and sequence you will know that all that has been said regarding it
falls short of encompassing all its aspects. The search for the knowledge of the
true essence is more important than the pursuit of mere verbalizations.
Explication of the Obligatoriness and Excellence of Repentance
Know, that
the obligatoriness (wujub) of
repentance is evident in the Koran and the Tradition,b and it is
manifest in the light of discernment to him whose discernment has developed and
whose heart God has laid open to the light of faith, so that he is capable225
of advancing. in this light amidst the murk of ignorance, without need of
someone directing226 his every step.
A
pilgrim (sdlik), may be blind, and must have someone to direct his steps; or his
vision may be good, and he will be guided227 to the beginning of
the way (tariq) whence he will guide
himself. In the way of religion, men are similarly divided. There is the limited
type not able to transcend blind imitation (taqlid)
of past authority, and requiring, at each step, a text from God's Book or
the tradition of His prophet, and in the absence of such a passage he may become
perplexed, and, though he live long and be most diligent, such a man's progress
may be limited, and his steps failing.
But
then there is the fortunate man whose heart God has opened to an acceptance of
Islam, and who is illumined by God. He will respond to the slightest indication
to follow a difficult path and overcome tiresome obstacles. The light of the
Koran and the Faith will glow in his heart, and, due to the intensity of his
inner illumination, the slightest explanation will suffice him. IT IS AS IF HIS
OIL WELLNIGH WOULD SHINE EVEN IF NO FIRE TOUCHED IT; and if THE FIRE TOUCHED IT
THEN IT WOULD BE LIGHT UPON LIGHT. GOD GUIDES TO HIS LIGHT WHOM HE WILL.228
Such a man has no need for a traditional text at every turn.
A
person like that, if he desires to understand the obligation of repentance,
examines, through the light of [his] discernment, what is the nature of
repentance, then he scrutinizes what is the meaning of Obligation, then he
combines these, and there will be no doubt as to his perseverance therein: To
wit, he knows that the meaning of the obligatory is that which is obligatory for
attainment of eternal bliss and deliverance from everlasting damnation. For
unless 'happiness and misery are dependent229 on some action or its
Omission, describing the act as being obligatory would be without meaning. The
statement, 'it became obligatory by being given obligation [in some impersonal
way]', is mere verbiage. For, in the case of an act where we have no purpose,
near or distant, in doing it or leaving it undone and so no meaning in busying
ourselves with it, someone else made it obligatory for us or did not make it
obligatory.
If man understands the
concept of obligation [of repentance], that it is the means to eternal bliss;
that. there is no bliss in the Hereafter except in encounter of God; that
everyone barred therefrom is no doubt suffering, feeling separated from. the
object of his desire, and seared by the flame of separation and hellfire; that
what keeps him away from encountering God is following the lusts and fondness
for this ephemeral world and the pursuit of affection for something with which
lie inevitably must part; that nothing can bring near the encounter with God
except the severance of his heart's attachment to the vanity of this life,
complete responsiveness to God, in search of intimacy with Him by constantly
remembering Him and by love (mahabba) for
Him, in the knowledge of His Majesty and Beauty, to the extent of man's
capability; and that the transgressions which constitute turning from God and
following the delights of the devils, those enemies of God that keep one away
from His presence, are the cause of man's being shut off, kept out from [the
presence] of God; then there is no doubt that renunciation of the path leading
away [from God] is obligatory in order to achieve closeness to Him.
Renunciation,
however, is achieved by Knowledge, Regret, and Determination. As long as man
knows not that transgressions are the causes for the remoteness of the Beloved,
he will neither regret nor grieve over his traveling on the path of withdrawal.
As long as he has not grieved, he will not turn back, retreat being abandonment
and determination. No doubt, these three elements are necessary in reaching [5]
the Beloved, Such is then Faith that derives from the light of perception.
As
for the [ordinary] man who is not qualified for such a station, whose climax
transcends the bounds of most people, he has ample scope, through the following
of convention and example, to attain salvation from damnation. Let him heed
the word of God, His prophet and the righteous forebears (salaf
).
God said, as a universal
statement, BELIEVERS, TURN TO GOD [in repentance], HAPLY YOU MAY PROSPER;230
and He said: 0 BELIEVERS, TURN TO GOD IN SINCERE REPENTANCE.231 The
meaning of 'sincere' in the verse is 'sincere with God', free of blemish, the
word being derived232 from 'sincere counsel'. Further, God's word
points out the excellence of repentance. TRULY GOD LOVES PENITENTS AND THOSE
THAT CLEANSE THEMSELVES.233
The Prophet said: 'The
Penitent is beloved unto God, and he who repents of sin is as one who has never
sinned.'a He also said: 'God is happier with the repentance of His
faithful servant than the man [about whom the following story is related].
'Accompanied by his camel
which bore his food and drink, he came to an arid desert. He laid down his head
and napped. He awoke and his camel was gone. He searched for it until the heat
and thirst overcame him, et cetera. He said, I will return whence I started and
sleep until I die. He proceeded to place his head upon his arm so as to die.
Then, he was aroused, and lo, his camel stood before him, provisions intact.
God's joy at the repentance of the faithful servant is more intense than that of
the man on account of his camel.'a (Some versions have it that in his
great joy and desirous of thanking God, he exclaimed: 'I am your master and you
are my servant.')
It
has been transmitted on the authority of Hasan [al-Basri]: When God forgave
Adam, the angels congratulated him. Gabriel and Michael descended to him and
said: '0 Adam, may you delight in God's forgiveness!' Adam replied: '0
Gabriel, if a question remains after this pardon, what is my standing?' God,
then, revealed to him: '0 Adam, you have bequeathed your descendants toil and
hardship but also repentance. Whosoever of them shall call upon Me, I shall
respond to him as I did to you. Whosoever shall seek pardon, I shall not
withhold it from him, for I am nigh and responsive! 0 Adam, I shall gather up
the penitents from their graves happy and laughing, their supplication
answered.'
There
are innumerable traditions on the subject, and there exists within the community
a general consensus as to the obligatoriness [of penitence]. For its meaning is
the recognition that sins and iniquities are destructive and remove Man from
God. This sense is part and parcel of the obligatoriness of Faith. At times,
however, disregard of it may occur. Knowledge means the elimination of this
disregard. There is no doubt of the obligatory nature of repentance.
Among
the various aspects of repentance are the abandonment of iniquities in the
present; resolve to abstain in the future; correction of previous shortcomings.
Of the obligation of these there is no doubt. As for regret and sadness of past
offenses, surely this is obligatory. It is the very spirit of repentance which
includes full rectification. How could this not be obligatory? Nay, it is a sort
of pain one suffers following the realization of how much of lifetime has passed
away and was wasted in the wrath of God.
You
might say:
Heart
anguish is a necessary state about which one has no choice. How then can it be
classified as an obligation?
Know,
then, that such anguish is caused by the certainty of having missed the Beloved.
Man has a path by which to grasp its cause. In this sense, knowledge can be
classified as obligatory. It cannot, however, be understood as a self-induced
creation of man, for this would be absurd. Rather, Knowledge, Regret, Action,
Volition, Capacity and the carrier ate all creations and deeds of God . GOD
HAS CREATED YOU AND [ALL] THAT YOU DO.234 This is what men of insight235
consider true, and all else is wrong.
You
might also ask:
Has
man, then, no choice in action and abandonment?
This we must answer in the
affirmative. Yet this does not contradict our previous statement that everything
stems from God's creation. So, also, does choice. Man is compelled in that
choice which is his.
Indeed
when God created the right hand, [6] delicious food and the appetite for food in
the stomach, He also created the innate awareness that this food would alleviate
the craving. He also produced the opposing notions: does or does not this
food, while alleviating the craving, also contain harm and, perhaps, there is
some objection to it, making its consumption objectionable. Further He created
the knowledge that there is no obstacle. When these factors converge, there
emerges a resolve motivating consumption. The emergence of the resolve, then,
after vacillating between contradictory notions, and following on the intense236
appetite for the food, is called choice. It is inevitable that it should set in
upon the convergence of all these conditions. Then, as resolve emerges through
God's creation of these conditions, the right hand duly rises towards the food.
For after volition and ability are attained, the following of the act is
necessary so that the movement is produced. Thus the movement is by God's
creation, following the attainment of ability and the emergence of the resolve,
both also of divine creation. The emergence of volition follows real appetite
and the recognition that there are no objections, again by divine creation. But
some of these creations follow others in an order habitual in divine creation.
YOU SHALL NOT FIND FOR THE WAY OF GOD AUGHT OF CHANGE.237
God does not create the
movement of the hand in orderly writing so long as He has not created in the
hand the quality of capacity, life and emerging will. Nor does He create a firm
resolve as long as He has not brought forth desire and inclination in the soul.
This inclination is not fully induced until there is knowledge that it suits the
soul either immediately or ultimately. Knowledge, also, comes about only by
other elements going back to movement, will and knowledge. Knowledge and
natural disposition, then, always entail firm resolve. Movement always follows
power and resolve. Such is the order of each action. All of it derives from
divine origination.
Some of His creations,
however, are preconditions of others and, therefore, some will have to precede
others, e.g., will appears only after knowledge, which comes only with life,
which emerges only after the creation of the body. The creation of the body is,
therefore, requisite for the incidence of life but not in the sense that life is
generated from the body. Likewise, the creation of life is a condition for the
creation of knowledge, but not in the sense that knowledge is born of life. Yet,
there is no ready receptacle for knowledge except it be alive. The creation of
knowledge is then a requisite for the emerging resolve but not in the sense that
knowledge engenders resolve. But only a live and knowing body is receptive of
a state of volition.
Nothing is included in
Existence except that which is possible, and possibility is an ordained order
which does not tolerate change, for such would be an absurdity. As soon as the
precondition of a quality exists, the carrier endowed with it is created to
receive the quality. This quality, then, is attained through divine grace and
eternal power, once the disposition has set in. In as much as the disposition,
on account of the preconditions, has [pre-ordained] order, the flow, by God's
directives, of events has a set order, and Man, then, is the arena of these
divinely pre-ordained successive events. These events are regulated by divine
decree, which is as the twinkling of an eye,238 in a universal and
unchangeable order. Their manifestation239 is so predestined in
detail that man cannot transcend them. This is expressed in the divine saying,
WE HAVE CREATED ALL THINGS ACCORDING TO A FIXED DECREE,240 and
concerning the absolute and eternal decree in the verse, WE HAVE COMMANDED.
BUT ONE WORD, AS THE TWINKLING OF AN EYE.241
Men are subject to the flow
of fate and divine decree. Part of destiny is the creation of the movement in
the hand of the writer242 after the creation of a special quality in
the hand which quality is termed capacity. This follows the introduction of a
strong and definite inclination, called Intent, in man's soul. This succeeds
knowledge of the object of his inclination, which is called Awareness and
Perception.
When,
from the hidden reaches of the invisible world,243 these four
elements appear upon the person of a man, who is subject to the compulsion of
fate, the people of the visible world, barred as they are from the invisible and
sublime world, come and say: O man, you who have moved, aimed and written. But
proclaimed from behind the veil of the transcendental and the whirlwind of
majesty, it has been announced: When you have aimed it is not you that has aimed
but God. When you have killed, it is not you that has done it.244 But,
BATTLE THEM, GOD CHASTIES THEM AT YOUR
HANDS.245
The minds of those sitting
in the middle of the sensible world are there upon sorely confused. Some teach
utter predestination (jabr). Some maintain
pure indeterminism (ikhtird' sirf). Yet
others mediate and tend towards the theory of acquisition (kasb).
If the gates of heaven were opened to them and they looked into the
transcendental world, it would become apparent to them that each one is right in
a sense, and yet all share in failure, and not one of them had fathomed the
matter in all its aspects. Complete perception of it is attained by illumination
through an aperture reaching into the invisible world. God knows the hidden
world and the manifest. He reveals this hidden realm only to such a messenger
with whom He is well-pleased.246 The manifest may be perceived [7] by
one who has not come within the scope of [His] satisfaction. To him, who sets
into motion the chain of causes and results, and knows the manner of its
sequence and the nature of its connection to the primal cause; the secret of
destiny is disclosed, and he acquires certainty that there is no creator and
originator save for God.
If
you say: you have concluded that each of these respective advocates of
predestination, free will and acquisition is correct, to some degree, but also
falls short of truth, are you not positing a contradiction? How can such a
situation be understood? Is it possible to explain this through a parable?
A
group of blind men heard that a strange animal, called an elephant, had been
brought to the town but none of them had seen its shape nor had they heard its
name. They said: 'We must inspect and know it by touch of which we are capable.'
So, they sought it out, and when they found it they groped about it. One of them
grasped its leg,247 another its tusk and the third its ear. Then they
said: `Now we know it.' When248 they departed, the other blind men
questioned them but the three differed in their answers. The one who felt the
leg said: `The elephant is similar to a coarse cylinder outside although it
appears to be softer than that.' The one who had felt the tusk said: 'It is not
as he says. It is solid without any softness on it. It is smooth, not coarse. It
is not at all stiff but rather it resembles a column.' The third man, who had
handled the ear, said: `By my life, it is soft and somewhat coarse. One of them
is right but it is not like a column or a cylinder. It is rather, like broad,
thick hide.'
Now, each of these presented
a true aspect when he related what he had gained from experiencing the elephant.
None of them had strayed from the true description of the elephant. Yet,
together, they fell short of fathoming the true appearance of the elephant.
Ponder this parable and learn from it. It is the pattern of most human
controversies. If these words touch the revealed sciences and provoke ripples
therein, this was not our intention.
Let us, then, return to our
present concern, i.e., the explanation that repentance with all its three
divisions: Knowledge, Regret and Renunciation is obligatory. Regret comes
within the scope of obligatoriness as this occurs in all of God's actions that
are interposed between man's knowledge and his will and power. That which
answers this description is included in the term 'obligatoriness'.
Explication that
Promptness is [essential in fulfilling] the Obligation of Repentance
No
one doubts that promptness if [essential in fulfilling] this obligation, since
perception of sins' destructiveness is of the essence of faith (iman),
which is immediately obligatory. Its obligatoriness is profoundly grasped by
him whom this keeps from reprehensible action. Indeed this perception is not of
the revealed disciplines ('umm al-mukashafat)
which are independent of action. Rather, it is of the sciences of practical
religion ('ulian al-mu amala).249
Every [item of] knowledge that is intended to be a stimulus to action has
not been fully perceived as long as it has not become such a stimulus. The
knowledge of sins' harm was intended to be a stimulus to renouncing them. He,
then, who has not abandoned sin is failing in this part of faith. Such is the
intent of the Prophet's saying: `The adulterer does not fornicate at the time
of fornication, he being a believer."
His
intent in [this saying] was not the denial of the faith which pertains to the
revealed disciplines, such as knowledge of God['s existence], His unity, His
attributes, His scriptures and Apostles. Indeed, adultery and transgression do
not preclude that. Rather, he thereby meant denial of the belief that adultery
alienates [one] from God and leads to abomination. It is similar to a
situation where the physician says: 'This is poison, do not take it.' If the
patient then takes it, it can be said [that] he took it as a non-believer. [This
is meant] not in the sense that he lacks belief in the existence of the
physician or in his being a physician. Neither [does it indicate] the patient's
distrust of the physician. Rather, what is meant is that the patient distrusts
the physician's statement that the compound is a lethal toxin. Indeed, he who
knows [the nature of] the toxin will not take it at all.
The
sinner, of necessity, lacks in faith. Faith is not one variety but rather some
seventy whose highest point is the creed (shahada)
that there is only one God, and whose lowest point is the removal of harm
from the path. It is similar to the saying: Man is not one creature but rather
some seventy whose highest is the heart and spirit, and whose lowest is keeping
harm from the outer skin so that the mustache will be shaven, the nails cut and
the skin free [8] of scum so that he is set apart from the beasts soiled by
their detestable dung, with their long claws and hooves. This is a fitting
simile.
Faith
is similar to man. The loss of the affirmation of [God's] unity produces total
futility like the loss of the spirit. He who has nothing save the affirmation of
God's unity and of [Muhammad's] mission is like a man whose limbs are cut off,
whose eyes have burst, and who has lost all his organs, both internal and
external, except250 the spiritual element.
Just
as he, who is in this condition, is close to death, the weak and solitary
spirit, bereft of the limbs which support it and give it strength, abandoning
him, so, he who being deficient in works, has naught save the root of faith is
near to having the [whole] tree of his faith uprooted when, preceding the
approach and arrival of the Angel of Death, the tempest which dislocates faith
strikes the tree.
Any
faith that is not firmly rooted in certitude nor branched out in action will not
withstand the stormy terror of the Angel of Death, and may be in danger of an
evil end, unlike faith that is tempered continuously with pious deeds until
faith is firmly anchored.
The
statement of the defiant to the obedient [servant]: 'I am a believer just as you
are a believer,' is like the statement of the pumpkin tree to the stone pine: 'I
am a tree and you are a tree.' How apt was the pine's retort when it said: 'When
the autumn winds blow you will surely realize your foolishness in including [us
both under the same] nomenclature, for then your roots will be severed, your
leaves will fall away, and your conceit in sharing the name 'tree', as well as
your heedlessness of the conditions of a tree's stability, will be made
apparent.'
When the dust settles, you will see, If it's a horse you're
riding, or an ass.
This
matter will become apparent at the end. The arteries of people of perception
collapse in fear of the vicissitudes of death and its terrible foreshadowing
which only very few will withstand.
The sinner, when undaunted
by the consequence of his disobedience, eternal hellfire, is like the healthy
man who, addicted to injurious passions, is not, while in his healthy state,
afraid of death. Indeed death does not usually occur suddenly. He may be told:
'The healthy man fears sickness, then, if he takes ill he hears death. So, the
sinner fears a bad end, then, when, God forbid, his end is bad, he is consigned
to eternal hellfire'.
Sins
are to faith what toxic foods are to the body. They. keep accumulating inside
[the body] until the component elements change, imperceptibly, until the
composition deteriorates and suddenly the man falls ill, then, suddenly, dies.
So it is with the sinner. If a man afraid of ruination in this passing world
must, immediately and constantly, abandon toxic substances and harmful foods,
so too, and even more so must he who fears eternal perdition.
If a man who
consumed poison, then felt regret, would need vomit and discontinue the
consumption of poison by invalidating and removing it from the stomach in the
quickest manner, to save his body which is on the verge of death, the loss
merely of this ephemeral world, then, he who consumes what is toxic to religion,
that is commits sins, is even more obliged to desist from these sins by
correcting whatever is possible so long as there remains time for correction,
namely [the remainder of his] lifetime.
For,
what is feared from this toxin is the loss of everlasting life which contains
lasting bliss and the great kingdom;251 its loss entails the fire of
Hell and lasting chastisement which is such as multiples of life in this world
are less than one tenth of a tenth of its duration, it having no end at all.
Hurry,
hurry, then, to repent before the toxic sins do their work on the spirit of
faith, and the matter will transcend physicians and their knowledge.252
After which seeking shelter will avail naught nor will counsel and admonition,
and man may be said to be among the damned, as it says: SURELY
WE HAVE PUT ON THEIR NECKS FETTERS UP TO THE CHIN, SO THAT THEY ARE MADE STIFF
NECKED; AND WE HAVE PUT BEFORE THEM A BARRIER AND BEHIND THEM A BARRIER; AND WE
HAVE COVERED THEM, SO THEY
DO NOT SEE. IT IS ALIKE WHETHER OR NOT YOU FOREWARN THEM, THEY DO NOT BELIEVE.253
Do
not be deluded by the word `faith'. We say the verse pertains to the unbeliever.
Since it has been explained to you that faith is of some seventy varieties, and
that 'the adulterer does not fornicate being a believer',254 he then
who is barred from faith which is bough and branch, will be barred, in the end,
from that faith which is the root. Just as the man who, bereft of limbs, which
are the branches, will be led to final death of that spirit (ruh)
which is the root. But the root has no continuity without the branch, [9]
nor has the branch existence without the root. There is no difference between
the root and the branch except in one point: the existence and continuity of the
branch requires the existence of the root while the existence of the root does
not require the existence of the branch. The continuity of the root, then,
lies in the branch, and the branch draws its existence from the root.
Likewise the revealed
discipline and the disciplines of practical religion are as inseparable as the
root and branch. Neither can dispense with the other even though one of them has
a primary status and the other is secondary. If the disciplines of practical
religion have not become a stimulus to action, their non-existence is
preferable to their existence. If they have not carried out their intended
function, they turn into a support for the case against their student.
Therefore, the chastisement of the learned but immoral is greater than that of
the immoral ignoramus, as can be seen from the Traditions we cited in the Book
of Knowledge.255
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