THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE
ARTICLES OF FAITH
BEING
A
Translation with Notes
OF
The Kit?b
Qaw?‘id
al-Aq?’id
OF
Al-Ghazz?li’s
“Ihy?’
‘Ul?m
al-D?n”
By
NABIH AMIN FARIS
American University of
Beirut
Beirut, Lebanon
Book II
SH.
MUHAMMAD ASHRAF
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THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE
ARTICLES OF FAITH
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To
the
Memory of my father
AMIN FARIS
In Gratitude and Reverence
PREFACE
The Ihy?’‘Ul?m
al-D?n
of al-Ghazz?li
is divided into four quarters (sing. rub‘). The
first deals with the acts of worship (al-‘ib?’d?t),
the second with the usages of life (al-mu‘?mal?t),
the third with the destructive matters of life (al-muhlik?t),
and the fourth with the saving matters of life (al-munajjiy?t).
Each of these four quarters comprises ten
books (sing. kit?b).
The present work represents the second book in the first quarter. It deals with
the foundations of the articles
of faith and is, perhaps, the most important part of the first quarter.
The texts utilized in
the preparation of the present translation were the following:
The first is the text printed at Kafr al-Zagh?ri
in A.H. 1352 from
the older Cairo edition of A.H.
1289. It is referred
to in the notes as ‘C’. The second is
that contained in the text of al-Sayyid
al-Murtada al-Zab?di’s
commentary on the Ihy?’
, known
as the Ith?f
al-S?dah
al-Muttaqin
bi-Sharh Ihy?’ ‘Ul?m
al-D?n,
printed in ten volumes in Cairo A.H.
1311; it is
referred to
in the notes as SM
(text). The third is the text which is
reproduced in the
margin of the same Ith?f
al-S?dah;
it is referred to in the notes as
SM (margin). The fourth and, perhaps, the
most important is the text contained in a four volume manuscript at the Princeton
University Library (Philip K. Hitti,
Nabih Amin Faris, and
Butrus Abd-al-Malik, Descriptive Catalogue of
the Garrett
Collection of Arabic
Manuscripts
in the Princeton University Library, Princeton,
1938, No.1481). It probably
dates from the late fifteenth
century. This text, called ‘B’ in the notes,
corresponds to SM (text),
while ‘C’ corresponds
to SM (margin).
The first
book of the first
quarter, the well-known Kit?b
al-‘Ilm, was
published, under the title of The
Book of
Knowledge, by
Sh. Muhammad Ashraf of Lahore 1962. Once
again I am grateful to Sh.M.
Ashraf for his continued interest in seeing as
many of the
books of the Ihy?,
appear in English.
And once again I
wish to acknowledge my indebtedness
to the three Princeton
scholars: the late Edwin E.
Conklin, the late Harold H. Bender,
and Philip K. Hitti, and to
the American Philosophical Society for the
Promotion of Useful Knowledge in Philadelphia, without
whose imaginative help neither The
Book of
knowledge nor the present work would have
been done. May I also
express my thanks to my students:
Mr. Robert Hazo, Mr. John Dudley
Woodberry, and Major Angus M. Mundy who
read the manuscript and made several useful observations,
and to Dr. John H. Patton,
Professor of Religion,
Park College, Parksville, Mo., for his
careful examination of the
manuscript and his valuable suggestions.
Nabih Amin Faris
American
University of Beirut
October 31,
1962.
BOOK II
“In the Name of God the
Merciful, the Compassionate”.
The Foundations of
the Articles of Faith,
Containing Four Sections.
SECTION I
On the
Exposition of the Creed of the Orthodox Community
as
Embodied in
the Two
Words of the Shah?dah
which form One
of the
Pillars of Islam.
We say-and our trust
is in
God-praise be to God the
Creator, the Restorer, the Doer of whatever He
wills, He Whose throne is glorious
and Whose power, mighty, Who guides the elect to the
orthodox path and the right way, Who
grants them benefits once they
affirm His unity by guarding the articles of faith from the obscurities of
doubt and hesitation, Who leads them to imitate the way of His chosen Apostle and
to follow the example of his most honoured Companions by
directing their footsteps to the way of truth, Who
reveals Himself to them in His Essence and in His works by
His beautiful attributes which none perceive except he who inclines his ear in contemplation,
Who makes known to them that
He is one in His Essence without any associate, single (fard)
without any compeer, eternal (?amad)
without any opposite,
separate (munfarid) without
any like. He is one, ancient (qad?m)
with nothing preceding Him, eternal (azali)
without any beginning, abiding in
existence with none after Him, everlasting
(abadi) without
any end, subsisting without cessation, abiding without termination. He has not
ceased and He will not cease to be described by the epithets of majesty. At
the end of time He will not be
subject to dissolution and decay, but He is the first and
the last, the external and the internal, and He knows all.
1. Transcendence
(tanz?h).
We attest that He
is not a body possessing form, nor
a substance restricted and limited
: He
does not resemble other bodies either in
limitation or in accepting division. He is not a substance and substances
do not exist in
Him; He is not an accident and accidents do not
exist in Him. No, He
resembles no entity and no
entity resembles Him; nothing
is
like Him and He is not
like anything; measure does not bound Him and boundaries
do not contain Him; directions do not surround Him and neither the
earths nor the Heavens are on different
sides of Him. Truly, He is seated on
the throne after the manner in which
He said and in
the sense in which He willed-in a state
of
equilibrium removed from contact, fixity of location,
stability, envelopment, and change. The throne does not support Him, but the
throne and those who carry it are
supported by the grace of His power and are constrained by
His hand. He is above the
throne and above the Heavens and above everything to the limits of the earth with
an aboveness which does not
bring
Him nearer to the throne and the Heavens, just as
it does not make Him farther from the earth. No,
He is highly exalted above the throne
and the Heavens, just as He is highly exalted above the earth. Nevertheless,
He is near to every entity and is “nearer
to a creature
than his jugular vein”; (s?rah
L:15) and He witnesses everything since His nearness does not resemble the
nearness of bodies, just as His essence does not resemble the essence of
bodies. He does not exist in anything, just as nothing exists
in Him: He has too much exalted Himself that any place should contain Him,
just as He has too much sanctified Himself that time should
limit Him. No, He
was before He had created time and
place, and just as He was, He
now is. He is
distinct from His creatures through His attributes. There is
not in His essence any other
besides Him, nor in any
other besides Him, His
essence. He is far removed from change of state
or
of location. Events have no place
in Him and mishaps do not befall Him. No, He does
not cease, in the epithets of His Majesty, to be far removed from decay, and in
the attributes of
His perfection He has no
need of an increase in perfection. In His
essence His existence is known by reason;
His essence is seen with the eyes, a
blessing from Him and a grace to the righteous in the
life everlasting and a completion of bliss from Him through beholding His
gracious face.
2.
Life and Power. We witness that He is living,
powerful, almighty and all-subduing; inadequacy
and weakness befall Him not; slumber overtakes Him not nor sleep;
dissolution does not prevail over Him nor
death. He is Lord of the visible world and
the invisible, and of power
and might; His are dominion, subjugation, creation, and command; the Heavens
are rolled in His right hand and created things are subjugated in His hand. He
is separate in creating and inventing; He is alone in bringing into existence
and innovating. He created all creatures and their works, and decreed their
sustenance and their lives; nothing decreed
escapes His hand and the mutations of things are not beyond His power. The
things which He decreed can not be numbered and the things which He knows
have no end.
3. Knowledge. We
attest that He knows all things which can be known,
grasping all that happens from the limits of earth
to the highest heaven; not an atom's
weight in the earth or in Heaven is beyond His knowledge. Yes, He knows the
creeping of the black ant upon the solid rock in the darkest
night, and He perceives the movement of the mote in the
midst of the air. He knows the secrets and that which is more
shrouded in secrecy than secrets; He has knowledge of the suggestions of the
mind, of
the movements of the
thoughts, and of the concealed things of the inmost parts by a knowledge
which is ancient from eternity and by which He has not ceased to be described
through the ages, not by a knowledge
which renews itself and arises in His essence through experience.1
4.
Will. We attest that He is the willer of all things that are, the
ruler of all originated phenomena; there
does not come into the visible or invisible world anything meagre or plenteous,
small or great, good or evil, or any advantage or disadvantage,
belief or unbelief, knowledge or ignorance, success or failure, increase
or decrease, obedience or disobedience, except by His
will. What He wills is and what He does not will is not; there is
not a glance of
the eye nor
a stray thought
of the heart that is not subject to
His will.
He is the Creator, the Restorer, the Doer of whatsoever
He wills. There is none that
rescinds His command,
none that supplements His decrees, none that
dissuades a servant from disobeying
Him, except by His
help and mercy, and none has power to obey
Him except by His will. Even though mankind, jinn,
angels, and devils were to unite to move the weight of a
single atom in the world or to render it still, without His will they would
fail. His will subsist in His
essence as one of
His attributes. He has not ceased to be described by it from
eternity, willing, in His infinity, the existence of things at their appointed
time which He has decreed. So they
come into existence at their appointed times even as He has willed in His
infinity without precedence of subsequence.
They come to
pass in accordance with His knowledge and will without
variation or
change. He does not direct things through arrangement of
thought and awaiting the passage of time, and therefore one thing does not
distract Him from another.
5.
Hearing and Sight. We attest that He is a hearer
and a see-er. He hears and sees and no audible
thing, however faint, is beyond His hearing, and no visible
thing, however minute, is hidden from His sight. Distance does not prevent His
hearing and darkness does not obstruct
His seeing. He sees without eyes and hears without ears; just as He perceives
without a brain, and
seizes without a hand, and creates without an instrument, since His attributes
do not resemble the attributes of created things, just
as His essence does not resemble the essence of created
things.
6.
Speech.
And we attest that He speaks, commanding, forbidding, promising, and
threatening, with a speech from eternity, ancient, and self-existing. Unlike
the speech of created things, it is not a
sound
which is caused through the passage of air or the friction of bodies; nor is it
a
letter which is enunciated through the movement of the lips and tongue. We also
attest that the Qur’?n, the Bible, the Gospel, and the Psalms
are His books revealed to His apostles; that the Qur’?n is repeated
by the tongue, written down in copies, and preserved in the heart, yet it is,
nevertheless ancient, subsisting in the essence of God, not subject to division
and separation through its transmission to the heart and (transcription on)
leaves.
We further attest that Moses heard the speech of God without sound and without
word, just as the righteous see the essence of God in
the
hereafter, without substance or accident.
And since He has these qualities, He is
living, knowing, willing, hearing, seeing and speaking through life, power,
knowledge, will, hearing, sight, and speech, not solely through
His essence.
7. Works. And we
attest that there is no entity besides Him, except what
originates by His action and proceeds from His justice, after the most
beautiful and perfect and complete and just of ways. We attest that He is wise
in His actions, just in His judgements; His justice is not comparable with that
of men, since tyranny is conceivable in the case of the latter when he deals
with the property of others than himself; but tyranny is
inconceivable in the case of God, for He does not
encounter
any property of another besides Himself, so that his dealing with it might be
tyrannous. Everything besides Him, men and jinn, angels and devils, Heaven and
earth, animals, plants, and inanimates, substance and accident, as
well
as things perceived and things felt, are
all
originated things which He created by His power from nothing and made from
nought, since He existed in eternity by Himself and
there was not along with Him any other. So He originated
creation thereafter as a manifestation of his power and a
realisation
of that which had preceded of His will and that which existed in
eternity
of His word, not because He had any need or necessity for it.
We also attest that He is
magnanimous
in creating and inventing and in imposing obligations(takl?f), not doing
it through necessity. We attest that He is gracious in
beneficence
and reform, though not through any need. Munificence and kindness, beneficence
and
grace are His, since He is able to bring
upon His creatures all manner of torture and to shower upon them all kinds of
pain and affliction. Even if He should do this, it would be justice on
His
part, it would not be vile, it would not be
tyrannous. He rewards His believing servants for their acts of obedience in the
spirit of generosity and encouragement rather than according to their merit and
desert. For He is under obligation to none and tyranny is
inconceivable
in Him. None possesses any claim against Him. His claim to obedience
is obligatory and binding upon all creatures [ir?dah] because He
made it obligatory upon them through the
words of
His prophets and not by reason
alone. But He sent His apostles and showed their veracity through explicit
miracles and they conveyed His commands and prohibitions as well as His
promises and threats. So it
became obligatory upon all creatures to believe in what they brought.
The Meaning of
the Second Word of the
Witness (al-shah?dah)
The second word of the
witness is that which
testifies that the apostleship belongs to the Apostle, and that God sent the
unlettered (ummi) Qurashite
Prophet Muhammad, as an apostle to all
the Arabs and the non-Arabs, to the jinn and men.
And by his law He abrogated the other laws, except
such of them as He confirmed. And He gave him precedence over all other
prophets and made Him Lord of mankind, and declared incomplete any profession
of faith which attests to unity, i.e. “There is no
god but Allah,” unless it is followed by the witness to
the Apostle, namely,“Muhammed is the Apostle of
AIlah,’’. And he made belief in him, in all the
things which he narrated concerning the affairs of this
world and the hereafter, obligatory upon all creation. And He will not accept
the belief of any creature
until he believes in that which the Prophet
narrated concerning the things after death, of which the first is the
question of Munkar and Nak?r.
These are two awful and terrible beings who will make the dead one sit up
in the grave, both soul and body; they will ask him about
the unity of God and
about the apostleship, saying, “Who
is the Lord, and what
is the religion, and
who is thy prophet?”2 They are the two inquisitors
of the grave and their questions comprise the first examination after death.
Again, man should believe
that the punishment of the grave is real and that His judgment of the body and
soul is just and in accordance with His will. And he
should believe in
the balance with the two scales and the tongue-the magnitude
of which is like the
stages of the Heavens and the earth; in it
the deeds are weighed by the power of God, even to the weight of the mote and
the mustard seed, in order to establish exact
justice. The records of the good deeds will be placed in
a good manner in the scale of light, and then the balance will be weighed down
by them according to the measure of their favour
in the sight of
God and by His grace, while the records of the
evil deeds will be cast in a vile manner in the scale of
darkness, and they will be light in the balance through the justice of God. He
should believe also that the bridge (al-?ir??)
is real; it is a bridge stretched over Hell, sharper than
the edge of
the sword and finer than a hair. The feet of the unbelievers
slip on it, according to the decree of God,
and they fall into the Fire; but
the feet of the believers stand firm upon it, by the grace of God,
and so they pass into everlasting life. And he should
believe in the frequented tank (hawd)
the tank of Muhammed,
from which the believers will drink before entering Paradise and after (w?jib)
crossing the bridge. Whoever drinks a single draught from it will never thirst
again. Its width is the distance of one
month’s journey; its waters are whiter than
milk and sweeter than honey. Around it are ewers in number like the
stars of heaven,3 and
into it flow two canals from al-kawthar 4. And he, should believe in
the judgment and the distinctions between men in it, that some will be
closely
questioned that some will be treated with leniency and that others
will enter Paradise without questioning-these are
God’s
favourites (al-muqurrab?n).
God
will ask, whomsoever He will of the prophets
concerning the carrying of His message, and whomsoever of the unbelievers
concerning their rejection of the apostles; 5
and
He will ask the innovators concerning the law and the Muslims concerning their
works. And he should believe that the monotheists will be released from
Hell-fire after vengeance has been taken on
them
so that there will not remain in Hell a
single
monotheist.
And he should believe in the intercession of the prophets,
of the learned, and of the
martyrs-each according to his dignity and rank before God. And he who remains
of the believers and has no intercessor will be released through
the grace of God. Therefore not a single believer will abide in Hell forever;
whosoever has in his heart the weight of an atom of
belief will be brought out from there. And he should acknowledge the excellence
of the Companions and their different ranks, and that the most excellent of
mankind, after the Prophet, is Abu-Bakr, and
then ‘Umar, and then ‘Uthman, and then ‘Ali. And he should think well of all
the Companions and praise them, just as
God
and His Apostle praised them.
All this was handed down in traditions
from the Prophet and from his Companions. Therefore he who
subscribes
to all this and believes in it without
doubting will be of the people of truth and the Law, thus separating himself
from the followers of error and heresy.
So
we ask God to perfect our
faith and make us steadfast in it. We ask this, through His
mercy,
for ourselves and for all the Muslims throughout the world. Truly He is the
most merciful. And may the blessing of God be upon our Lord Muhammed and upon
very chosen servant.
SECTION II
On the
Introduction to Religious
Instruction and the
Stages of
Belief.
You should know that
what we have already stated under the Exposition of the Creed (Book II, Sect.1)
should be presented to the child in his early
years in
order that he may commit it to memory; its meaning will
continue to be unfolded to him little by little as he grows older. The first
step is to commit it to memory, after which comes understanding, then belief,
then certainty and acceptance, all of which obtain in the child without proof.
For God showed His grace to man by preparing his heart from the beginning for
belief without the necessity of any argument or proof. How can this be denied
when all the articles of faith of the common folk are based on pure instruction
(talq?n)
and simple acceptance on authority (taql?d)?
True, a belief which results from
simple acceptance of authority may not be free of some
weakness at the beginning, in that it can be shaken and impaired by its
opposite whenever that is mentioned.
It
should, therefore, be strengthened and confirmed in the
heart of the child and the layman until it
becomes well established and unshakeable. But the way to strengthen and confirm
it does not lie in learning the art of argumentation and speculation. It is
found in the reading and exposition of the Qur’?n,
in the study of
the traditions and their meaning,
and in the performance of religious duties and acts of worship. Consequently a
child’s belief continues to increase in strength through what falls on his ears
of the proofs and arguments of the
Qur’?n, through what reaches him of
the illustrations of tradition and
their merits, through what shines on him of the lights of the acts of worship
and the fulfilment of the duties thereof, and finally by means of what comes to
him from watching the righteous, sitting
in their company, and listening to their words, as well as from observing their
mark and manner in obeying God, fearing
Him, and humbling themselves before Him. Instruction will then be like the
sowing of the seed in the heart, while these actions will serve to water and
tend the seed until it grows up and becomes strong and develops into a
good and strong tree the roots of which are well grounded in the
earth, while the branches reach up into the sky.
The child should also
be guarded with utmost care against argumentation and speculation, because what
argumentation impairs is greater than what it repairs, and what it
corrupts is greater than what it sets aright. In fact, the
practice of strengthening the belief of the child through argumentation is like
striking a tree with an iron mallet in the hope of strengthening
it. Breaking its limbs in this way, however, will destroy it
or, more likely, impair its growth. Seeing should, in this
case, suffice. Compare then the creed of the righteous and pious among the
common folk with that of the speculators and those given to argumentation and
you will find that the belief of the
commoner is as firm as the lofty mountain which
is moved neither by storm nor lightning, while the creed of the speculator who
guards his belief with the syllogisms of controversy is like a thread hanging in
the air, blown to and fro by the winds. This is
true of all except those who have heard the proof of
belief and have accepted it on authority, just as they have
taken hold of belief itself and accepted it on authority,
since there is no difference in accepting things on authority between the proof
and the thing proved. Thus learning the proof is one thing; arriving at it
through independent thinking is another.
But if
the child were brought up on this doctrine and should then
pursue a worldly activity in order to earn his
livelihood, he might not go any farther, though he would, in the opinion of the
people of the truth, be saved
in the hereafter, since the Law did not require of the barbarous Arabs anything
more than a verbal
acceptance of the literal meaning of these articles of
faith. But study and inquiry, as well
as undertaking the working out of
proofs, were not required of them
at all [w?jib]. But
if he should wish to be one
of the travellers along the path of the
hereafter and be fortunate
therein, so that he could continue to act
(according to his knowledge), holding fast to piety,
“restraining his soul from lust,"[s?rah
LXXIX:40] and practising self discipline and self-mortification, there would be
opened for him avenues of guidance which would reveal
to him the realities of this doctrine through a divine light cast into his
heart by self-mortification (muj?hadah),
in fulfilment of the promise
of God whom He
said, ‘‘And whoso striveth for us, in Our ways We
will guide them;
for God is assuredly with those who
do right”(s?rah XXIX:69).
This is, in truth, the precious pearl which is the ultimate goal of the belief
of the saints and the favourites of God. The secret which rested in the
bosom of Abu-Bakr
al-Sidd?q and by
which he excelled all others referred to this pearl. The revelation of this
secret (sirr), nay, these secrets, has different stages, depending upon the
degree of self mortification and upon the degree in which
the inner self (al-b?tin)
is clean and free of things other than
God, as well as upon
the obtaining of guidance by means of the light of faith(yaq?n).
This is just like the differences which
exist among men in the comprehension of the mysteries of medicine,
jurisprudence and the other sciences, since their differences vary with their
diligence and with their native endowment (fitrah)
in
brilliance and prudence. Just as the former variations are not limited,
so are the latter not limited.
(A case).
If
you say that the study of argumentation and scholastic
theology (kal?m)
is
blameworthy, like astrology, or that
it is
permissible (mub?h) or commendable (mand?b),
then, you should know that in
this particular respect men go to excess and exaggeration on
both sides: some say that it is an innovation and therefore unlawful and that,
excluding the sin of polytheism (shirk), it is better for
the servant to face his God guilty
of eyery offence except that of scholasticism; others
say that it is an obligation and an ordinance either
of the kif?yah
or the ‘ayn
type, that it is the best form of
work and the highest kind of oblation, and
that is the verification of theology and the
safeguard of the religion of God. Among those who hold it unlawful are Sh?fi‘?,
M?lik, Ahmad ibn-Hanbal, Sufy?n
[al-Thawri] and all the traditionists among the Fathers.
Ibn-‘Abd-al-A‘la‘6
once said, “On the
day al-Sh?fi‘?
was debating with Hafs al-Fard,7 who was one of the Mu‘tazilite
theologians, I
heard him say, ‘Excluding
the sin of polytheism it is better for the slave to face his God guilty of every
offence than to stand before Him with [even a] little scholasticism.’ I have
also heard Hafs say things which I cannot repeat.” Ibn-‘Abd-al-A‘la
reported also that al-Sh?fi‘?
said, “I
have discovered among the scholastic theologians things
which I never expected to find. Excepting the sin of polytheism, it is better
for the servant to disobey all the commandments
of God than to address himself to scholastic theology.”
Al-Kar?b?si
related that al-Sh?fi‘?
was once asked about something scholastic and was consequently infuriated and
said, “Ask Hafs al-Fard and his cohorts about this-may God dishonour them.”
When al-Sh?fi?? was
taken sick, Hafs came in to him
and said, “Who am I ?” Al- Sh?fi??
replied, “You are Hafs al-Fard-may God neither keep nor prosper
you
until you repent of your sins.” Said al- Sh?fi??
again, “If men but knew what predilections
lurk in scholastic theology they would
have run away from it as they would run away from a lion.” And again, “Whenever
I hear
a man
say
that the name is
the thing named, I testify that
he is
a scholastic theologian and has no
religion.”
Al-Za‘far?ni8
related that al- Sh?fi??
once said, “My
judgment concerning the scholastic theologians is that
they should be beaten with palm branches and carried in that
condition round among the tribes and clans.” This, it is
said, is the penalty of those
who discard the Qur’?n
and the traditions and address themselves to scholastic theology.
Ahmad ibn-Hanbal
said, “A scholastic theologian never succeeds.
You can hardly
find anyone who, having dabbled in scholastic
theology, is
without unsoundness in his heart.” He
was
so strong in its condemnation that he
ostracised al-H?rith al-Muh?sibi,9
in
spite of the latter’s asceticism and godliness, because
he composed a work
on the refutation of heresy,10 telling
him, “Woe unto you. Do you not
first
state their heretical beliefs and then answer
them, thereby compelling men to study
these heresies and to ponder over these
dubiosities, all of which
will draw them into speculation and controversy.” Ahmad ibn-Hanbal also said,
“The scholastic theologians are heretics
(sing. zindiq)."
(Speaking of the
scholastic theologian) M?lik
said “Have you seen how, when one
of stronger argument confronts him
he will discard his religion for a new
one every day?” In other words, the position of the debaters
is (constantly) changing. M?lik
also said, “The testimony of sectarians and heretics is not permissible.” In
interpreting this, some of his friends said that he meant by sectarians (ahl
al-ahw?') the
scholastic theologians, no matter to what school of thought they might belong.
Abu-Y?suf
said, “He who seeks knowledge through speculation will become a heretic (zind?q).”
Al-Hasan [al-Ba?ri]
said, ‘‘Argue not with sectarians and associate with them not, nor hearken unto
them.”
Thus the
traditionists among the Fathers have been unanimous (in their condemnation of
scholastic theology). The many strictures which came down to us from them are
innumerable. They have said that the companions refrained from scholastic
theology only because
of their knowledge of the evils it would breed, although they
were better informed and more eloquent phrase-makers than
anyone else. For this reason the Prophet said, “The hairsplitters are doomed;
they are doomed to destruction.” By
this he meant those who are extravagant in investigation and
research. [The traditionists among the Fathers] also protested that if
[scholastic theology] were an integral part of religion the Apostle of
God would have commanded [his Companions to address
themselves to] it, and would have taught [them] its ways. He also would have
praised it and commended its protagonists. He
thus taught them abstersion11 (istinj?’)
and urged
them to study the law of inheritance (‘ilm
al-far?’id)12 and
commended [its teachers]. On the other
hand he forbade them to speculate on
divine decrees saying, “Refrain from speculation on
the decrees of God,” and the Companions continued to refrain
from such speculations. To add to what
the teacher set forth is disloyal and unfair;
the Companions are our teachers and our example,
and we are their
followers and disciples.
The other group
protested that the dangers in speculation are
such terms as essence (jawhar)
and accident (‘arad)
and the other strange terms with which the Companions were
not familiar. But the matter is not
difficult to explain, because there is not
a single
branch of knowledge in which new terms have
not
been introduced for the sake of conveying
meanings, as
for example, the science of tradition, the science of
interpretation, and the science of jurisprudence. Were these people
to encounter terms such as
refutation (naqd),
invalidation (kasr),
composition (tarkib),
deduction (ta‘diyah), and false
collocation (fas?d
al-wad'), as well as the
other questions which are adduced by analogy (qiy?s),
they would not comprehend them.
Therefore the introduction of new terms
to signify a
definite meaning is just as legitimate as inventing
vessels of new shape and form for use in permissible things. If it is the
meaning of these terms which is dangerous, we do not mean to attain
through them anything except the knowledge of the proofs for the creation of
the universe, the unity of the Creator, and
(the nature of) His attributes as they have come down to us
in the Law. Since when, then, has the knowledge of God by proof been unlawful?
But if it is sectarianism, fanaticism, enmity, hatred, and all that speculation
and controversy breed which are meant and intended, then these are unlawful and
should be guarded against and avoided, just as pride, conceit, hypocrisy, and
the desire for power which the sciences of tradition, interpretation, and
jurisprudence breed are unlawful and should be guarded against and avoided.
Nevertheless, the fact that a branch of knowledge may lead to [these evils]
should not prevent one from seeking that knowledge. For how could the mention
of a piece of evidence and the desire to learn and investigate it be forbidden
when God said, “Say: Give your
proof if ye speak the truth.”s?rahs
II:105, XXI:24, XVII:69; XXVIII:75. And again “…
that he who would perish might perish by clear proof, and he
who would live might live by clear proof.’’13 And again, “Have ye
any authority for this?” cf.S?rah
X:69. in other words [“Have ye
any] evidence or proof [for this?”]. And again, “Say:
Peremptory evidence is God’s.’’S?rahX:110.
And again, “Hast thou not considered him who disputed with Abraham about his
Lord, because God had given him the kingdom? When Abraham said, ‘My Lord is He
who giveth life and death,’ he said, ‘It is I who
give life and death,’ Abraham said, ‘Since God bringeth the sun from the East,
do thou then bring it from the West. The infidel was confounded, for God
guideth not the evil
doers.”14 In this
instance God mentioned with commendation the controversy between Abraham and
his adversary
and how Abraham debated with the adversary and silenced him.
God also said, “This is our argument with which we furnished
Abraham against his people.”S?rahVI:83.
And again, “They said, ‘O Noah!
Already hast thou disputed with us, and increased our disputation." 15
Again, in the story of Pharaoh, God said, “Said Pharaoh, ‘Who then is the Lord
of the Worlds?’ to the words ‘What if I show thee
that which shall be a proof [of my mission]?”16
In short the Qur’?n,
from beginning to end, is an argument with the unbelievers. The greatest proof
of theologians for the unity of God is the word of God
when He said, “Had there been in either [Heaven or earth] gods besides God,
both would have surely gone to ruin.”17 Their greatest proof for the
prophecy is, “And if ye be in doubt as to that which we have
sent down to our servant, then produce a S?rah
like it.”18 Their greatest
proof for the resurrection is, “Say : He
shall give life to them who first gave them being.”19
Thus the apostle did
not cease to debate with the unbelievers and dispute with them. God said,
“Dispute with them in the kindest manner.”20 The Companions, too,
used to debate and dispute with the unbelievers, but only in the
time of need. At
the time of the companions the need for disputation was
small. The first to establish the precedence of summoning innovators back to
truth by means of debate and argument was ‘Ali ibn-abi-T?lib
when he dispatched ibn-‘Abb?s to
the Kh?rijites.
Ibn-‘Abb?s argued with
them saying, “Would you rebel against your im?m?”
But they replied, “He has fought, but did not capture any
prisoners or booty.”
Ibn-‘Abb?s explained
to them that prisoners and booty are taken only in war
against unbelievers, adding, “Would any of
you, if ‘A’isha had been taken captive on the
Day of
the Camel21 and had fallen to his lot, have
deemed it lawful to deal with her as he would have dealt with his own property
[and forgot] that she was, according to the express word of the Qur’r?n,
your mother?”cf.S?rah
XXXIII. They answered “No,” and
consequently two thousand of them
surrendered.22
It was also related
that al-Hasan (a1-Bas?ari)
once debated with a Qadarite23 with the result that the latter
renounced his error. Similarly, ‘Ali ibn-abi-T?lib
once debated with a Qadarite. It is also
related that ‘Abdull?h
ibn-Mas‘?d debated
with Yaz?d ibn-‘Am?rah24
on the subject of belief. Said ‘Abdull?h[ibn
Mas‘?d], “If I say
that I
am a believer it will be
like saying that I am in Paradise.”
Thereupon Yaz?d ibn ‘Amirah
said to
him, ‘‘O
Companion of the Apostle of God,
what is belief except to believe
in God,
His angels, books and aspostles, as well as in resurrection and the balance [of
the day of the Judgement], and to perform prayer, observe
the fast, and pay alms. Yet we have trespasses which, if we but knew that
they will be forgiven us, we
would know that we will be of the people of Paradise. For this reason we
say that we are believers, but we do not say that we are
of the people of Paradise.”
Ibn-Mas‘?d replied,
“By God, you
have said the truth;
this is a mistake on my part.”
Thus it should be said that [the Companions]
addressed themselves little to [speculation], and this they did briefly and
only in time of need. They did not go into it [as a
subject] to be written about or taught, nor did they take it
up as a
vocation. It is then said that they addressed themselves to
it little because the need was small, since no heresy had appeared at that
time. They addressed themselves to it briefly because their only purpose was to
silence the adversary and compel him to admit his error;
they aimed at revealing the truth and removing dubiosities.
Yet whenever the confusion of the adversary persisted or his insistence on
error continued, they had to prolong
their argument, never reckoning, as it were, the
need with weight or measure
once they had embarked on their
[argument]. Their not applying themselves to teaching and writing about it is
not unlike their custom with regard to jurisprudence,
interpretation, and tradition. Therefore, if it is permissible to compose books
on jurisprudence and to work out rare hypothetical cases (?uwar)
which seldom arise, either as a preparation for the time of need,
or
simply to sharpen the wits, it is
also permissible for us to
classify the methods of disputation in preparation for the time with
dubiosities flare up or an innovator runs loose;
or simply to sharpen the wits or have
the argument ready so that when needed it will be within reach of
all just as the preparation of armaments for war before the
day of battle.
This is practically
all that can be said on behalf of the two groups, [the proponents and the
opponents of speculation]. If you ask me what I think
of this, I will say that the truth of the matter is that those who condemn it
absolutely and under all circumstances as well as those who praise it
absolutely and unreservedly are wrong. The question should be more carefully
analysed.
You should know,
then, that first of all a thing, such as wine or carrion,
may be pronounced unlawful from its very nature. What I mean by ‘its very
nature’ is that the cause of its
being pronounced unlawful is a quality inherent in it:
intoxication [in the case of wine]
and putrefaction [in the case of
carrion]. If we were asked concerning these two things, we would not hesitate to
say that they were absolutely unlawful, and would in no way
think of allowing carrion to be eaten in time of need, nor ever think of
permitting the drinking of wine when a person chokes over a mouthful of food
and finds nothing with which to swallow it besides wine.
In
the second place a thing may be pronounced unlawful for
some other reason, such as underselling your Muslim brother
during the period of option
(khiy?r),25
trading during the call to prayer, or
eating earth which is pronounced unlawful because of its
harmful effect. Such things are divided into those which are harmful both in
small and large quantities and are therefore pronounced unlawful, like, for
example, poison which is fatal whether
in small or large quantity; and those which are harmful only when taken in
excess like, for example, honey, which when taken in excess
is harmful to the feverish patient. The same is true of eating earth.
Therefore, in
pronouncing wine absolutely unlawful, only the most general
cases were taken into consideration. In the event
that something new arises, it will be well to consider the attending
circumstances. Consequently it is better and safer to analyse each case [and
treat it on its own merits].
We turn now to the
science of scholastic theology (‘ilm al-kal?m) to
say that it has advantages and disadvantages, usefulness and harm. With regard
to its usefulness, whenever it is useful it is either
lawful, or commendable, or obligatory, as the occasion demands. As to
its harm, whenever it is harmful it is unlawful. Its harm lies in raising
doubts and undermining the articles of faith by moving them out from the realm
of certitude and determination. These things are lost at
the beginning and their restoration by means of
proof is doubtful; further more it varies
with the individual.
Such then is, its
harm in
the orthodox faith. Yet it has another harmful influence
which manifests itself in confirming the belief of the heretics in their
heresies and establishing them in their hearts so that their claims increase
and their insistence on them becomes more stubborn. The kind of them, however,
results from the fanaticism which disputation enkindlles. For this reason you find
that the lay heretic can, through kindness, be easily dissuaded from his error
in no time. But if he were brought up in a town where disputation and
fanaticism abound it will be impossible for both the ancients and the moderns
to remove the heresy from his heart, their combined efforts, notwithstanding.
On the contrary, passion, fanaticism, hatred of the adversaries of diputation
and non-conformist groups prevail over his heart and prevent him from
comprehending the truth so that even if he were told, "Do you want God to
remove for you the veil and to reveal to you through personal observation that
the truth is on the side of your adversary?" he would dislike it for fear
that his adversary would be gladdened by it. This, then, is the chronic disease
which has spread among men all over the land. It is a kind of corruption which
is set in motion by the diputants through their fanaticism. This much for its
harm. As to its benefits [some] think that it is useful in revealing realities
and knowing them as they really are. But how far from the truth this is,
because the fulfilment of noble desire is not found in disputation. In fact the
perplexity and confusion consequent on diputation surpass anything which it may
reveal or unfold. If you were to hear that from a traditionist or a
half-scholar you might think that they have been moved to that by their
ignorance, for men are the enemies of that of which they are ignorant. Take it,
then, from one who has familiarised himself with disputation
and, after a
careful study and a thorough
investigation of it in which he surpassed the extreme limits of its masters and
went even further to study in great detail other cognate subjects, has come to
dislike it, and has ascertained that the road to the realities of knowledge is
closed from this direction. Disputation, as a matter
of fact,will inevitably reveal, unfold,
and clarify a few things, but this is very rare and
only occurs in simple and clear matters which are readily understood even
before any thorough study of the
art of
disputation. It has only one benefit:
it preserves the creed for the common folk and safeguards it
against the confusion of innovators by different kinds of argumentation.
For the layman is swayed by the argument of the innovator although the argument
may be false; and to confront a false position with another refutes it. People
are expected to follow this creed which we have already mentioned because the
Law has ordained it for the good of their temporal and spiritual lives and
because the righteous Fathers agreed on it. The learned men are expected to
watch over it for the common folk against the ambiguities of
the innovators, just as the magistrates are expected to
safeguard their property against the attacks of the
oppressors and ravishers.
When both its harm
and benefit are fully understood by man, he should be like the physician who is
adept in the use of dangerous
drugs, which he does not apply except to the right place and only at the time
of need.
To explain
further, the laymen and the commom folk
who are engaged in crafts and trades should be left alone in the integrity of
their beliefs which they have accepted when they
have been instructed in the orthodox faith which we have already stated. To
teach them disputation is decidedly harmful to them as it will perhaps arouse
doubts in their minds
which will shake their belief. Once these doubts are aroused it will not be
possible to remedy their shaken belief.
As
to the layman who believes in a certain
innovation, he should be called back to the truth with kindness and tact and
not with fanaticism: with soft
words which are convincing to the soul and effective in the heart, words
similar to those of the
arguments of the Qur’?n and
the tradition, mixed with a little admonition and warning. This is much better
than debate along the line set down by the scholastic theologians, since the
layman, when he hears such arguments, thinks that they are a kind of
technique in disputation which the disputant has learned in
order to draw men to his belief. Consequently,
if the layman fails to reply to these arguments he will assume that the
scholastic theologians of his school are capable of refuting them. Disputation
with both this man and the former is unlawful. Likewise it is unlawful to argue
with one who has fallen victim to doubt, since doubt should be removed with
kindness by admonition and understandable proofs free of
excessive speculation and endless debate. In fact disputation is useful in only
one case, namely, when the layman has been persuaded to believe in an
innovation through one kind of
argument, in which case it should be countered by the same kind of argument
in order to
recall the man to the truth. This, however, applies to him
who, because of his fondness of disputation, is no longer
satisfied with the ordinary admonitions and warnings, but has reached a stage
where nothing will cure him except debate. Consequently it is permissible to argue
with him. But in a country where
heresy is rare and one rite (madhhab) prevails, it
should be sufficient to state the articles of faith which we
have already mentioned, without any attempt to take
up the question of proofs. The person should wait until something questionable
arises before he takes up the question of proofs which he should present
according to the need. If the heresy were a Common one and
a fear existed that the children might be beguild with it, then there would be no
harm in teaching them the equivalent of what we have
included in the book entitled al-Ris?lah
al- Qudisyah,26
as a means for overcoming the influence of the
disputations of innovators if that
influence should confront the children. This is a brief thing which we included
in this book because of its brevity.
If [the child] were bright and therefore became aware of a certain
question or grew skeptical of something in his mind, then the feared disease
has appeared and the malady has become visible. There will be no
harm, then, to promote [the child] to the equivalent of that
which we have included in the book entitled al-Iqtis?d
fi al-I'tiq?d,27
equalling about fifty folios and free
from any departures from a discussion of the foundations of
the articles of faith to the other investigations of the
scholastic theologians. If this should convince [the child]
then he might be let alone; but if this should fail to convince him, then the
disease has become chronic, the malady rooted, and the epidemic widespread.
Let, then, the physician be as kind and tactful as possible, and let him await
the will of God until, through His grace, the truth shall be revealed to the
child. Otherwise he will persist in his doubt and skepticism as long as it is
so ordained.
The amount contained
in that book and others of the same kind is that from which
benefit can be expected. Books not confined
to the same subject are of two kinds. The first comprises books which deal with
subject other than the foundations of the articles of faith, such as those
which discuss propensities (i'tim?dat),28
transmutations (akw?n),29
and [the different kinds of ] perceptions
(idr?k?t),30
or
discoursing on sight (ru'yuh):
whether or not it has an opposite which is called
obstruction(man‘) or
blindness, and that if this obstruction does exist, then it
will be an obstruction [which prevents the eye] from
[seeing] all invisible things, or [a proof
which] verifies every visible thing that can be seen, as well as other
misleading trivialities.
The second kind of
these books contains a further expansion of the same arguments as applied to
other subjects, together with several questions and answers - details which add
nothing but confusion and perplexity to him who
has not already been convinced by the
previous amount. For there are certain things which become more obscure with
dilation and expansion. Were one to say that the
investigation into the rules of perceptions and propensities is useful for
sharpening the mind which is the instrument of religion just as the sword is
the instrument of holy war (jih?d),
hence there is no
harm in sharpening it, it will be like saying that playing
chess, because it sharpens the
mind, is a part of religion. This, however, is insane because the mind may be
sharpened through the other sciences of that Law in which there is no fear of
harm or injury.
By this you see how
much of scholastic theology (kal?m) is
blameworthy and how much is praise worthy, the conditions wherein it is
condemned and these wherein it is praised, as well as the persons who are
benefited by it and the persons who are harmed. If you should then say that,
since you acknowledge the need for it in refuting [the arguments of] the
innovators, and since innovations have now
risen and calamities spread, the need for it
has become urgent, it is inevitable that undertaking this
science should become a fardkif?yah,
just as undertaking to safeguard
property and other rights and fulfilling the duties of justice and government
and the rest. And unless the learned men engage in spreading and teaching this
science and in doing researches in it, it will not endure;
and if it
were completely abandoned, it would surely disappear;
nor is there in human nature by itself a sufficient ability
to cut through the dubiosities of innovators unless this subject be learnt and studied.
Therefore there should be instruction in it, and its
investigation is now one of the fur?d
al-kif?y?t,
contrary to what it was at the time of
the Companions when the need for it was not urgent.
If you should
say this, then know that the truth of the matter is that undoubtedly there
should be, in
every town, someone who would undertake to engage in this
science and take it upon himself to refute the dubiosities of the innovators
which have spread in that particular town. This
undertaking is performed
through education, but it is not wise to instruct
the laity in it just as they are
instructed in jurisprudence and interpretation. For this is like
drugs, and
jurisprudence is like food: the
harm of food
is not dangerous but the harm of drugs
is dangerous as we have
already mentioned.
The learned men of
this science should confine their
instruction to men who have the three following traits: The first is devotion
to knowledge and
passion for it; for
the working man is prevented by his work from
mastering the subject completely and from dispelling
the doubts when they arise. The second trait
is sagacity, intelligence, and eloquence, because the stupid one does not
benefit by his understanding and the dull one does
not gain by his argument. On the contrary
such a
man is injured by disputation and
should not expect any good from
it. The third trait is that the man
should by nature be good, religious, and pious; he should
not be dominated by passions, because the sinful man would stray
from religion at the least provocation.
Passions would do away with all deterrents and remove the barrier which stands
between him and worldly pleasures. He would not be keen on
dispelling anything questionable, but rather
would seize upon it to free himself from any obligation (takl?f).
The things which such a student will
spoil would be greater than those which he would reform. When you know these
divisions you would realize that, in disputation the praiseworthy argument is
of the same kind as the arguments
of the Qur’?n:
kind words which
influence the hearts and convince the minds without going deeply into
syllogisms and analyses which most people do not understand;
and whenever they understand them they consider them
trickeries and artifices which their proponent has learnt in order to make
things ambiguous. Should he be confronted by
one of his professional colleagues he would resist him.
You
will also know that al-Sh?fi‘i
and all the Fathers were forbidden from engaging in disputation and devoting
themselves exclusively to it, because of the harm
inherent in it which we have already pointed out. The reports of ibn-‘Abb?s’
debate with the Kh?rijites and
‘Ali’s debate concerning free will (qadar) [show
that their disputation] was of the clear and intelligent kind, carried out at
the time of
need. Such disputation is praiseworthy
under all conditions. Undoubtedly the need for disputation differs with the
time; therefore it is not unlikely that the
rule which governs it should also differ. This then is the rule of the creed
which God imposed on man and the
method of
defending and preserving it.
As to dispelling
doubts, revealing truths, knowing things as they really
are, and comprehending the mysteries (asr?r)
which the words of this creed signify,
there is no way to attain any of
them except through self-mortification (muj?hadah)
and the subduing of passions,
through seeking God wholeheartedly and persisting in thoughts which are free
from the blemishes of disputation. They are a mercy
from God which comes to those who expose themselves to its beneficence
according to what God ordained to them and the extent to which they had exposed
themselves to it as well as the capacity of their hearts and the degree of
their purity. This is the
sea the depth of which cannot be sounded and the waters of which can not be
traversed.
If you should say
that this discourse implies that these sciences have external as well as
internal meanings, that some of them are obvious and readily understood, while
others are hidden and become evident through self-mortification, discipline,
earnest desire, pure thinking and a heart (sirr)
free from all wordly activities except those which are required,
and conclude that such discourse is almost contrary to the Law since the Law
does not have external and internal meanings,
secret and manifest, but the external and the internal, the secret and the
manifest, are in it all the same, then you should know that the division of
these sciences into hidden and obvious is not
denied by anyone of any insight but is denied by the ignorant who, having
acquired some knowledge in their youth, did not advance any further and
consequently failed to gain promotion to the lofty heights where lie the
stations (maq?m?t)
of the learned men and the saints.
This is evident from the testimony of the Law as the Prophet
said, “Verily there is to the Qur’?n
an external meaning and an internal meaning, a scope and a point.” ‘Ali,
pointing to his breast, said, “Verily herein lies abundant knowledge;
would that there were some
to [comprehend and] transmit it.” The Prophet also said, “We prophets were
ordered to communicate with everyone according to his ability to understand.”
And again, “No one has ever
recited a tradition to a people which their minds have failed to grasp without
being a temptation for them.” God said,“These similitudes do We set forth to
men: and none understands them except those who know." S?rah
XXIX:42. The Prophet said, “Verily of knowledge is a branch which resembles a
hidden thing; no one grasps it save those who know God.” And again, “If you
only know what I know,
you would laugh little and weep much.”31 If this
had not been a secret which he was forbidden
to divulge because of the inability of the minds to comprehend it, why then did
he not explain it to them, especially since they would have certainly believed
him if he had done so? In connexion
with the interpretation of the words of God, “It is God who
hath created seven heavens and as many earths; the [divine] command cometh down
among them.’’S?rah LXV:12. ibn-‘Abb?s said,
“Were I
to relate its interpretation, you would stone me”-and
according to another version,“you would have said, ‘He is
an unbeliever’.” Abu-Hurayrah said, “I have
received from the Apostle of God
two things, one of which I have made public. Were I to
divulge the other, this throat would be cut.” The Prophet said, “Abu-Bakr has
excelled you not by excessive
fasting and much prayer, but by a secret (sirr)
which rested in his bosom.” No doubt this
secret was connected with the
foundations of religion and not removed from it. And whatever belonged to the
foundations of religion could not have been hid from the other Companions
through its outward form. Sahl al-Tustari said, “The learned man possesses
three kinds of knowledge:
exoteric (Z?hir)
which he imparts to the followers of
exoteric knowledge; esoteric (b?tin)
which he cannot reveal except to its
own people; and finally a
knowledge which lies between him and His God and which he cannot reveal to
anyone.” One of ‘the gnostics (sing.‘?rif)
said, “To divulge
the secret of Lordship (r?b?biyah)
is [equivalent to] unbelief.” Some one
also said, ‘Lordship has a secret, if revealed, prophecy will become obsolete;
prophecy has a secret, if divulged, knowledge will become
useless; and the
learned men of God have a secret, if disclosed,
the law will become of no force.” If he who had said
this did not thereby mean the futility of prophecy as far as the feeble minded
are concerned because of their inability to understand, then what he said is not
true. Rather, that which is true is free of contradiction. The perfect man is
he whose knowledge does not destroy his piety, and the road to piety is through
prophecy.
You may say, "
These verses and traditions may be subject to several interpretations.
Show us, then, how their exoteric meaning differs from the esoteric. For if the
exoteric is contradictory to the esoteric, it will destroy
the Law, which is exactly the position of those who say
that reality is contrary of the Law. This is sheer unbelief
because the Law represents the exoteric and reality represents the esoteric. If
the one is neither contradictory to, nor in disagreement
with, the other, then both are identical. Therefore the division [of knowledge
into obvious and hidden, exoteric and esoteric] is hereby destroyed and the Law
will have no secret [meaning] which should not be divulged. Rather both the
hidden and the obvious will be the same.” If you should so inquire, then you
should know that this question raises a grave issue and leads into the science
of revelation (al-muk?shafah)
departing
from the intent of the science of practical religion (al-mu'?malah)
which
is the purpose of these books. For the articles of
faith which we have already mentioned come under the works of the heart which
we are required to receive with acceptance and consent, by
fixing
the heart on them and adhering to
them,
not by endeavouring to comprehend their realities, since this was not required
of all people. Were it not a part of practical religion we would not have
mentioned it in this book, and were is not one of the outward works of the
heart we would not have mentioned it in the first half of
the
book. Real [and complete] revelation is an attribute of
the essence of the heart and its inward part. But if the discussion leads to
the stirring up of doubt or the shadow of
doubt concerning the contradiction of the exoteric to the esoteric, a
brief
word of explanation becomes
necessary. For he who says that reality disagrees with
the Law and the esoteric contradicts the exoteric is closer to unbelief than to
belief. In fact, the secrets whose comprehension
is peculiar to the favourites of God (al-muqarrab?n) and the
practice of which is limited to them and which they do
not
divulge to the masses may be divided into five categories:
The first is that the thing in itself is
subtle and beyond the comprehension of most minds.
Consequently its, comprehension is restricted to the elite who should not
divulge it to those who are unable to grasp it lest, whenever
their minds fail to comprehend it or to understand the concealed secrets of the
spirit, it becomes a calamity to them. The Apostle himself refrained from
explaining this part.32 The minds fail to comprehend its reality and
the imaginations to imagine its truth. But do dot think that this was
not
revealed to the Apostle of God, for he who does not know the spirit does not know
himself,
and he who does not know himself does not know his God.
It
is not unlikely that this was revealed to some of the saints and the learned
men although they were not prophets; but
they disciplind themselves in the etiquette of the Law and held their peace in
the matters where the Apostle himself was silent. In fact there are in the
attributes of God many a hidden thing which are beyond
the comprehension and understanding of the crowds. Of
these,
the Apostle of God did not mention anything except those that are
obvious
to the minds, such as knowledge and power and the like, which
men understand in terms of something akin to them and
then suppose that they performed the feat through their own knowledge and
power, especially since they possess certain qualities which are called knowledge
and power. Consequently they arrive at that by some manner of analogy. But if
the Apostle mentioned some of the attributes of God to which men have nothing
akin and which do not resemble, even remotely, anything they possess, they
would not have understood them. Thus, the pleasure of coition, if mentioned to
the child or to the impotent, will not be understood by them except in relation
to the pleasure of
eating which they comprehend. This
understanding, however, will not be one of actual
experience. Further more, the difference between God’s knowledge and power and
human knowledge and power is greater than the difference between the pleasure
of coition and the pleasure of eating. In short,
man does not comprehend except himself and his own attributes which are present
with him or
were with him in the past. By
comparison and analogy with these he understands the attributes of others. He
will also realize that there is a difference between his attributes and those
of God in nobleness and perfection. Therefore it is not
within the power of men but to declare as belonging to God what has been
declared as belonging to himself, such as action, knowledge, and power as well
as other attributes, and to acknowledge that in the case of God they are more
perfect and more noble. Most of his emphasis would, therefore, be on his own
attributes rather than on those of majesty which
belong exclusively to God. For this reason the Prophet said, “I shall
not praise Thee as Thou hast praised Thyself.” This does not mean the inability
to express what I
comprehend but rather an admission of the inability to
comprehend the essence of the majesty of God. For this
reason again someone said “No one has truly known God except God Himself.”
Abu-Bakr al-Siddiq said, “Praise be to God who hath not given men a way to know
Him except through their inability to know Him.”
Let us now, however,
stop this kind of discussion and go back to the main purpose, namely that one of these
categories comprises that which the minds fail to comprehend, such as the
spirit (al-r?h)
and some of the attributes of God.
Perhaps the Prophet referred to something of the same nature when he said,
“Verily God hath seventy veils of light. If He would remove them, the majesty
of His face would consume every one whose eyes might happen to behold His
glory.”33
The
second category of the hidden things which the prophets and the saints decline
to mention or divulge comprises those things which are intelligible in
themselves and the minds do not fail to grasp, but their mention is harmful to
most hearers although it is not harmful
to the prophets and the saints. The secret of the decrees of God which the
learned men
were forbidden to divulge belongs to this part. Consequently
it is not unlikely that certain truths may be harmful to some people just as
the light of the sun is harmful to the eyes of bats and the rose perfume is
harmful to blackbeetles. And how could this be deemed unlikely when we know
that our saying that unbelief, adultery, sin, and evil exist all by the will
of God, which in itself is true, but, nevertheless, has been
harmful to many because it was taken by them as an evidence for folly, lack of
wisdom, and approval of evil and wickedness? Thus has al-R?wandi,34
as well as several separatists, deviated from the right path by following such
heresies.
Similarly, if the
secret of the decrees of God were divulged most people would fancy that God is
lacking in power, because their minds are incapable of comprehending anything
which will remove that fancy. Furthermore, if someone should discuss the day of resurrection
and should say that it will fall after a thousand years, or
a few years after or a few
years before, his words would be understood. Nevertheless the appointed time of
the day of resurrection was not foretold for the welfare of men and for fear of
the harm which might ensue. The [intervening] period may be long and the
appointed time very distant, with the result that people, thinking that the day
of
retribution is remote, would cease to mind or care.
On the other hand it may be,
in the knowledge of God, close at
hand. If
then, the appointed time should be foretold, people would be
greatly frightened with the result that they would neglect their [daily] work
and transactions and havoc would overtake the world. Were
this to occur and come true, it would be an example of this
category.
The third category is
where the thing is such as will be understood and cause no harm when mentioned
clearly, although it is usually expressed through metaphor or allegory so that
its impression on the heart of
the listener may be deeper. Its value is that it leaves a greater impression on the
heart. Thus if a person
had said that he had seen a man place pearls around the necks of swine
and his words were taken metaphorically to express the imparting of knowledge
to, and the spread of learning among those who are
unworthy, the [ordinary] listener would readily understand its literal meaning
while the thorough and careful listener, when he examines and finds that the
man had no pearls and was not surrounded by swine,
would see through and comprehend the inner and esoteric meaning. Consequently
men differ in this respect. An example of this kind of speech is the following:
A weaver
and a tailor toil
On either side of Spica
Virginis;
The one is weaving
shrouds for
the dead,
The other fashions swaddling
clothes.
The poet
expressed the celestial phenomena of the rising
(iqb?l) of the
stars and their setting (idb?r) metaphorically
through the parable of two artisans.
This kind of [metaphor]
belongs to the principle of expressing a
certain meaning through a picture which contains the same
meaning or a similar meaning. Belonging to the same kind
are the words of the
Prophet when he said, "Verily the mosque will shrink when people spit on
its
courtyard just as the
piece of skin will shrink when it is placed over the fire.”
You can readily understand that the courtyard of the mosque
does not actually shrink when people spit on it.
What the words of the Prophet really mean is that the atmosphere of the mosque,
being honoured and exalted, has been dishonoured and belittled by spitting,
which is as opposed to the idea of the mosque as fire is to the integrity of the
particles of skin. Belonging to the same kind are the words of the Prophet when
he said, "Is he
who raises his head from prostration before the im?m
not afraid that God will transform his head into that of a donkey?”35
This, however, will never take place literally but only metaphorically since
the head of
the donkey is proverbial, not for its form and shape, but
for its characteristic stupidity and foolishness. Thus, whoever would raise his
head from prostration before the im?m,
his head would become like
that of a donkey in stupidity and foolishness. It is this which is meant and
not the shape which the literal meaning [of the words] indicates. For it
is utterly foolish to place following[the im?m]
and preceding [him] together because they are contradictory. The knowledge
that, in such cases, there are inner meanings which differ from the outward
significations, can only be determined by either rational or legal
evidence. The rational is when any interpretation according to the outward
meaning is impossible, as in the words of the Prophet when he said, “The heart
of the believer lies between two of the
fingers of the Merciful [God].” When we examine the hearts of the
believers we shall not find them surrounded with fingers, and consequently we
shall know that the words are used metaphorically for power which is inherent
in figures and constitutes their hidden life. Furthermore, power was
metaphorically represented by the fingers because such a metaphor conveys the
idea of power more completely. Of the same kind is the instance where God
expresses the idea of His power metaphorically by saying, “Our words to a
thing when We will it is but to say, ‘Be,’ and it is” S?rahXVI;
42. The outward meaning of this verse is not possible because if the saying of
God ‘Be’ was addressed to the thing before that thing came into existence, then
it would simply be an impossibility since the non-existent does not understand
address and, therefore, can not obey. And if
it was addressed to the thing after the thing has come into existence, then it
would be superfluous, since the thing is
already in existence and does not need to be brought into being.
But whereas this metaphor has been more impressive
upon the minds in conveying the idea of the greatest power, recourse has been
made to it.
Those cases where the inner
meaning is determined by means of legal evidence are the cases which can be
interpreted according to their literal and outward
signification, but, on the authority
of tradition, a meaning other
than the outward was intended, as is the case in the interpretation of the
words of God when he said, “He sendeth down the water from Heaven:
then flow the torrents in their due measure, and the flood
beareth along a
swelling foam.” S?rahXIII:18
Here the word water stands for the Qur’?n
which the torrents represent the hearts. Some of the hearts receive and hold
much; others receive much and hold little;
while others still receive much and hold nothing
at all. The foam represents unbelief and hypocrisy, which, although it rises to
and floats upon the surface of the water, does not last;
but guidance which benefits men, endures. Into this part a
group of men went deeply and interpreted the things which were mentioned in
connexion with the hereafter, such as the balance (al-m?z?n),
the bridge (al-?ir?t),
and the like. All this, however, is innovation
because it was not handed down by tradition, especially since its literal and
outward interpretation is not impossible.
Therefore it should be interpreted literally.
The fourth category
is where man comprehends the thing in a general way and then through further
investigation and experimentation, he understands its particulars so that it
becomes a
part of him. Thus the two kinds of knowledge differ. The
first, (i.e. the general) resembles the husks, while the second (i.e. the
particular), resembles the pith. The first is the exoteric or outward, the
second is the esoteric or inward. This is just like the example of the
man who sees a person in the dark or from a
distance and acquires a certain picture of that person.
But when he
sees him from a close range or after
the darkness is gone, he realizes certain differences [between this second
picture and the first]. This last picture, however, is not
opposed to the first but complementary to it. The same is true of knowledge,
faith, and
belief. For a man may believe in the existence of
love, sickness, and death even before any of
them occur. But to believe in their existence after they
have taken place is more complete than believing in their existence before they
take place. In fact man has,
with regard to passion and love as well as the other conditions, three
different stages and three distinct degrees of comprehension. The first is to
believe in the existence of the thing before it takes place;
the second is to believe in
its existence at the time of its occurrence; and third is to believe in its
existence after it has taken place. To recognize
the existence of hunger after it is gone is different from recognizing its
existence before it is gone. Similarly, there are some of the sciences of
religion which mature by experience and their mature state as compared with
their premature state is like the esoteric as compared to
the exoteric. Hence there is a difference between the sick man’s knowledge of
health and the healthy man’s knowledge of it. In short,
men differ in these four parts; yet in none of them
is there an esoteric meaning which contradicts the exoteric. Rather the
exoteric meaning completes and perfects the esoteric just as the pith completes
the husk.
The fifth category is
where concrete words are used figuratively. The feeble minded will regard the
literal and exoteric meaning sensible and will not go
beyond it; but the man who has an insight for realities will
comprehend the secret it contains. This is like the words of him who said, “The
wall said to the peg, ‘why do you split me?’ The peg replied, [‘How do I know?].
As
him who is hitting me and does not let me go. Go see the
mallet which is behind me' ” This is, undoubtedly, figurative. Of the same kind
are the following words of God, “Then He applied Himself to
the Heaven, which was then but smoke: and
to it and to the Earth He said, ‘Come ye, whether in
obedience or against your will? And they
both said, ‘We come obedient’’S?rahXLI:10.
The stupid one, because of his lack of understanding, would assume that both
‘the Heaven and the earth possess life, intellect, and the ability to
understand speech. He would also assume that they were
addressed by a speech
of actually enunciated words which
both could hear and reply to with enunciated words saying,
“We come obedient.” But he who has insight would realise that this was a
figurative [use of language], and that God only expressed the idea that the
Heaven and earth are subject to His will. Of the same kind, too, are the words
of God when He said, “Neither is there aught which does not
celebrate His praise.” S?rahXVII:46.
The stupid one, because
of
his lack of understanding, would assume that the inanimate
things possess life, intellect, and the ability to speak and enunciate words,
so that they would have to say, “Praise be to God” in order that His praise might
be established. But he who has insight would
know that no actual
utterance with the tongue was meant
by that, but
merely that everything, through his own existence, praises
God, and in its own essence
sanctifies Him and attests to His
unity. As has been said:
In everything He has a song
Which declares that He is one.’36
In the
same way it is said, “This masterpiece testifies that its maker
possesses fair ability and perfect knowledge.” This does not mean that the
masterpiece actually utters the words, “I testify…"
etc. but merely that, through its form and state, [it testifies to the ability
and knowledge of its maker]. Similarly everything does, in itself,
stand in
need of a creator
to create and sustain it, to maintain its attributes
and to move it to and fro in its different states. And through its need
it testifies to its Maker by hallowing Him. Such a witness is comprehended
by those who have insight, not those who stand still and venture not beyond
externals. For this reason God said, “But their utterances of praise ye
understand not.”S?rahXVII:46.
The feeble minded do not understand this at all, while the favourites of God
and the versatile learned men do not
understand it perfectly because everything hallows God and praises Him in many
ways and each comprehends according to his intellect and insight. The
enumeration of these witnesses is not becoming under the science of
practical religion. In this part too those who
cling to externals differ from those who have insight, and
in it the disagreement between the esoteric and the exoteric becomes evident. In
this connexion people are either extremists or
followers of the middle-road. As extremists,
some have gone so far in the [allegorical] interpretation of words that they
have explained away all or most of their outward
and literal meaning. They have taken the words of
God,
“Yet shall their hands speak unto us and their feet
shall bear witness,” S?rahXXXVI:65. as
well
as, “And they shall say to their skin,
‘Why witness ye against us?’ They shall say,
‘God who giveth a
voice
to all things, hath given us
voice'," S?rahXLI:20. and the
conversation
which takes place between Munkar and Nak?r,
and in the balance (al-m?z?n),
the bridge (al-?ir?t),
and
the judgment day together with the debate between the
people
of Hell and the people of Heaven when [the former] said, “Pour
upon us some water, or
of
the refreshments God hath given you,” and claimed that all this was
figurative.
On the
other hand some went to the opposite
extreme and forbade [any but the literal interpretation]. Among those was
Ahmad
ibn- Hanbal who went as far as to forbid the allegorical interpretation of the
words of God ‘‘‘Be’, and it is.”S?rahXVI:42. [His
followers] have claimed that these words were words of actual speech with
enunciated letters and sounds brought into existence by God every moment He
created a created thing. I have even heard one of
his
followers say that [Ahmad ibn-Hanbal] forbade the
allegorical interpretation of all but three
traditions, namely the words of the Prophet when he said, “The Black Stone (al-Hajar
al-Aswad) is the
right
hand of God in the earth;” and, “The heart of
the
believer lies between two of the fingers of the Merciful [God];”
and
“Verily I shall find the soul of the Merciful [God
coming]
from the direction of al-Yaman.” [Even here] the
literalists have been inclined to forbid any allegorical interpretation. It is
assumed, however, that Ahmad ibn-Hanbal knew that ascending (istiw?’)
is
not fixity of location (istiqr?r),
and
descending (nuz?l)
is
not change of location (intiq?l);
nevertheless
he forbade allegorical interpretation for the good and welfare of people, since
whenever it is allowed matters become worse and go out
of
control, overstepping the limits of moderation. Things which go beyond the
limits of moderation are beyond control.
Therefore there is no harm done by
such
a prohibition which is also attested by the lives of
the Fathers who used to say, [when discussing verses and traditions], “Take
them literally as they have been [revealed and] handed down.”
Thus
M?lik, on
being
asked about ascending (istiw?’),
went
so far as to say, “The fact of ascending (istiw?’)
is
known but its manner is not; to believe in it is an obligation, to inquire
about its manner is a heresy.’’
Another group advocated the middle of the
road position and permitted allegorical interpretation in everything which
relates to the attributes of God but have taken
the things which pertain to the hereafter in a literal sense and forbade their
allegorical interpretation. The advocates of this position are the
Ash‘arites.37
The Mu‘tazilites go further.38 They explain away the
possibility of seeing God and His being possessed of hearing and sight. They
also explain away the ascension (al-mi'r?j)
of
the Prophet and claim that it had not taken place bodily, the punishment of the
grave, the balance, the bridge, and other eschatological representations.
Nevertheless they confess the resurrection of the body, Paradise with its food,
perfume, and sex as well as other sensual
pleasures, and Hell with burning first which scorch
the skin and melt the fat.
The philosophers go still further. They
interpret all eschatological representations as allegories denoting mental and
spiritual pain, and mental and spiritual delight. They deny the resurrection of
the body but believe in the immortality of the soul and that it will be
punished or made happy by
punishment
and
delight of non-sensual nature. They are extremists.
The true middle-road
between this complete allegorism and the rigidity of the Hanbalites is subtle
and obscure. It is found only by those who enjoy divine guidance and comprehend
things by the aid of divine light, not by hearsay. Then when
the mysteries of things are revealed to them, so that
they see them as they are, they go back to [the Qur'?n]
and
traditions and their wording; whatever agrees with what they see with the light
of certainty they affirm,
and
whatever disagrees with it they interpret allegorically.
But he who bases his knowledge of
these
things on mere hearsay will
thereby fail to secure a firm foothold or gain a
well-defined
position therein. Such a man who
confines
himself to mere hearsay would do better to follow the position of
Ahmad
ibn-Hanbal.
But a closer
examination and definition of the middle-road position in these things belongs
to the vast subject of revelation which we must leave aside. Our aim was only
to make clear that the esoteric and exoteric may be in harmony with one another
and that no disagreement exists between them. At any
rate
many things have been unfolded through [our discussion] of these five parts. It
is our opinion that for the common people the explanation of
the
creed which we have already given is sufficient for them and that
nothing further will be required of them in the first degree [where they
stand]. But if any fear of
disturbances
arises on account of the spread of heresies,
then, in the second degree, recourse may be had to a [statement of the] creed
wherein a brief and undetailed outline of the
obvious proofs is presented. We shall, therefore, present these obvious proofs
in this book and shall confine ourselves therein to
what we have issued to the people of Jerusalem,
entitled al-Ris?lah
al-Quds?yah
fi Qaw?'id
al-'Aq?'id
(The Jerusalem Epistle on the Foundations
of
the Articles of
Faith) and contained in the third section of
this
book.
SECTION III
The Third Section of
the Book on
the Foundations of
the Articles of
Faith :
On the
Obvious Proofs
for the Creed
Written In
Jerusalem
We say-In the name of God the Merciful,
the Compassionate. Praise be to God who distinguished the community of the
faithful with the lights of certainty and favoured the people of truth by
guiding them to the bulwarks of faith; who saved them from the errors of the
unrighteous and the wickedness of the unbelievers, and with His grace led them
to follow the example of the chief Apostle; who directed
their footsteps in the way of the honoured Companions of the Apostle and
enabled them to emulate the righteous Fathers, so that they protected themselves
against the dictates of [sheer] reason with the strong cord [of God], and
against the lives and beliefs of the ancients with the clear beaten track [of
the Fathers], combining thereby the products of reason and the ordinances of
the traditional Law. Furthermore they found out that mere verbal repetition of the
words “There is no god but God; Muhammad the Apostle of
God” is of no avail unless they completely
understand what fundamental principles the words of the witness involve. They
also have known that the two words of the witness, despite their brevity,
contain an affirmation of the
existence of God Himself, His attributes, and His works, as
well as an affirmation of the truthfulness of the Apostle.
They have also known that faith is
founded upon four pillars (sing. rukn) each
of which involves ten principles (sing.a?l).
The first pillar (rukn) is
the knowledge of
the essence of God and involves ten principles (sing.a?l). They
are the knowledge that God exists and that He is ancient
and subsisting; that He is neither substance nor
body nor accident; that He is not limited by direction (jihah)
nor fixed in location; that He is seen
and that He is one.
The second pillar
treats of the attributes of God and comprises
ten principles. They are the knowledge that He is living, knowing, powerful,
willing, possessed of hearing, seeing, and speaking;
that He is removed from being
a substratum for originated properties or a locus
of phenomena; and that His words, knowledge and will are ancient and eternal.
The third pillar
pertains to the works of
God and involves ten principles. They are :
that men’s actions are created and willed by God and
acquired by men; that God has
been gracious to create and to invent; that He is free to impose unbearable
obligations and to punish the innocent, while taking into consideration
that which is salutary (al-a?lah) is
not obligatory upon Him; that there is
nothing obligatory except by Law; that the sending of prophets is possible and the prophecy
of our Prophet Muhammad is true,
being confirmed by miracles.
The fourth
pillar is on the things
accepted on authority
(sam'iy?t) and
involves ten principles. They are the affirmation of the day of resurrection
and the day of judgement, the inquisition [of the dead by] Munkar and Nak?r,
the torment of the grave, the balance, the bridge, the creation of Paradise
and Hell, the nature of the im?mate,
that the excellence of the Companions is in accordance with the chronological
order, the qualifications of the im?mate,
and that even though piety and knowledge are not possible to
obtain [in the incumbent], his im?mate
is
considered legitimate and binding.
The first among the
pillars of belief is the knowledge of the essence of God and that He is one and
it involves ten principles.
The first principle
is the knowledge of the existence
of
God. The first light which should be used for illumination
and the first thing to be followed on the road of admonition are the
instructions of the Qur'?n, since no explanation is
better than that of God. Thus He said, "Have We not made the Earth a
couch? And the Mountains its tent-stakes? We have created you of two sexes, and
ordained you sleep for rest, the night as a mantle, and the day for gaining livelihood.
We built above you seven solid heavens, and placed therin a burning lamp; and We sent down waters in abundance
from the rain-clouds, that We might bring forth by it corn and herbs, and
gardens thick with trees" S?rah LXXVIII
: 6-16.
And again, "Assuredly in the creation of the Heaven and of
the Earth; and in the alternation of night and day; and in the ships which pass
through the sea with what is useful to man; and in the
rain which God sendeth down from Heaven, giving life by it to the earth after
its death, and by scattering over it all kinds of cattle; and in the change of the
winds, and in the clouds that are made to do service between the Heaven and the
Earth; - are signs for those who understand.” S?rah
II 159. He also
said, “See ye not how God hath created the seven heavens one
over the other? And he hath placed
therein the moon as a light,
and hath placed there the sun as a torch;
and God hath caused you to spring forth
from the earth like a plant;
hereafter He will turn you back into it again, and will bring you forth anew.”
S?rah LXXI:14-17. And again, “What
think ye? The germ of life-is it ye who created them? or we their creator? Is
it we who have decreed
that death should be among
you; yet are we not thereby
hindered from replacing you with others, your likes,
or from producing you again in a
form which ye know not. Ye have known the first creation: will ye not then
reflect ? What think ye
? That which ye
saw-. Is it ye who cause its upgrowth, or do we
cause it to spring forth? If we pleased we could so make
your harvest dry and brittle that ye would ever marvel (and
say), ‘Truly we have been at cost, yet we are forbidden harvest.’ What think ye
of the water ye drink? Is it ye who
send it down from the clouds, or send we it
down? Brackish could we make is, if we pleased
: Will ye not then
be thankful ? What think
ye? The fire which ye obtain by friction-is it ye who
rear its tree, or do we rear it? It is we who have made it a memorial and a
benefit to the wayfarers of the deserts.”
S?rah
LVI:58-72. Any one with the least traces of brain in his
head will, upon reflecting upon the import of these
verses and examining the wonders of God’s handiwork, in Heaven and on
earth as well as the beauties of nature in
animal and plant, realizes that this wonderful [universe]
with its consummate order requires a creator to
direct it and a maker to govern it and watch it over. Human nature, in
tact, testifies that it is subject to
the will of God and governed in accordance with His law. For this
reason God said, “Is there any doubt
concerning God, maker of the Heavens and of the Earth?” S?rahXIV:11.
The prophets were, therefore, sent in order
to call men to monotheism, that they may say, “There is no
god but God.” They were not, however, commanded to say, We
have a god and the world has another,” because such a thing is inborn in their
minds from the time of their birth. For this reason God
said, “If thou ask them who hath
created the heavens and the earth, they will certainly reply ‘God’.”S?rahXXXI:24.
And again,‘ “Set thou thy face then, as a true convert (han?f),
towards the faith which God hath made,
the native [religion] whereon God constituted
man.”S?rahXXX:29.
Therefore there is in human nature and the testimonies
of
the Qur’?n what
will render the task of citing proofs unnecessary. Nevertheless, by way of preparation
and following the example of the learned theologians, we say:
One of the accepted
axioms of the mind is that an originated phenomenon can not come into existence
without a cause. Since the world is an originated phenomenon, it can not, come
into existence without a cause. That originated phenomena can not come into existence
without a cause, is obvious. For every
originated phenomenon belongs to a certain definite time the precedence or the
subsequence of which may be assumed. Its being definite in time and
distinct from what preceded it and what succeeded it, will naturally require
one who renders things definite [in time]. As to
one
saying that the world is an originated phenomenon, its proof is
found
in the fact that bodies are not independent of
motion
and rest. Both states are originated phenomena; and whatever is not independent
of originated things is itself originated. The proof comprises three assertions
of claims.
The first is that bodies are not
independent of motion and rest. This is readily
understood and requires neither meditation nor thinking, for
he who conceives of a body in neither the kinetic state nor in the static state
is both ignorant and foolish.
The second assertion is our saying that
both motion and rest are originated phenomena, the proof of
which
is found in the alternation and in the appearance of the one
after
the other is gone. This is true of
all
bodies, those that have been seen as well as those that have
not been seen. For there is not
a static
object the potential motion of which is not required by
the
mind, and there is no moving object the potential rest of
which
is not required by the mind. The novel (??ri’)
is originated because of its emergence
and the anterior (s?biq), because of its
extinction (‘adam), since if its
eternity (qidam) were
established its extinction would have become impossible, as we
shall
show and
prove in establishing the subsistence (baq?’)
of
the Maker.
The third assertion is our statement that
whatever is not independent of originated things is itself originated. Its
proof lies in the fact that if it were not so,
then
there would be, before every originated phenomenon, other originated phenomena
which have no beginning; and unless
these originated phenomena come to nought in
their entirety, the turn for the present
originated phenomena to come into being immediately would
never arrive. But it is impossible for
that
which has no end to come to nought. Furthermore if
the celestial spheres have revolutions, the numbers of
which
have no end,
it is inevitable that their numbers be either odd or
even,
or both odd and
even, or
neither odd nor even. But it is impossible that their numbers be
both
odd and even at the same time, or neither odd nor
even for this would be a combination
of both the negative and the affirmative, since in the affirmation
of the one is the negation of the
other,
and in the negation of the one is the affimation of the
other.
Furthermore they can not possibly be
even
because the even number becomes odd with the addition of one;
and
how could that which has no end be wanting one? Nor
can
they possibly be odd because the odd number becomes even with the addition of
one; and
how could
it be wanting one when its number has
no end ? (Again they cannot
possibly
be neither odd nor even
for this will mean that they have an end).’39
Therefore the conclusion is that the world is
not
independent of originated phenomena, and that which is
not independent of originated
phenomena is itself originated. And when its being
an originated phenomena has been established, its need for an originator
becomes axiomatic.
The second principle is the knowledge that
God is ancient (qad?m)
from
eternity (azali). He has no
beginning,
but He is the beginning of everything and before anything living or
dead.
The proof of this is found in supposing that if God
were originated and not ancient, He would have been in need of an originator
Himself. In turn His originator would also need an originator and so on to
infinity. And that which goes on and on endlessly will
never reach an ancient originator which is the first
cause. This is the required thing which we have called the Maker of the world
and its Creator and Fashioner.
The third principle is
the
knowledge that God, besides being without beginning, is also everlasting
without end. He is the first and the last, the visible and the invisible, since
that of which the eternity is established its coming to an end is impossible.
Its proof lies in the realization that if it came to nought
it is inevitable that it should come to nought either by itself or
through an opposing annihilating agency. And if it
were
possible for a thing, which is conceived of as
self-subsisting, to come to
nought,
it will be possible for a thing, which is conceived of as self-annihilating, to
come
into being. And just as the sudden emergence (?aray?n) of existence
requires a cause (sabab),
so does
the emergence of extinction require a cause. That it will come to nought
through an opposing annihilating agency is false,
because if that annihilating agency were ancient (qad?m), existence
side by side with it would be inconceivable. But we
have
learnt in the two previous principles of the existence
and eternity of God. How then did He exist
in
eternity with His opposite? If, however, the
opposing annihilating agency were an originated phenomenon, its existence from
eternity would be impossible because for the originated phenomenon to
oppose
the ancient and destroy its existence is less likely than
the
ancient to oppose the originated and prevent its
existence. In fact prevention (daf
‘)
is
easier than destruction while the ancient is stronger and more
pre-eminent
than the originated.
The fourth principle is
that
God is not a substance which can be isolated.
Rather He transcends everything which resembles isolation. The proof of this
lies in the fact that every substance which is definite (mutahayyiz),
is limited by its own
place
and is inevitably either quiescent in it or moving away from it.
Therefore
it is not independent of motion or
quiescence.
But both these are originated, and that which is not independent
of originated phenomena is itself originated.
If an ancient definite substance were
conceivable the eternity of the substances
of the world would have been reasonable. And if a
person
should use the term substance [for God] and not mean thereby a
definite
substance, he would be mistaken as far as
the
use of the term is concerned, not as far as the meaning for
which
he had used it.
The fifth principle is
that
God is not a body (jism) composed of different substances, since the body is
that
which is composed of substances. When
His being a substance limited by place is refuted,
His being a body is also refuted, because every body
is
limited by place and is composed of substances. But it is
impossible for the substance to be free from division, composition, motion,
quiescence, form, and quantity, all of which are characteristic of originated
phenomena. And if it were possible
to believe that the Maker of the world is a body,
it would also be possible to believe in the Divinity
of the sun and the moon
as well as other heavenly bodies. If, therefore,
one should dare and call God a body
but not mean thereby a
composition of substances,
he would be wrong as
far as the name is concerned,
but not in negating the idea of body.
The sixth principle is the
knowledge that God is not an accident (‘arad) subsisting
in a body or existing in a substratum;
because an accident is that which exists in a body.
But every body is inevitably originated and as such its originator exists
before it. How then could [God] exist in a body when He has existent in eternity
alone, with no other besides Himself, and then originated the bodies and the
accidents after Himself. [Again how could He exist in a body] when He is
a knowing, and able, and willing Creator as shall be
discussed later. It is impossible
for
these attributes to exist in accidents. On
the contrary they are impossible except in a self-existing
and self-sufficient being. The conclusion derived from
these principles is that [God] is
a self-existing being, neither substance, nor body, nor
accident; that the
whole world is made of substances, accidents,
and bodies, and consequently He resembles nothing and
nothing resembles Him. He is the
living, the subsisting, there is none like unto Him. For how could the created
resemble its creator, the ordained he who
ordained it, and the fashioned, he who fashioned it. All bodies and accidents
were created and made by Him; hence it is
impossible that they be like unto Him or [in any way]
resemble Him.
The seventh principle
is the knowledge that God is removed from being limited by any direction
because a direction is either above or below, right or left, before or behind.
All these He had created and originated through the creation of man whom he
made with two extremities, the one rests on the
earth and comprises his feet, while the opposite extremity is his head.
Consequently the term above was originated to indicate the direction of the
head and the term below, the direction of the feet. This is true even of the
ant which creeps on the ceiling
with the result that the directions, in relation to it, are reversed-what we
consider above is to it below, and what we consider below is to it above.
Similarly man was created with two hands, the one usually stronger than the
other. The term right was therefore originated to indicate the direction of the
stronger hand and the term left to indicate the opposite direction.
Consequently the right hand side is called the right and the opposite direction
thereof is called the left. Man was also created with two [other] directions
from one of which he sees and toward which he moves. Consequently the term
before was originated to designate the direction toward which he moves, while
the term behind was
originated to designate the opposition.
Therefore the
directions are originated through the creation of man;
and had he not been created along these lines,
but rather created round like a sphere, these directions would never have
existed. How then could God have been limited by any direction
in
eternity when every direction is originated.
Or
how could He have become limited by any direction when
He never had any direction
above Him when He created man; for that will mean that He has a
head, since above designates the direction above the head. But God is too
exalted [above His creatures] to have a head [like their heads]. Again how
could He have become limited by any direction when He never had any direction
below Him when he created man; for that will mean that He has feet, since below
designates the direction below the feet. But God is too
exalted [above His creatures] to have feet [like their
feet]. All this is impossible [to imagine] in the mind. For whatever
the mind conceives is definite is so
far as it is limited by place, in the
same way as substances are limited, or by
substances, in the same way as accidents are. But the impossibility of His
being a substance or
an accident has been established; consequently
His being limited by direction becomes impossible.
If therefore
anything else is meant by the term direction other than these two meanings then
the usage will be wrong in terminology and signification; because if God were
above the world He would be opposite to it, and everything which is opposite to
a body is either equal to it in size, or smaller
or larger. All
this implied measurement
which necessarily requires
an object or
measurement. But God the One
Creator and Ruler of the
world is too exalted
above such things.
As
to the raising of hands heavenward at
the time of petition
it is because Heaven is the direction of supplication
and implies a description of the one to whom
the supplications are offered, such as majesty and grandeur, employing thereby
the direction of height to represent the quality of glory
and exaltation. For God is
above in all dominion and power.
The eighth principle is that
God is
seated upon the throne in the sense
which He willed by that state of equilibrium-a state which is not
inconsistent with the quality of grandeur
and to which the
symptoms of origination and annihilation do not permeate. It
is exactly what has been mean by the ascension to Heaven in the Qur’?n
when God said, “‘Then He ascended to Heaven and it was but
smoke.”’S?rahXLI:10.
This is only through dominion and power, as the
poet40 said,
“Bishr41 has gained dominion over al-‘Ir?q,
With neither sword nor shedding of blood.”42
Thus were the
people of truth (ahl al-haqq) compelled
to pursue such a figurative and allegorical interpretation just as the
esoterics (ahl al-b??in)
were compelled to
interpret the words of God,
“And wherever ye are, He is with you.”S?rahLVII:4.
This has been taken, by agreement, to mean thorough comprehension and knowledge
just as the words of the Prophet, “The heart of the believer lies between two
of the fingers of the Merciful [God]”, have been taken to mean might and power,
while his words, “The Black Stone is the right hand of God in the
earth,” have been taken to mean veneration and honour, because if they were
taken literally, the result would have been impossible. Similarly the sitting
of God upon the throne, if it were left to mean fixity of location and
stability, would necessitate that He who is seated upon the throne be a body in
contact with the throne, and be either equal to it in size, or larger
or smaller. But all this is impossible, and what leads to
the impossible is itself impossible.
The ninth principle
is that God, although removed from form and quantity and unlimited by
directions and climes, is nevertheless seen with the eyes in
the hereafter, the everlasting abode. For He said, “On
that day shall faces beam with light, outlooking towards
their Lord.”S?rahLXXV:23-33.
But He cannot be seen in this world
according to His words, “No vision taketh
Him, but He taketh in all vision”S?rahVI:103.
and according to His words in His conversation with Moses saying, “Thou shalt
not see Me.”S?rahVII:139.
Would that I
knew how the Mu‘tazilites knew the attributes of God that
Moses himself did not know; or how
Moses asked to see God S?rahVII:139
when seeing Him was impossible. Ignorance is more
likely to be rampant among heretics and sectarians than among the prophets.
The acceptance of the
verse [which speaks] of seeing [God]S?rahLXXV:22-23.
literally [is justified] because it does not lead
to anything impossible. For sight (ru’yah) is
a kind of revelation and knowledge, although it is more
complete and clearer than knowledge. And if it is
possible to know God without reference to distance or direction (jihah)
is also possible to see Him with reference to distance or
direction. And just as it is possible for God to see men without confrontation,
it is possible for men to see Him without confrontation; and just as it is
possible to know Him without modality or form,
it is possible to see Him likewise.
The tenth principle
is the knowledge that God is one without any associate, single
without any like. He is separate in creating
and innovating; He is alone
in bringing into existence and inventing.
There are none like Him to
rival or equal Him, and none opposite Him to
contest or contend with Him. The proof of this is found in the
words of God when He said, “Had there been in either [Heaven or
earth] gods besides God both surely would have gone to ruin.”S?rahXXI:22.
This will be readily illustrated [by the fact] that had there been two gods and
the first of
them willed a certain thing, the second, if he were under
compulsion to aid the first, would be a subordinate and impotent being rather
than an almighty god; and if the second
were
able to contradict and oppose the first, he would be
a powerful and dominating
being while the first would be weak and impotent rather than an almighty god.
The Second
Pillar Concerning the Attributes
of God,
Involving Ten Principles.
The first principle is
the knowledge that the Maker of the world is almighty and that, in His words,
“He hath power over all things,”S?rahV:120. He is truthful, because the world
is perfect in its making and orderly in its
composition. For he who would see a garment of silk,
fine in its weave and texture, symmetrical in its embroidery and
ornamentation, and would imagine that it was woven by a dead man that has no
life, or by a helpless man that has no power, would be completely
lacking in intellect and utterly foolish and ignorant.
The second principle is the knowledge that
God is omniscient knowing all things and comprehending all things; nothing in
Heaven or on earth is ever hid from His knowledge. He is truthful when He says,
“And He knoweth all things.”S?rahII:27. Furthermore evidence of His
truthfulness
is found in His words when He said, “What!
Shall
He not know who hath created? For He is the Subtle,
the Cognizant.”S?rahLXXVII:14. He
has
led you, through His creation, to arrive at the knowledge that you
can
not doubt the evidence which this intricate and orderly creation, even in
insignificant and meagre things, offers to the knowledge of the Maker of how to
bring order and how to arrange. And what God Himself said is
the
last word in guidance and in revealing
knowledge.
The third principle is the knowledge that
God is living, because he whose knowledge and power are established, his being
possessed of life will, of necessity, become established. If
it
is possible to conceive of the existence of an able, knowing, doing and ruling
being yet lifeless, it will be
possible to doubt the life of animals, despite their movements, as well as the
life of all craftsmen and artisans, all of which is utter ignorance and error.
The fourth principle is the knowledge that
God is willing. He wills all His works and nothing exists which does not depend
upon, and proceed from His
will. He is the Creator,
the Restorer, the Doer of whatsoever He
wills. And how could He not be a willer when, in everything which has proceeded
from Him, He could have willed its opposite; and wherever
there is no opposite He could have caused the Same
thing to proceed from Himself before or after the time in which it has
proceeded. His power is equal to coping with both opposites and both times in
the same way. Therefore, it is necessary that there should be a will which
directs His power to one or the other possible thing. And if
knowledge
would, in specifying the thing known, render the will needless, so that it
could be said that a thing has come into being at a time when its existence had
already been known, it would be possible for
knowledge to render power needless, so that it could be said
that a thing has come into being without [the
instrumentality of] power, but
simply because its existence had already been known.
The fifth principle
is the knowledge that God is hearing and seeing. Neither the cogitations of the
innermost heart nor the secret
thoughts and reflections are hid from His sight; the
sound of the creeping of the black ant upon the solid rock in the darkest night
is not beyond His hearing. And how could He not see and hear when seeing and
hearing are [attributes of] perfection not of defect?
Could the created be more perfect than the
creator, the thing made more magnificent and more complete than the maker?
Or how could they ever be equal, no
matter how much He might diminish in perfection
while His creation and handiwork increase therein? And
again how could the argument of Abraham against his father, who ignorantly and
erroneously worshipped idols, be sound?
Abraham addressed his father saying, “Why dost thou worship
that which neither seeth nor heareth
nor availeth thee aught?"S?rahXIX:42.
But if these defects which characterized the idols of his
father characterized his god as
well, his argument would have been invalid and his evidence worthless, and the
words of
God, “This is Our
argument which We furnished Abraham against His people,”S?rahXI
83 would have been false. And just at is has been possible for the mind to
conceive of
His being a doer, although He has none of
the physical senses, and knowing, although He has neither heart nor brain, so
it is possible to conceive of Him as
seeing, although He has no eyeballs, and
hearing, although He has no ears,
for all cases are the same.
The sixth principle
is that God speaks with a speech which is a self-existing attribute. It is
neither a sound nor a letter; it does not resemble the speech of other beings,
just as His existence does not resemble theirs. In reality genuine speech is
the speech of the soul although sounds were
built into words merely as symbols, just as gestures and signals are often used
to represent the same thing. How then has this fact not been known by a group
of ignorant people while it has been known by ignorant
poets.
Said their spokesman:
“Genuine speech is that of the heart;
Our words are its outward expression.”
As to him
whose intellect does neither deter nor restrain him from saying that his tongue
is an originated thing, but what originates in it by means of his originated
power is ancient, [you have no reason to expect that he will ever be sane
again, and, therefore, shun all discussion with him. Similarly pay no attention
to him who does not understand that the ancient (qad?m)
is that thing before which nothing
existed. (Thus in
the words “bism-All?h”
the b precedes the s and
consequently the s cannot be ancient). For God has a
secret [ reason ]
for leading some men astray; “And
whom God causeth to err, none shall guide.”S?rahXIII:33.
As to him who deems it improbable that Moses could have, in this world, heard a
speech which was neither sound nor phone, let him deny that in the
hereafter he could see a being who has neither body nor colour. But if it has
been possible to conceive of seeing that which has no
colour, or body, or size or quantity, while until now
nothing else has been seen, the same thing would be possible in the case of hearing,
just as it has been in the case of seeing.
And if it has been possible to conceive of God as having one knowledge, which
is the knowledge of all existent things, it would also be possible to conceive
of Him as having one attribute, which is a speech comprising all that He has
represented with words. And if it has been possible to conceive
of
the existence of the Seven
Heavens, and Paradise and Hell, written all on a small piece of paper and
preserved in a minute part of the heart, and seen with a
part of the eyeball not exceeding the size of a lentil seed,
without the Heavens and Earth, Paradise and Hell actually existing in the
eyeball, or the heart, or the paper, it would also be possible to conceive of
the speech of God as being read with tongues, preserved in the hearts, and
written in
books, without the actual existence of that speech in these
things. For if the very speech
[ of God ] should
actually exist on the leaves of a book,
God Himself, through the writing of His name on these leaves, would exist
actually thereon. Similarly the very fire of Hell, through
the writing of its name on
the leaves, would exist actually thereon and [ the
leaves ] would be consumed.
The seventh principle
is that the self-existing speech [of God], as well
as His other attributes, is ancient from eternity; since it is impossible that
He be a substratum for originated phenomena and subject to change. On the
contrary His attributes demand the same external nature which His essence
demands. Change does not overtake Him and mishaps do
not befall Him. Nay, He does not cease, in His eternal
nature, to be described with the commendable attributes, and in His
everlasting nature, to be far removed from change. For whatever is a substratum
for originated phenomena is not free therefrom, and whatever is not free from
originated phenomena is itself originated. The description
of bodies with the epithet of origination was established because of the fact
that they are subject to change and variation in properties. How, then, could
their Creator share with them [ the property
of ] accepting change.
We conclude from this
that the speech of God is ancient from eternity and
self-existing. Only the sounds which represent it are originated. For just as
it is possible to conceive that a
child’s desire for learning and
his wish for it are existent in the personality of the
father before the child is born-so that when he is born
and attains maturity, having been given by God [a predilection for that]
knowledge which is related to the father’s desire, he becomes bound by that
same desire which existed in the personality of his father and persisted until
he has
acquired the knowledge related to it-it is likewise
possible to conceive that the divine command, which the words “Take off thy
shoes” S?rahXX:12.
represent, has existed in the personality of God [from the
beginning], and that these words were addressed to Moses after he was born,
having been given by God [the predilection for] their knowledge and an ability
to hear that ancient speech [of God].
The eighth
principle is that His
knowledge is
ancient. He has not ceased to know Himself and His
attributes, as well as everything which He creates.
Everything which He creates is not novel to Him, rather it comes into being
with His eternal knowledge. Thus if we were given foreknowledge of the coming of Zayd
at sunrise, and that foreknowledge persisted until the sun had risen, then the
coming of Zayd at sunrise would have been known to us
through that foreknowledge without any necessity
for its renewal. This is, then, how
the eternal nature of the knowledge of God should
be
understood.
The ninth principle
is that His will is ancient. In its eternal nature it governs the origination
of phenomena in their appointed times in accordance with the eternal
foreknowledge [of God]. For if His will were originated [and not ancient], it
would have become a substratum for originated
phenomena. Furthermore if the will of God
should happen in other than Himself, He would not be the
willer of it, just as you would not yourself execute an action which is not
in yourself. No
matter what hypothesis you may assume,
its presence requires another will, and likewise
the other will requires a third, and so on to infinity. And
if it were possible for a will to come into being without [another] will, it
would be possible for the world to come into being
without a
will.
The tenth principle
is that God
is living possessing life, powerful possessing might, willing
possessing a will, a
speaker with the ability to speak, a hearer who can hear,
and seeing possessing sight. He has the qualities of these ancient attributes.
To speak of a
knower but without knowledge is like speaking of one
who is wealthy but without wealth, or
of
knowledge without a knower, or a
knower without something known. For knowledge,
the knower, and that which is known are inseparable just
as murder, the murdered, and the
murderer are inseparable. And just as it is impossible to conceive
of a murderer without murder and one murdered, or of
one murdered without a murderer and murder, it is impossible
to conceive of a knower without
knowledge, and of
knowledge without something known, and of something
known without a knower. These three are inseparable and the one is inconceivable
without the other. Whoever would deem it possible that
a knower would exist independently of knowledge, he
would have to
deem it possible that a knower could exist independently of
that which is known, and that knowledge could exist independently of a knower,
since there is no difference between these qualities.
The Third Pillar
Concerning the Knowledge of
the Works
of God, Involving Ten
Principles.
The second principle
is the fact that God, being the sole inventor of the actions of
His servants, does not prevent them from doing voluntary (maqd?rah)
actions by way of acquisition, for God
has created will (qudrah) as
well as the willed (maqd?r),
choice as well as
the chosen. Will is a quality with regards to man and a
creation of God
rather than an acquisition (kasb); whereas
actions are a creation of God and an acquired quality of
man. They were created voluntary through His will which is one of His
attributes. Furthermore they are related to another quality which is called
freedom (qudrah). Consequently
in this relation, they are called an acquisition. And how could they be the
result of complete compulsion (jabr) when the difference between the voluntary
actions and the involuntary (dar?ri)
reflexes is instinctively comprehended by man? Or how
could they be a creation of man when he does not know the
different parts of acquired (muktasabah) actions
and their numbers? Thus when the two extreme positions are disproved, [namely
the position that actions are the result of compulsion
and the position that they are the result of volition], there remains nothing
except the middle-road position which asserts that they are voluntary through
the will of God by invention
and through the will of the servant by another connexion which is expressed by
the term acquisition (iktis?b).
The connexion between the will and the
willed need not necessarily be one of invention only, since the will of God in
eternity was connected with the world although the world was not yet invented,
and at the time of invention the connexion is of a
different nature. Hence it is evident
that the will is not limited by the necessity that the willed should obtain.
The third principle is that
the works of the servant, although they are his acquisition (kasb),
are nevertheless willed by God. Neither
a twinkling of an eye nor a
stray thought of a heart ever occur, either in the visible
or the invisible world except through His decree and will. He is the source of
good and evil, benefit and harm, belief [Isl?m]
and unbelief, knowledge and ignorance,
success and failure, orthodoxy and heresy, obedience and disobedience,
monotheism and polytheism. There is none that rescinds His commands, none that
supplements His decrees. He leads astray whom He wishes and guides whom He
wishes. “He shall not be asked for his doing, but they shall be asked.”S?rahXXI:23.
This is attested in tradition by the words which enjoy the catholic consent of
all the faithful, namely, “What He wills is and what He
wills not is not,” as well as the words of God, “That had He pleased; God would
have certainly guided all men aright;”S?rahXIII:30
and again, “Had we pleased we had certainly given to every soul its guidance.”S?rahXXXII:13.
As
to the evidence for it from reason [we know ]
that if God does neither like nor will sins and crimes, they
must be in
accordance with the will of the enemy, the devil (Iblis),
who is the enemy of God, and consequently
what takes place in accordance with the will of the
enemy will be greater than what takes place in accordance with the will of God.
How on earth would a Muslim deem it possible that the authority of the most
powerful God, He of the majesty
and honour, be reduced to a state [so weak] that if the authority of a village
chieftain were reduced to it, he would scorn and adjure it, since if the enemy
of the village chieftain can achieve in the village itself more than the
chieftain himself, the latter would abjure his rank and resign his office?
But his prevails
among men, and according to the innovators, its prevalence is contrary
to the will of
God. This would be the limit in
weakness and impotence. God, the Lord of Lords
is high exalted above the
blasphemous words of the transgressors.
Furthermore when it
becomes evident that the works of men are, in relation to God,
created, it follows that they are also, in the same way,
willed by Him. If
it should then be asked, “How does God forbid what He has
willed and enjoin what He does not will?” we
would say that the question is not that
of
will (ir?dah). Therefore
if a master strikes his slave and is reprimanded
by the sult?n, he
justifies his action by the rebellion of the slave against him. But the sult?n
disbelieves him. So he attempts to prove his contention by ordering the slave
to do something which the slave would refuse in the presence of
the sult?n.
Therefore he tells the slave to saddle a mount. Now the
master ordered the slave to do something the fulfilment of
which he did not really
desire. If
he had not given his order, he would not have been able to
justify himself; and if had really desired its
fulfilment he would have desired destruction for
himself, which thing is impossible.
The fourth principle
is the knowledge that God is generous
in
creating and inventing and gracious in imposing obligations
upon men. Neither creation nor imposing
obligations were necessary for Him although the Mu‘tazilites hold that these
were necessary
for the welfare of men.
But this is impossible since
He is the sole cause
(m?jib),
the only being
to enjoin
and to forbid. How then can He be subject to
any
necessity or exposed to any need or petition.
Necessary (w?jib)
means
one of two things: First an act in the
neglect of which is harm, either remote as is the case when we
say that it is necessary for
men to obey God if they want to
escape torment by fire in the hereafter, or
immediate
as is the case when we say
that it is necessary for him who is thirsty to
drink lest he dies. Secondly, it means anything the non-existence of which
would lead to an impossibility. Thus it is said that the existence of that
which is known is
necessary
(w?jib)
since
its non-existence will lead to an impossibility,
namely knowledge becoming ignorance.
If the adversary,
by saying that the act of creation is necessary for God, should
mean the first signification, he would expose
God to harm. If he should mean the second signification, he would
then be a Muslim, since when knowledge of thing obtains, its existence will be
inevitable. But if he should mean a third signification,
that thing is unintelligible. As to his
statement
that [creation and imposing obligational are necessary for the welfare of men,
it is worthless since if no harm would overtake God for neglecting the welfare
of men, the assertion that [creation and imposing obligation] are necessary, as
far as God is concerned, is meaningless. Furthermore,
the welfare of men demands that God should create them in Paradise;
to
create them in the world of misery and to expose them
to sin, lay them open to the dangers of punishment, and to the terrors of
resurrection and the day of judgment, spell
no bliss in the opinion of the intelligent.
The fifth principle is that, contrary to
the position of the Mu‘tazilites, God is free to impose on men obligations
which are beyond their power to fulfil, For if this were not contingent, it
would be impossible for men to ask God to spare them that burden. But as a
matter of fact they have beseeched God to spare them that burden when they
said.” “ O our Lord !
Lay
not on us that for which we have no strength.”S?rahII:286
Furthermore God has informed His prophet that Abu-Jahl would not believe Him,
nevertheless God commanded the Prophet to command Abu-Jahl to believe in all
the words of God. But among the words of God were those that Abu-Jahl would not
believe Him. How then-would he believe Him by not believing Him?
The
existence of such a thing is absolutely impossible.
The sixth principle is that, contrary to the position which the Mu‘tazilites hold, God is free to inflict pain on men and to torment them, without their having previously committed any offence, and without the necessity of compensating them with future rewards. For He has freedom of action among His subjects and its inconceivable that His subjects would oppose His freedom therein. Tyranny is dispensing with the possessions of others without their permission. But this is impossible in the case of God, because He does not confront possessions belonging to others besides Himself whereby His dispensing with these possessions could be tyrannous.
The existence of such
a thing proves its
contingency. Thus the slaughter of animals is an
infliction of pain on them, and the various kinds of torture
which man imposes upon
them have not been preceded by any offence.
If
it should be said that God will raise
them from the dead and will reward them according to the
amount of pain which they suffered, and that
such action is necessary,
and, therefore, incumbent upon God to perform, we would say that
anyone who would claim that it is incumbent upon God to
bring every ant which was killed under the feet and every
bug which was crushed
between the fingers back to life, so that He might reward them for
the pains which they suffered, would violate the dictates of
the Law and reason, since He would
regard resurrection and reward necessary and therefore incumbent upon God. If
he means thereby that God will suffer some harm
through its neglect, then it is impossible;
and if he means something else, we have
already said that it will be intelligent whenever it does not conform
to [any of] the [two] meanings of the
term necessary (w?jib)
mentioned above.
The seventh principle
is
that God does with His servants whatever He wishes and does not
have to take
into consideration that which is salutary (al-aslah)
for His servants, because of what we have already mentioned
regarding the fact that there is nothing necessary and,
therefore, incumbent upon God. In fact it is not
reasonable to think of necessity in connexion with God. “He shall not be asked
for His doing, but they shall be asked.”S?rahXXL:23.
I wonder
what answer would the Mu‘tazilites give when, in connexion with his statement
that it is incumbent upon God to do what is salutary and good, we place before
Him the following [hypothetical] problem: It
is supposed that in the hereafter an argument takes place between two persons,
a child and an adult, both of whom died Muslims. Now, according to the
Mu‘tazilites, God exalts
the rank of the adult and gives him preference over the child, because the
former toiled and laboured in acts of worship after he attained maturity. In
fact this is incumbent upon God according to the Mu‘tazilites. Suppose then
that the child says, “ O
my Lord! Why hast thou
exalted his rank above mine?” And God answers, “Because he hath attained
maturity and hath laboured in acts of worship.” Thereupon the child rejoins,
“But Lord, it is thou who hast caused me to die a child. Thou shouldst have
prolonged my life until I attained maturity; then I would have laboured in Thy
worship. But thou, O Lord, hast deviated from justice by favouring him with long
life. Lord ! Why hast thou
so favoured him?” God would
then reply, “Because I knew that if thou hadst lived to
attain maturity, thou wouldst have committed the sins of polytheism and
disobedience. Hence it was salutary for thee to die a child.” Such will the
apology of the Mu‘tazilite be for God. But then the unbelievers will cry up
from the midst of Hell-fire saying : “0
Lord ! Hast thou not
known that if we had lived to attain maturity we should have committed the sin
of polytheism? Why then hast thou not caused us to die in childhood before we
could sin ? We should
have been content to enjoy in Heaven a lesser rank
than
that of the Muslim child.” What kind of answer could be
given for this? In the face of this situation, is it not imperative to
conclude
that divine matters, in view of their majesty, transcend the evaluation and
judgment of the followers of the Mu‘tazilite school ?
If it should be
said that since God can consider that which is salutary for
men but instead he inflicts upon them all manner of
torment,
His action is undesirable and unworthy of wisdom, we should then say that the
undesirable is that which does not promote the
satisfaction of one’s desire. But a thing may be undesirable to one person and
desirable to the other if it disagrees with the desire of the one and promotes
that of the other. Thus a family would deem the murder of their child
undersirable but their enemies would welcome it. Hence if that which does not
promote the satisfaction of the desire of God is what is meant by
the word undesirable, then it is impossible, because God has no desire and,
therefore, it is impossible to conceive of anything
undesirable proceeding from Him, just as it is impossible to conceive of God
being tyrannous, because it is impossible to conceive of Him acting freely with
the possessions of others, [since He does not confront possessions belonging to
others
besides Himself]. But if that which does not promote the desire of some other
than God is what is meant by the word undesirable,
then why did you say that it was impossible for Him?
Is it
not merely wishful thinking, disproved by what we have postulated in the debate
of the adult and the child and the plea of the unbelievers
from the midst of Hell-fire? Furthermore the
wise is he who knows the realities of things and
capable of harnessing them in accordance with his will. It is here where the
consideration of that which is salutary is imperative. And as to the wise among
us, he takes into consideration that which is salutary as far as he himself is
concerned, in order to gain there with praise in this world and
reward in the hereafter, or to prevent some evil from befalling him-all of
which
are impossible in the case of God.
The eighth principle is that the knowledge
of God and obedience to Him are obligatory upon men, not, as the
Mu’tazilites say, on account of reason, but on
account
of the ordinance of God and His Law. For if reason renders obedience
obligatory, it does so either for nor
purpose,
which thing is impossible, or for some purpose
or desire. This must refer either to God, which thing is
impossible
since God is free of all desires and wants [in fact
belief and unbelief, obedience and disobedience, are, the same in
relation
to God], or to the desire of the creature, which is also
impossible, since the creature has no desire at the time, but
rather he is worried by reason and is deterred from
his
desires because of it; and he has no
desire
except reward or punishment in the hereafter. But how could it be known that
God rewards man for obedience and disobedience and does not punish him for them
when both, in relation to Him, are the
same. Furthermore He has no inclination to the one or
to the other and is not
characterized by the one or the other. The
knowledge of how to distinguish
between them was arrived at
through
the Law; while he who
arrives at it through
drawing an analogy
between the creator and the creature errs, as the creature
distinguishes between gratitude and ingratitude on
the basis of the amount
of
joy, gladness, and pleasure which he derives from the one or
the other.
If it should
be said that if study and knowledge are not
rendered obligatory except through the Law, which does
not become fixed and defined unless the person who is
required to fulfil its obligations studies and examines it,
and if
that person should say to the Prophet that reason does not
place upon him any such
obligation, and, therefore, he is not going to pursue the
study of the Law
despite the fact that
it becomes fixed and defined only through such study,
with the result that the Prophet is silenced, we would
then say that this argument is
the same as that of the person
who, on being warned by another that there is a
wild lion standing behind him, and that unless he runs away the beast will devour
him, and that he can ascertain
that the warning is true if he
will only look behind, says to the one who warned him that the truth of the
warning can be established only if he looks behind him, yet he is
not going to do so unless the truth of the warning is first
established. This will reveal the foolishness of the man and will accomplish
nothing besides exposing him to
the danger of being devoured. It will not, however, cause the Warner any
harm. The same is
true of the Prophet who says, “Beware,
for death is lurking behind you and further beyond wild lions and consuming
fire await you. If we
do not take heed for yourselves and admit my truthfulness by acknowledging my
miracle, ye will surely perish. He who will take notice will realize
the dangers, take the necessary precautions, and will consequently be saved but
he who will not take notice and persists in his subbornness will die and
perish. But I
shall suffer no harm even though all men may perish, because
my
duty is confined to warning.”
The Law declared the
existence of the wild lions beyond death, while reason aids
in understanding the words of the
Prophet and in realizing that what he foretells is possible, and nature urges
that precautions be taken against injury and harm. A thing
is necesary because its neglect causes injury and harm; while is
reason that which renders a thing necessary because it makes
known the impending harm. But reason in
itself does not lead to the knowledge that when a person follows his appetite
he will expose himself to harm
after death.
This then is the
meaning of both the Law and reason as well as their part in
determining that which is necessary. For had it not been
for the fear of punishment for the neglect of things enjoined, necessity would
not have been established, since the term necessary would be meaningless if no
harm in the hereafter were consequent upon its neglect in
this world.
The ninth principle
is that sending prophets is not
impossible. This is contrary to
the Brahmans who say there is no use in sending prophets since reason renders
it unnecessary. [This is false] because reason does not
guide men to works which lead to salvation in the
hereafter, just as it does not guide them to discover medicines which are
useful in the health. Therefore the need of men for prophets in just
like their need for physicians. The integrity of the physician
is known through experience while the truthfulness of the
principle is known through
miracles.
The tenth principle is
that God sent Muhammad as the last of
the prophets and as an
abrogator of all previous Laws before him; the laws
of the Jews and
the Christians and the S?bians;43
He upheld him with unmistakable miracles and wonderful signs such as
the splitting of the moon,44
the praise of the
pebbles45 and
causing the mute animal to speak,46 as well
as water flowing from between
his fingers47 and the
unmistakable sign of the glorious Qur’?n
with which he challenged the Arabs S?rahXVII:90.
For the Arabs, in
their struggle with the Prophet, did everything to check
mate him but despite their
distinguished ability and excellence in eloquence
and rhetoric, they were not able to oppose him with anything like the Qur’?n,
because it was not within the power of human beings,
[in their writings], to combine
the succinctness of the phrases of the
Qur’?n and the smoothness of its style
(notwithstanding
the richness of the Qur’?n in narratives
of early history and the fact that the Prophet himself was
unlettered (ummi and unfamiliar with books) with the
prediction of
unknown future events the subsequent occurrence of which
established the truthfulness of the Prophet. Examples of this are found in the
words of
God when He said, “Ye shall surely enter the sacred Mosque,
if God will, in
full security, having your heads shaved and your hair cut;”S?rahXLVIII:27
and again, “Alif, L?m, M?m.
The Greeks have been defeated in a land
hard by; but after their defeat, they overthrow their foes in a
few years.” S?rahXXX:1-3.
The reason why a
miracle attests the truthfulness of apostles is because everything which human
beings can not do must be the work of God. Whatever is linked by the Prophet
with a
challenge enjoys the same position as that to which God says
“You are right.” This is like the case of the person
who, standing before the king announces to the subjects that he is the king’s
messenger, and in
order to prove that he is right asks
the king to stand upon his throne and sit down three times contrary to his
usual practice. The king obliges and the subjects know, beyond the shadow of
doubt, that the king’s action takes the place of his
saying “You are right.”
The Fourth Pillar Concerning the Things Accepted
on
Authority and Believing what the Prophet Related
Concerning them, and it Involves Ten Principles.
The first principle
is the belief in
the resurrection of the dead and
the day of judgment both of which have been mentioned in tradition.48
They are real and belief in them is obligatory, because, according to reason,
they are possible. They signify restoration to life after death which, like the
first act of creation, is within the power of God. Said God, “Who shall give
life to bones when they are rotten? Say: ‘He shall give life to them who gave
them being at first’.’’S?rahXXXVI:78.
Therefore the ability of God to restore the dead to life
is deduced from His ability to perform the first act of creation. Said, God,
“Your creation and quickening (hereafter), are but as those of a
single individual.”S?rahXXXI:27.
Restoration to life is nothing but a second
act of creation, and is possible like the
first act of
creation.
The second principle is
the belief in the inquisition of Munkar
and Nakir. This is
mentioned in tradition,49
and should,
therefore, be accepted, because it is possible,
since it does not require anything except the restoration to life of that part
[of the body] with which dialogues are understood. This is
possible in itself and neither the
apparent stillness of the dead man’s corpse nor our
failure to hear the questions put to him
will refute it. For the sleeping person is outwardly still and motionless, but
he perceives inwardly pains and pleasures
the effects of which he
feels once he is awake.
Furthermore the Prophet used to hear the voice
of Gabriel and to see him while those who were around neither
heard nor saw him.50
For
“nought of His
knowledge shall they grasp, save what
He willeth.”S?rahII:256 b.
Thus if God does not create for men
hearing and sight, they will not know Him.
The third principle
is the belief in
the punishment of the grave
which is mentioned in tradition.51 God [also]
said, “It is the fire to which they shall be exposed morning and evening, and
on the day when‘the Hour’ shall arrive-‘Bring in the
family of Pharaoh into
the severest punishment.”S?rahXL:49.
It was also well known that the Prophet and the righteous Fathers were wont to
seek refuge in God from the punishment of the Grave.52 This punishment of the
grave is possible and the fact that the corpse may be dismembered and scattered
in the bellies of lions and the gizzards of fowls does not prevent the belief in it,
because the bodily members which feel the pains of punishment are those
particular members to which God ordains the restoration of sense perception and feeling.
The fourth principle
is the belief in the balance which is real. God said, “Just
balances will we set up for the day of resurrection;”S?rahXXI:48
and again, “And they whose balances shall be heavy, these are they who shall be
happy. And they whose, balances shall be light, these are they who have lost
their souls." S?rahVII:7-8.
The manner in which this is done is that God
causes to exist in the balance sheets of men’s works a weight in
proportion to the value of these works in His sight.
Consequently the value of the works of men becomes known to them so that the justice of
God in punishment,
His grace in forgiveness, and generosity in reward might become evident.
The fifth principle is the belief in the
bridge (al-?ir?t),
which
is stretched over Hell; it is finer than a hair and sharper
than the edge of the sword. God said, “And guide them to the road for Hell, and
set them forth: they shall be questioned.”S?rahXXXVII:23-24.
This is also possible and belief in it is obligatory. For God who is
able to make the birds fly in the air is
also able to make man walk over the bridge.
The sixth principle is the belief that
Paradise and Hell are created. God said, “And vie in haste for pardon from your
Lord, and a Paradise, vast as
the
Heavens and the Earth, prepared for those who fear God."S?rahIII:127. The
word of God ‘prepared' proves that both Paradise and Hell are
created. Therefore the literal meaning of the verse should be accepted,
especially since it is not impossible. Nor will it be said that there is no use
in their creation before the day of judgment because “God is
not
responsible to anyone for His works while His servants are answerable for
theirs.”S?rahXXI:23.
The seventh principle is
that
the rightful im?ms after the
Apostle of God are Abu-Bakr, then ‘Umar, then ‘Uthm?n, and then
‘Ali. No clear designation of an im?m
was
ever made by the Apostle of God. For had there been any such designation it
would have had a much better chance to become known and survive than the
designation of a local im?m
in
some part of the land by unknown governors and army commanders. In the
latter case the designation became known and survived. How then did it not
become known and survive in the case of the Apostle? If it were really made,
how then did it disappear and why was it not transmitted
to us? Accordingly Abu-Bakr was not an im?m except
through election (ikhtiy?r)
and
through the oath of allegiance (bay‘ah). To hold that someone other than
Abu-Bakr was designated53 would amount to the same thing as
accusing
all the Companions of contradicting the Apostle and of violating the principle
of catholic consent. No one dares fabricate such an accusation except the R?fidites.54
The belief of the orthodox community requires the vindication of all the
Companions as well as their praise just as God and His
Apostle have praised them.55 As to the struggle which took place
between Mu‘?wiyah and ‘Ali,
it was the result of different points of view in independent
interpretation (ijtih?d)
rather
than a struggle wherein Mu‘?wiyah disputed ‘Ali’s right to the im?mate. ‘Ali
deemed that the surrender of the assassins of ‘Uthm?n, because of
their many relatives among the tribes and the fact that these relatives were
scattered all over the army, would lead to disturbances which would endanger
the safety of the im?mate in its early days. He,
therefore, saw fit to postpone their surrender. On
the other hand, Mu‘?wiyah
thought that any delay in the surrender of the assassins to
justice would, in view of the enormity of their
crime, incite further attacks on the lives of im?ms
and would lead to the shedding of blood. One of the
celebrated learned men said
that every independent interpretor (mujtahid) of
the law was
right in
his own interpretation; while others said that he who is right
is one. No one of learning and
intelligence, however, has charged ‘Ali with error [in his interpretation].
The eighth principle is that
the excellence of
the Companions is in accordance
to their chronological order in which
they succeeded the Prophet. For real excellence is that
which is excellent in the
sight of
God, and no one will
have knowledge of it except the
Apostle of
God. Several
verses in praise of all the companions were revealed and a
number of traditions which recite their honour have been
handed down. Yet the subtle distinction of excellence and precedence is
not grasped except by those who were eye-witnesses to revelation
and had the opportunity to observe it in its
setting and to watch its development. Had they not understood
that so well they would not have
arranged matters as they did,
since they did not use to abandon the way of God because
of
threat of pressure and nothing would turn
them away from truth.
The ninth principle
is that, in addition to Islam, the qualifications of the im?mate
are five:56
male sex, being
of age (takl?f),
piety (wara‘), learning,
competence (kif?yah), and
membership in
the Qurayhs tribe, because the Apostle said, “The im?ms
should be of the Quraysh.”57 When these
qualifications obtain in several candidates, the im?m
will be the one who
receives the homage and allegiance of the
majority of Muslims, and he who contradicts the [will of the] majority is a
trespasser who should be brought back into line with the
majority.
The tenth principle
is that if
neither piety nor knowledge
obtain in the claimant, yet any attempt to oust him will result in perilous
and unbearable strife, we hold that his im?mate
should be considered legitimate and binding because of the grave dilemma which
confronts us.
Thus we have
either to replace him by another and consequently stir strife, in which case
the evil that will afflict the Muslims will surpass any loss
they may incur because of the claimant’s lack of piety
and knowledge, qualifications designed to promote the public welfare; but no
one will destroy the means of welfare in order to promote and enhance
it, for this will be just like the person who will erect a
single house and demolish a whole town; or we
have to declare that there is no im?m
and consequently there is neither law nor equity
in the land, which thing is impossible. We declare that
the authority of unjust rulers should be enforced in their
land because of the urgent need for authority therein. How, then, do we not
declare an im?mate
legitimate when the need for it is great and urgent ?
These then are four
pillars which comprise the forty principles which pertain to the foundations of
the
articles of faith. He who believes therein will be
in
harmony with the orthodox community and the enemy of
all heretics. May God by His grace guide us and lead our steps
into the way of truth.
SECTION IV
The Fourth Section of
the Book
on the Foundatlon of
the Articles of
Faith
On belief
and Islam,
the relation between and the
differences which
distinguish them, whether belief
increases or
decreases and
the
qualifications which the
Fathers laid down
concerning it. This
section comprises three
problems:
(Problem). People disagreed concerning
Islam, whether it was identical with belief (im?n)
or different therefrom;
and,
in the event it was different, whether it was removed from
belief and could exist without it, or
inseparable
from it and does not exist without it. Some have said
that they are one and the same thing, others that
they are two different things
wholly unrelated, and still others that although they are two different
things, they are closely related to each other.
Abu-T?lib al-Makki
had something to say in this connexion;
yet
what he said was greatly confused and extremely long.58 Let us,
therefore, proceed to declare the truth without bothering about what is
useless.
To begin with, this discussion comprises
three considerations: first concerning the literal meaning of
the
two terms Islam and belief (im?n);
second
the technical meaning of the two terms in the Qur’?n and tradition;
and
third the functions which they fulfil in this world
and
the next. The first is one of language, the
second is one of interpretation, and the third is one
of
jurisprudence and Law.
The first consideration concerning the
literal meaning of the words. Belief (im?n)
means
literally acceptance (ta?d?q).
God
said, “But thou wilt not believe us;” S?rahXII:17
which
is the same as saying that he will not
accept
their word. Islam on the other hand means submission (tasl?m),
and
surrender (istisl?m)
to
God through yielding (idh‘?n) and compliance (inqiy?d);
and
henceforth abjuring rebellion, pride, and stubbornness. Acceptance lies in the
heart while the tongue serves as its
interpreter. But submission is more
comprehensive and pervades the heart, the tongue and the senses. For
every
acceptance with the mind (ta?diq
bi’l-qalib)
is
a submission and a dispapproval of pride and unbelief. The same is true of
verbal confession (al-i'tir?f bi'l-lisan) as well as of obedience and
compliance with the senses. According to
the
dictates of language Islam is the more general
term, while belief (im?n) is the more
specific. Therefore belief represents the noblest part of Islam. Consequently
every acceptance is submission, but not every
submission
is acceptance.
The second consideration treats of the
technical meaning of the two terms in the Qur'?n and tradition. The
truth
of the matter is that the Law (al-shar‘)
i.e.
the Qur’?n and
tradition, has used the two terms as synonyms interchangeably, as different terms
of different
meaning, and as related terms the one being a part of
the
other.
Their use synonymously is
shown
in the words of God when He said, “And we brought
forth the believers who were in the
city: but
we found not in it but one family of Muslims.” S?rahLI:35-36. Yet as a matter of
fact there was only one family. God said again, “O
my people, If ye believe in God, then put your trust in Him-if
ye be Muslims.’’S?rahX:84. The Apostle also said, “Islam was built upon five
pillars.”59 At another time the Apostle was asked what belief (im?n) was and he
gave the same answer, namely the five pillars.
The use of the terms Islam and belief (im?n) to signify
different meanings is shown in the words of God when He
said, “The Arabs of the desert say, ‘We believe’. Say thou:
Ye
believe not; but rather say, ‘We profess Islam’.”60
This means that they have surrendered outwardly only. In
this
case the Apostle used belief (im?n)
for
acceptance with the mind only and used Islam for surrender outwardly through
the tongue and senses.
[Similarly when Gabriel assumed the aspect
of a stranger] and interrogated the
Prophet concerning belief (im?n) the latter
replied saying, “Belief is to believe in God, His angels,
books, apostles, the last day, the resurrection of the dead, the judgment, and in
the
decrees of God, the good and the evil.”61 Gabriel then asked what
Islam was, to which the Apostle replied by citing the
five pillars.62 He thus used Islam for submission outwardly in word
and deed.
According to a
tradition related on the authority of
Sa‘d [ibn-abi-Waqq?s]
the Apostle once gave a
certain man a
gift and to another he gave nothing. Whereupon
Sa‘d said, “O Apostle of God,
Thou
hast given this man nothing although he is a
believer;” to which the
Apostle added, ‘‘Or a
Muslim.” Sa‘d repeated his question
and again the Apostle added, “Or a Muslim.”63
Their use as
related terms, the one
being a part of the
other is shown by
what has been related concerning the Apostle of God when he was
asked what works were best and he replied, “Islam”; and when
he was asked which type of Islam
was best he answered. “Belief
".64 This proves the use of Islam and belief (im?n)
both as different terms and as related terms the one
being a part
of the other, which latter use is the
best linguistically, because belief is in reality
a work-in fact the best of works.
Islam on the other hand is submission either with the mind,
or with the tongue, or with the senses; but the best is the
submission with the mind. It is that acceptance which
is called belief.
The use of
the terms Islam and belief (?m?n) as
two
different words of different meanings, as
related terms, the one being a part
of the other, and as synonyms, does not overstep the possibilities which the
language allows. Their use as different terms of different
meanings makes belief (im?n)
signify acceptance
with the mind only, which signification conforms to the dictates of language;
it makes Islam signify submission outwardly, which thing is also
in harmony with the requirements of
language. For the submission in part is also called
submission, since the universal application of a term is not
a necessary
prerequisite for its use. Thus he who touches another with but a part of his
body is
nevertheless called contiguous despite the fact that the
whole of
his body is not in contact with
that of the other. Hence the application of the term Islam to outward
submission, although the inward submission is lacking, is
in complete harmony with the rules of language. In
this sense were the words of God used when He said, “The Arabs of the desert
say, ‘We believe.’ Say thou: Ye believe
not, but rather say “We profess Islam’.’’S?rahXLIX:14.
The same is true of the use of the two words [Islam and (im?n)]
in the tradition related by Sa‘d [ibn-abi-Waqq?s]
where the Prophet added “Or a Muslim.”65
He did that because he preferred the one to
the other. What is
meant by the use of the two terms as different words of
different meanings is that the terms contend for superiority
and vie with each other in excellence.
Their use as related
terms, the one being a
part of the other, is also in harmony with the rules of
language. It is the use of Islam for submission with the mind as well as with
word and deed; while using belief (?m?n)
for a part of Islam,
namely acceptance with the mind. This is what we meant by the use of Islam
and belief (?m?n)
as related terms, the one
being
a part of the other (tad?khul). It satisfies
the rules of language with respect to both the
specific application of belief (?m?n) and the general use of Islam, which is
all inclusive. [The one is specific and
particular while the other is general and universal]. It was in this sense that
the Apostle used the term belief (?m?n)
when
he replied to the question put to him as to which type of
Islam was best, thereby making it a particular aspect of Islam and a part of
it.
The use of the two terms
synonymously, thereby using the word Islam for both inward and outward
submission, would make it all submission; the same is
true
of belief (?m?n),
which
may be used freely and its particular meaning extended, thereby making it
general and including under it outward [as
well as inward] submission. This is quite possible because the
outward submission through word and deed is the fruit and result of inward
submission. Thus the name of a certain tree is freely used to signify both the
plant itself as well as the fruit of the plant. Similarly the signification of
the term belief may be extended so as to become general, thereby making it
synonymous with the term Islam and in exact agreement with it.
It
was in this sense that God used the words, “But we found not in it but one
family of Muslims.” S?rah LI:36.
The third consideration deals with the
legal rules which govern the two terms. Islam and belief (?m?n) have two
functions, one which pertains to the hereafter (ukhrawi) and one which
pertains to this world (duny?wi).
The function which pertains to the
hereafter is for the purpose of bringing men forth from Hell fire and preventing
them from remaining there for ever. The Apostle of God said, “Whoever hath in his
heart
the weight of an atom of belief will be
brought
forth from Hell fire.”66 People disagreed concerning
this function and concerning its
fulfilment, and have asked what things comprised belief (?m?n). Some have taught
that it is simply an inward adherence ('aqd bi'l-qalb) and verbal
confession (shah?dah
bi'l-lis?n). Others add a
third element, works according to the pillars [of Islam].
We shall then draw the veil off and
declare that there is no disagreement at all that anyone who combines in
himself all these three elements will have
his final abode in Paradise. This is
the first degree.
The second degree is
that
where a person has the first two elements and a part of the third, namely inward
adherence and verbal confession together with some works [according to the
pillars of Islam], but commits one or
several
[mortal] sins (kab?’ir).
According
to the Mu‘tazilites, the person [by committing such mortal sins] departs from
the true belief (?m?n) but does not thereby become
an unbeliever. He simply becomes a
reprobate
(f?siq).
[He is
neither
a believer nor an unbeliever] but occupies an
intermediary position between the two, and will remain eternally in Hell fire.
This, however, is false as we shall show.
The third degree is
where the person fulfils the inward adherence and verbal confession but fails
to perform the works [according to the pillars of Islam]. Men have disagreed
concerning it. Abu-T?lib
al-Makki held that works were a part of belief (?m?n)
and the latter is incomplete without
them. He also claimed that catholic consent (ijm?‘)
back his position and cited in its
support proofs and evidence which tend to prove the contrary, such as the words
of God when He said. “Those who believe
and do the things that are right.”S?rahII:23,76,277.
This quotation would indicate that works are something over and above belief (?m?n)
rather than a part of it.
Otherwise the reference to works would be a repetition, which is redundant.
It is strange
that Abu-T?lib al-Makki
should claim the support of catholic consent for this position of his and yet
relate the following tradition, “No one
would be declared an unbeliever unless he should deny what
he hath professed,” and finds fault with the Mu‘tazilites because they insist
that a person who commits a mortal
sin will remain eternally in Hell fire.Yet he who holds such views holds the
same views the Mu‘tazilites hold, since if he were asked whether or
not a person,
who accepted Islam with his heart and testified with his tongue thereto and
then died would be in Paradise, he would necessarily say ‘Yes’, thereby
asserting that belief (?m?n) could
exist without works. We would then add another question and ask him whether or
not that person, if he had lived until the time of prayer had arrived, but
neglected to
perform his prayer and died immediately after, or if he had
committed fornication and died whether or not he would remain eternally in Hell
fire? If he should answer, ‘Yes’, he would agree with the Mu‘tazilites;
but if he should say, ‘No’, it
would amount to a declaration
that works are neither a
part of belief (?m?n) itself
nor a prerequisite
for its existence. Neither are the necessary for
gaining the reward of Paradise. But if he should say that what he meant was
that the person [would remain eternally in Hell fire] only if he had lived a
long time without either praying or attempting any of
the works prescribed by the Law, we
would ask, “Exactly how long is that period, and how many say, those
good works through the neglect of which belief
is rendered worthless? How many of the mortal sins would, if committed, annul
belief?” Such a thing is
impossible to determine and no one has ever done so.
The fourth degree is
represented in the case of the person who accepts [Islam] inwardly with his
mind but dies before either confessing it verbally with his tongue or
performing any of
the works which its pillars prescribe. Would it be said that
such a person died a believer? People differ on this question. Those who insist
on verbal confession as a prerequisite
of belief would say that he died before fulfilling the conditions of belief. But
this is false because the Apostle said, “Whoever hath in
his heart the weight of an
atom of belief will be brought forth from Hell fire.” This person’s heart
overflows with belief; how then would he remain eternally in Hell
fire? Futhermore when Gabriel interrogated
the Apostle concerning belief (?m?n),
the only condition set forth was to
believe (ta?d?q),
[i.e. verbal
confession] in God, His
angels, His books, the last day, the resurrection of the dead, the judgment,
and in
the decrees of God, the good and the evil], as has already
been mentioned.
The fifth degree is
when a person accepts [Islam] in his
mind and lives long enough to be able to confess the two words of the
witness with his tongue and to know that they are obligatory upon him,
but for some reason, he does not so
confess them. It is possible that
his failure to
confess them with his tongue is like his failure to pray.
Concerning such a person we will say that he is a
believer not doomed to Hell fire eternally. For belief (?m?n)
is
simple acceptance (ta?d?q) and
the tongue is
its interpreter. It is certain,
therefore, that belief exists in its entirety even before its
verbal confession with the tongue, so that the
tongue can interpret it. This is the most plausible position,
since there is no choice but to follow the exact meaning of terms and to
satisfy the dictates of language. The Apostle said, “Whoever hath in his heart
the weight of
an atom of belief will be brought forth from Hell fire”. The
heart does not become void of belief because of the failure of the
person to fulfil the duty of confessing that belief with the tongue, just as it
does not become void of belief because of the failure
of the person to perform obligatory works. Some men have said that to confess
the two words of the witness with the tongue is indispensable (rukn) because it
is not merely an outward expression of the
inward [belief], but rather the sealing of a contract
and the commencement of a life of witness and obligation. The
first position is the more
correct. In
this connexion the Murji’ites67 have gone to the
extreme, declaring that no one who professed to be a Muslim will ever enter
Hell fire, and that a believer, even if he should sin, is sure of
salvation. We shall see to it that their
position is refuted.
The sixth degree is
to say with the tongue that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is
the Apostle of Allah, but disbelieve it in his
mind. We have no doubt
that the fate of
such a person in the hereafter
is with the unbelievers and infidels, and that he will
remain eternally in Hell fire. On the other hand we are
sure that in this world, the affairs of which
are entrusted to im?ms and
governors, he will be reckoned among the Muslims, because we have no access to
his heart and have, therefore, to give him the benefit of the
doubt and assume that he adheres in his mind to what he
had professed with his tongue.
We, however, have our
doubts concerning a third matter, namely the status which exists in this world
between such a person and his God, in the
event that one of his relatives should die, and as a result of his
relative’s death he accepts Islam in his mind as well. Having thus accepted
Islam in his mind as well, he sounds
the learned men concerning his status saying, “I
did
not accept Islam with my mind, [although
I had confessed it with my tongue], until my relative died.
Having fallen heir to his property, I wish to know
whether or not it is lawful for me to
receive
it ?” Or in case he had married a Muslim woman
[while
he yet disbelieved in his mind], but
upon
his marriage he came to accept Islam in
his mind; would he be required to go through the marriage contract again? These
questions are controversial and leave room for
different opinions. Thus it may be said that the decisions of
this world, whether they be manifest or hidden, depend
upon the express confession of Islam. It may also be
said that, in so far as they pertain to the individual in
his
relations to other men, these decisions depend upon the outward confession of
Islam, because the mind of the individual is not known to
others besides himself and God. The more
correct position, and God knows best, is that it
is
unlawful for that person to receive the inheritance of his deceased relative,
and that he must go through the marriage contract
a second time. For this reason, Hudhayfah [ibn-al-Yam?n] used to stay
away from the funerals of hypocrites, and it was customary for ‘Umar to follow
his example and absent himself whenever Hudhayfah did so. Nevertheless prayer
over the dead is a formal ceremonial, although
it is also one of the acts of worship. To
guard
oneself against what is unlawful is, like prayer,
among the obligations of the individual towards God. This is not contradictory
to our saying that inheritance is the law of Islam. Islam is surrender (istisl?m),
in
fact complete surrender is that which includes both outward and inward [acts].
These are doubtful problems in jurisprudence, based upon the outward meaning of
words, vague generalites, and mechani-cal analogies. Consequently no
one
immature in knowledge should think that he could
arrive at absolute certainty in any of these
cases, although it has been customary to cite them under those parts of
scholastic theology where absolute certainty is the desired
goal. For no one who follows the
common practices and conventional formalities will ever succeed.
If you should say, “What then are the
fallacies of the Mu‘tazilites and the Murji’ites, and what are the proofs that
their position is false?” I would then say that their fallacies arose from
[their failure to understand] certain generalities
mentioned in the Qur’?n. As to the Murji’ites, they said that no
believer
would enter Hell fire, although he might commit every possible sin. They based
their position on the words of God
when
He said, “And whoever believeth in his Lord, need not fear either loss
or
wrong,”S?rahLXXII:13 and again on
His
words when He said, “And they who believed in God and His Apostle are the men
of truth, and the witnesses in the presence of the Lord;
they
shall have their reward and their light; but as for the
infidels and those who give the lie to Our signs, these shall be the
inmates of Hell.”S?rahLVII:18. [As
further evidence for their
position] they quote the words of God
when He said, ‘‘So oft
as a crowd shall be thrown into it, its keepers
shall ask them, ‘Came not the warner to you?’ They
shall say, ‘Yes, there came to us one
charged with warnings; but we treated him as
a liar and said, "Nothing hath God sent down. Ye are in nothing
but
a vast delusion”.S?rahLXIII:8-9.
His saying, “So oft as
a crowd is thrown”,
is
inclusive and therefore every one
who was
thrown into Hell fire must have treated the warner as
a liar. [They too quote] the words of God “None shall be
cast to it but the most wretched,-who hath called
the truth a lie and
turned their back.” S?rahXCII:15-16.
In this verse we
find a specification, as well
as an affirmation and a negation.
Again they quote the words of God
when He said, “To them who shall
present themselves with good works, shall be a reward beyond their desert,
and they shall be secure from terror on that day.”
S?rahXXVII:91.
But belief is the
beginning of good works. Again
they quote, “And God loveth, of doers
of good.” S?rahIII:129.
God also said,
“Verily We will not suffer
the
reward of him whose works were good to perish.” S?rahXVIII:29.
But they have no proof in any of
these verses, because when belief is
mentioned in
them it means belief
coupled with good works. We have shown that belief is used to signify
Islam, which is
in conformity with the mind, word, and deed. Supporting
this interpretation are many traditions, concerning the
punishment of sinners and the extent of their penalty. Furthermore the Prophet
said, “Whoever hath in his heart the weight of an atom of belief
will be brought from Hell fire.” But, how could anyone be brought forth from
Hell fire if he had not first entered therein? We also find in
the Qur?n the
following words of God, “Truly God will not forgive associating other gods with
Him; but other sins He will forgive to whom
He will.”S?rahIV:116.
The fact that God may exempt from
punishment according to His will, signifies discrimination. He also said, “And
for such as will rebel against God and His Apostle is the fire of Hell. They
shall remain therein always,-forever.”S?rahLXXII:24.
To declare such a person an unbeliever
is, nevertheless, unjust.
God also said, “Verily the unjust are in lasting torment.”S?rahXLII:44.
And again, “And they who shall present themselves with evil shall be flung
downward on their faces into the fire.”S?rahXXVII:92.
All these generalities contradict theirs. Therefore it is inevitable to resort
to specification and interpretation on both sides; especially
when traditions are clear in their pronouncements that the
sinners will be punished. In fact the words of God, “No
one is there of you
who shall not go down unto it,”68 is almost an express declaration
that punishment is inevitable to all, because every believer cannot help but
commit an offence. Furthermore, by the words, “None shall be cast to it but the
most wretched,-who hath called the truth a lie and turned their back,”S?rahXCII:15-16.
God meant certain particular men, since the appellation‘the most wretched’
refers to a particular person. Again in His word, ‘‘So
oft as a
crowd shall be thrown into it, its keepers shall ask them...
"S?rahLXVII:8.
God meant a special group of unbelievers. At any rate the
particularization of the general is not difficult. Because of this last verse
al-Ash‘ari as well as several other scholastics was misled into denying the
general application [of anything at all], and
said that such terms must await the development of [new] contexts which will
determine and
clarify their significations.
The fallacy of the
Mu‘tazilites arose from failure to understand the following words of God. [They
have thus failed to grasp the real meaning of]
the words of God when He said, “Surely
will I forgive him who turneth to God and believeth, and worketh righteousness,
and then yieldeth to righteousness;”S?rahXX:84
and His words when He declared, “I swear by the declining day. Verily men’s lot
is cast amid destruction, save those who believe and do the things which be
right.”S?rahCIII:1-3. Also
His words when He said, “No one
is there of you who shall not go down unto it-this is a settled decree with thy
Lord,”S?rahXIX:72 and
added, “Then will we deliver those who had
the fear of God.” S?rahXIX:73.
Also the words of God when He said, “And for such as will rebel against God and
His Apostle is the fire of Hell,” S?rahLXXII:24
as well as every verse wherein God mentioned good works coupled with belief.
Also the words of God when He said, “But whoever shall kill a believer of set
purpose, his recompense shall be Hell-forever shall he abide in it.”
S?rahIV:95.
These generalities are also specific as is proved by
the words of God when He said, “But other sins He will forgive to him
whom He will.”S?rahIV:116.
Therefore freedom to forgive men sins, other than the sin of polytheism,
must be left to God. Similarly the words of the Apostle when he said, “Whoever
hath in his heart the weight of an atom of belief will be brought forth from
Hell fire,” prove the same thing. So also do the words of God when He declared,
“Verily we will not suffer the reward of him whose works were good to perish;”S?rahXVIII:29
and again "Verily God suffereth not the reward of the righteous to perish.”S?rahIX:121.
How then would God suffer the reward of belief itself
as well as that of good works to be lost because of one single offence? As to
the words of God, “But whoever shall kill a believer of set
purpose,” they mean whoever shall kill a believer because of his belief, and
the words have been revealed for that particular purpose.
You may say, “What
has already been said will lead to the conclusion that belief obtains without
good works although it is well known that the Fathers said
that belief comprises inward adherence, verbal confession and good works;
explain to us therefore the meaning of all this.” I shall
then say: It is not unlikely that good works be considered a part of belief,
because they perfect and complete it, just as it is said that the head and
hands are part of man. It is evident that a person will cease to be human if
his head no
longer exists; but
he will not cease to be a human being if one
of his hands is lost through
amputation. Similarly both the magnificent (takb?r)
and the praise (tasb?h)
[at the beginning of prayer] are
considered a part of prayer, although it is not annulled with their omission.
Therefore acceptance with the mind stands in relation to
belief as does the head in relation to the existence of man [in this life],
since the one depends for its existence upon the other and ceases to exist when
the other no longer is. The remaining good works are
like the limbs of the body, some are more important than the others. The
Apostle said, "A believer is no longer a believer
when he commits fornication.”69 Furthermore the Companions held the
same opinion as the Mu‘tazilites concerning the fact that a person ceases to be a
believer when he commits the sin of fornication. When this really means is that
such a person is no longer a real believer possessing a
complete and perfect belief, just as the deformed individual
whose limbs have been amputated is described as being no longer a human being;
in other words he lacks that perfection which is beyond actual humanity.
(A problem).
You may say, “The Fathers have agreed that belief is subject to increase and
depreciation-increasing with obedience and good works, and decreasing with
disobedience and sin.” In that case I shall
say that the Fathers are just witnesses, and no one has any
right to depart from their judgment. What they have said is
true; but the important thing is
to grasp its meaning. It proves that
good works are not an integral part of belief nor a
basic thing for its existence. Rather they are a superaddition (maz?d)
which augments belief. Both the surplus
and the deficit exist, but nothing increases in itself. Thus it cannot be said
that man’s head is
an addition or a surplus which increases his stature or size;
but
his beard and corpulence are. Similarly it is not
permissible to say that prayer is augmented and increased by kneeling and
prostration; rather it is
augmented by the manner of
its execution and the usages followed therein. This, therefore, is a clear
declaration that belief as such does exist, and that once it exists, it may
vary, subject to increase and depreciation.
If you then say
that the ambiguity lies in the problem of acceptance;
how could it increase and diminish when it is always the
same? I
shall then say that if we put aside all
hypocrisy and ignore the opposition of adversaries
and then lift the veil off the
exact meaning of the word, all ambiguity will be removed. We consequently say
that belief is a common noun used in three
different ways.
The first usage
denotes an acceptance with the heart (ta?d?q
bi’l-qalb), a belief (i‘tiq?d)
based on the authority of others (taql?d)
without the benefit of revelation and
an open heart. This is the
belief of the common folk; in fact it is
the belief of all people except the elite. This belief is, as
it were, a knot bound around the heart,
sometimes tightened and made stronger and sometimes loosened and made weaker,
just like the knot of any string.
Do
not consider this unlikely but remember the tenacity of Jews
in
holding fast to their
doctrine, how they cannot be shaken or moved from it either by threatening, or
warning, promising or admonishing, examining or proving. The same
is
true of Christians and heretics among whom exist some who
can be made to doubt with the least word, and can be
made to move from their belief with the least attraction or
threat, although, like the Jews, they
do not doubt the veracity of their own doctrine, yet they differ in the
degree of their determination. Such variations in the degree of determination
do also exist in
the true belief, and good works influence the development
and growth of this determination, just as irrigation influences
the growth of
trees. Said God, “[Whenever a S?rah
is
sent down]... it will increase the belief of those who
believe, [and they shall rejoice].”S?rahIX:125.
And again, “[He it is who sendeth down
tranquillity into the hearts of the believers] that they might increase in
belief.”S?rahXLVIII:4.
According to one tradition the Prophet said, “Belief is subject
to increase and depreciation.”70 This is accomplished by the
influence of
good works upon the
heart, a thing which is not perceived except by him who meditates over his
different inner states during the hours of worship and
applies himself solely to it through the presence of the
heart at the time of inactivity and languor, as well as realizing the
variations which are inherent in devoting oneself in these states to the
articles of belief, so that the tie which binds him to his
belief might become firmer and consequently harder to undo for the person who
wishes to loosen it with doubt. In fact if the
person, who believes that the orphan offers him the opportunity to reveal the
quality of mercy, will act according to his belief and show kindness toward the
orphan, he will be assured within himself of the real
existence of
mercy as well as of its manifold increase through its active
operation. Similarly if the person who believes in modesty
will, in
accordance with his belief, humble himself before another
person, he will sense the quality of modesty within himself at the time he
performs the act. The same is true
of
all the qualities of the heart :
all bodily actions proceed from them, and then the very influence
of these actions react upon them,
thereby confirming [their
existence] and inereasing [their strength]. This subject will be discussed
in both the Quarter on the Saving Matters of Life and the Quarter on the
Destructive Matters in Life
when we take up the relation of the inward to the outward and that of works
to beliefs. This relation is of the
same nature as that of the relation between the visible world (?lam
al-mulk)
and the invisible world (?lam
al-malak?t). By
the visible world (?lam
al-mulk) which is also called '?lam al-shah?dah,
I mean
the world which is perceived by the senses; and by the invisible world (?lam
al-malak?t) which
is also called ?lam al-ghayb,
I mean
the world which is perceived by the light of the mind (n?r
al-ba??rah). The
heart belongs to the invisible world while the
members of the body as well as their
activities belong to the visible world. The subtlety and fineness of the
interdependence of the two worlds have led some men to think that they are
closely connected, while others thought that there was no world except the
visible ('?lam
al-shah?dah) which
is made of the concrete
and tangible bodies. One who has perceived the two worlds and realized first
their independence and then their interdependence expressed his observation in
the following manner :
“The
glass was fine, the wine was clear,
Like a single body they seemd to appear.
So confusion spread:
to
some it seemed
Nothing but glass ; while
others swore
‘This is but wine, no glass is here’.”
Let us
go
back to the main purpose of our discussion,
especially since the invisible world is outside the scope
of
the science of practical religion ('ilm al-mu‘?malah).
Nevertheless
the two worlds are connected and interdependent. For this reason the
science of revelation (ilm al-muk?shafah)
extends
its scope every now and then into
the realm of practical religion and does not withdraw until it
imposes
some obligations. This then is how belief, in
accordance with this usage, increases through good works. For
this
reason ‘Ali said, “Verily belief will loom as a single white
spot in the heart of man. If the man will do that which is good,
the
white spot will grow and spread until the whole heart is
white.
On the other hand hypocrisy makes its first appearance as a
black blotch in the heart of man. If the man
will do that which is unlawful, the
black blotch will grow and spread until the whole heart is black, and blackness
becomes man’s second nature.” Said God, “Nay. But their
own works have got the mastery over their hearts." S?rahLXXXIV:16.
The second usage of the term belief (Im?n)
denotes
both acceptance and works, just as the Apostle stated when he said, “Belief
comprises over seventy divisions (sing.b?b)” 71 The same thing is
also
seen in the words of the Apostle when He said, “A believer is no
longer
a believer when he commits fornication.” And when works become an integral part
of belief, it becomes evident that it is subject to increase and
depreciation. Does this, however, affect belief which is mere acceptance? The
question is one of opinion, and we have already stated that it does.
The third usage of the term belief denotes
certain acceptance resulting from revelation and an open heart as well as from
seeing [ truth ] with the light
of the mind. This last is the least to lend itself to increase. I shall,
however, say that the way in which the mind accepts certain things which are
free of doubt differs. Thus the way the mind accepts the fact that two are
greater than one is unlike the way it accepts the fact that the world is
created and originated, although there is not the slightest
doubt of the certainty of either fact. For the certain things differ in the
degrees of their clarity and in the degrees to which the mind accepts them. We
touched on this subject in the section on certainty (yaq?n)
in
the Book of Knowledge under the characteristics of the learned men of the
hereafter; therefore there is no need to go over it again. In
all
these usages it became evident that what they have said concerning the increase
and depreciation of belief was true. How could it not be true when we have the
express testimony of tradition that “Whoever has in his heart the weight of an
atom of belief will be brought forth from Hell fire.” According to another
tradition, “He will be brought forth from Hell fire, who
has
in his heart the weight of a dinar of belief.”72 Why then should the
amount differ if the belief in the heart does
not vary?
(A problem). You may
ask, “What then
have the Fathers meant with the saying, ‘If it be the will of God I am a
believer?”’ A qualification implies doubt, and to entertain doubts concerning
the veracity of belief amounts to unbelief. Yet all the Fathers used to refrain
from giving a definite reply concerning belief, and were extremely careful not to commit
themselves. In this
connexion Sufy?n al-Thawri
said, “He who says, ‘I am a believer in the sight of God’,
is a liar; and he who
says, ‘I
am really a believer’, is an innovator.’’
But how can he be a liar when he
himself knows that he is a believer? For he who is
a believer in himself is a believer in the
sight of God, just as he who is big73
and generous in
himself and is aware of this fact, will be big and generous
in the sight of God. The same is true of him who is likewise glad, or sad,
or
hearing, or seeing.
On the other hand if man were asked whether or not he was an
animal it would not be fitting for him to reply, “If it be the will of God, I am
an
animal.” When Sufy?n
made this statement he was asked, “What then shall we say?” Thereupon he
replied, “We believe in God, and that which hath been sent down to us." S?rahII:130.
And what is the difference between
saying, “We believe in God and that which hath been sent down to us” and
saying, “I am a
believer?”
Once upon a
time al-Hasan [ al-Basri
] was asked, “Art thou a believer ?”
To which he replied, “If it be the will of God.” Thereupon
he was told, “O Abu-Sa‘?d
? Why do you qualify
your belief?” He answered and said, “I fear saying, ‘Yes’,
and then God will say, ‘Thou hast lied, Hasan.’
Then I shall rightly merit His
punishment.” He also used to say, “I fear that God
may find out that I have done something abominable
to Him and will consequently abhor me and say, ‘Go away.
I accept none of thy works.’ Then I shall be
toiling in vain.”
Ibr?him
ibn-Adham once said, “Whenever you are asked, ‘Are you a believer?’ say, ‘There
is no god but Allah’.” At another time he said, “Say, ‘I do not doubt belief;
your question to me is an innovation’.’’
‘Alqamah74
was once asked, “Are you a believer
? To which he
replied, “I
do hope so. If
it be the will of
God.”
[Sufy?n]
al-Thawri said, “We believe in God and in His angels, books,
and apostles. But we do not know
what we are in the sight of God.’’
[You may ask all this
and say], “What then is the meaning of all these
qualifications?” The answer to your question is that these
qualifications are correct and are put forward for four reasons, two of which
arise from doubt, not of the reality of belief
itself, but of its end and perfectness ; and
two do not arise from
doubt at all.
The first reason
which does not arise from any doubt at all is the care not to be decisive for
fear of self-justification (tazkiyut al-nafs) and
making one’s self out to be pure. Said God, “Assert not your own purity.”S?rahLXII:33.
And again, ‘‘Hast thou not marked those who hold themselves to be righteous?” S?rah
IV:52. And again, “Behold how they devise a lie of God." S?rah
IV:53
A certain wise
man was once asked, “What is detestable truth?” He replied,
“Man’s praise of himself.”
Belief is one of the highest forms of praise and to be definitely certain of it
amounts to absolute justification. The formula of qualification (i.e if
it be the will of God) is nothing but an attempt to temper and tone down such
justification, just as when
the man is told that he is a physician, or a
jurisprudent, or a commentator,
he will say, “If
it be the will of God,’’ not because he doubts the fact but
simply to avoid being boastful. This formula is that of disavowing
and disclaiming the fact itself and means disclaiming one of the
implications of the fact which is [self-] justification. Following this
interpretation, when
the person is asked concerning something
uncomplimentary, it will not be fitting for him to
put forth any such qualification.
The second reason for
the use of these qualifications is courtesy (ta’addub) by remembering God at
every time and under all conditions, and by submitting all things unto His
Will. Thus God instructed His Prophet in courtesy and said to him, “Say not
thou of a thing, ‘I will surely do it tomorrow;’
without, ‘if it be the will of God'." S?rah
XVIII:23. Nor has God limited [the use of the qualifying phrase] to
those things the occurrence of which
is subject to doubt. On the
contrary He said, “Ye shall surely enter the sacred mosque, if it be the will
of God, in full security, having your heads shaved and your hair cut:
ye shall not fear ;" S?rahXLVIII:27
although He had full knowledge that they were to enter undoubtedly therein and
that He had willed their entrance. What God had meant was to instruct the
Prophet in the use of the qualifying formula. Consequently the Prophet learned
the lesson and showed his courtesy by the use of that formula in connexion
with everything he had said-whether that thing was known with certainty or
doubtful; so that when he entered the cemetery, he said, “Peace be upon you,
the believing inmates of this abode. Verily, if it be the
will of God, we shall follow you.’’75 This he said, notwithstanding
the fact that death is not subject to any doubt, because courtesy demands that
God be always remembered and that all things be made
dependent upon
Him. This formula indicates such a thing and has become, by
virtue of its common use, representative of the expression of
desires and wishes. Thus when you are told that such and
such a person is about to die and
should happen to say, “If it be the will of God,” you betray your desire and
not your doubt. The same is true
when you are told that a certain person will recover from his sickness and you say,
“If it be the will of God,” by way of expressing
your earnest desire. The phrase has thus been transferred from one expressing
doubt to one which signifies desire. In the same way
also is its transfer to express courtesy and respect for
remembering God under all conditions.
The third reason for
the use of those qualifications arises from doubt and means, “If it be the will
of God, I
am truly a believer,” since God spoke of some
particular men as
being truly believers.’S?rahVIII:4.
Consequently believers are divided into two groups: [those who are described as
truly believers and those who are not]. This arises from doubt concerning the
perfection of
belief and not its reality. Every person
doubts the perfectness of his belief, yet this doubt
does not constitute unbelief. Doubting the perfectness of belief
is right and justified for two
reasons: The first is
because hypocrisy militates against the perfectness of belief, and hypocrisy is
something hidden while freedom from it is readily
discerned or
determined. The second is because belief is perfected
through the fulfilment of good works which are not
known to exist in their perfect
form.
As
to works God said, “The true believers are those only who
believe in God and His Apostle,
and afterwards doubt not; and
who contend with their substance and their persons for the
cause of God these are the
truthful.” S?rahXLIX:15.
The doubt would, therefore, be concerning this truthfulness. Similarly God
said, ‘‘But righteousness is to believe in God, and the last
day, and the angels, and the Book, and the prophets.” S?rah
II:172. Thus God laid down twenty qualities, such as the
fulfilment of promises and
fortitude under hardships, as conditions for belief, and then said (of those who
possess them], “These are they who are true.” S?rahII:172.
God also said, “God will raise those of you who believe;
and those to whom knowledge is given, to lofty grades.” S?rahLVIII:12.
And again He said, “Those among you who contributed before the victory, and
fought, shall be differently treated from certain other among you" S?rahLVII:10.
He also said, “They are of varying ranks before God" S?rah
III:157.
The Apostle said,
“Belief is like unto a nude who should be clothed with piety.”76 And
again, “Belief comprises over seventy divisions, the least of
which is to clear the road of obstacles."77
This shows the, dependence of the
perfectness of belief on good
works. Its dependence on freedom from hypocrisy and concealed polytheism is
shown by the words of the Apostle when he said, “Four things,
if they obtain in a person make him an utter hypocrite, no
matter how much he prays, and fasts, and claims that he is a
believer; he who lies when he speaks, breaks a promise when he pledges his
word, betrays a confidence
when he is trusted, and deviates from justice when he enters a controversy,”78
According to another version “And when he makes a compact with his neighbour,
he defrauds him.”79
A tradition related
on the authority of Abu-Sa‘id al-Khudri, says, “The hearts are of four
kinds: a sealed heart,
which is the heart of the unbeliever; a double-faced
heart, which is the heart of the hypocrite; a clean
heart from the midst of which a radiant lamp sheds its radiant light;
and a heart which contains some
belief and some hypocrisy. The belief it contains is like unto the vegetable
which receives its nourishment ftom fresh waters. The hypocrisy it contains is
like unto an ulcer which feeds on pus and blood,
whichever of the two substances will prevail will determine its fate.”80
According to another version “whichever will prevail will seal his doom.” The
Apostle also said, “The worst hypocrites of this people are its Qur’?n
readers.”81 According to another tradition, “Polytheism among my
people is more subtle than the creeping of the ant on
the rock ”82
Hudhayfah said, “At
the time of the Apostle there were things which made the man who repeated them
a hypocrite as long as he lived. Now, however, I hear
these same things repeated ten times a day, [and no one seems to mind].”83
A certain learned man said, “The person closest to hypocrisy is he who deems
himself free thereof.” Hudhayfah also said, “Hypocrites are more numerous today
than they were at the time of the Prophet. At that time they
used to conceal their
hypocrisy; now
they [ are not
ashamed to] reveal it.”84 Such hypocrisy militates against the
reality of belief as well as against its perfectness. It is something concealed
and subtle: the farthest removed from it are those who are constantly afraid of it,
while those who deem themselves free of it are they who are nearest to it.
Al-Hasan al-Basri was
once told, “There is no more hypocrisy
nowadays.’’ To which he replied, “Brother ! Were
the hypocrites to perish from the land you would feel lonely on the way.” Again
either al-Hasan himself or someone else said, “Were tails
to grow [by a miracle] on the backs of the
hypocrites and trail behind them, our feet would no longer be able to touch the
earth.”
Once upon a time
Ibn-‘Umar, on hearing a man speak disparagingly of al-Hajj?j,85
told him, “Would you speak disparagingly of him if he were here present?” The
man answered, “No.” Thereupon
Ibn-‘Umar said, “We used to consider this hypocritical at the
time of the Apostle. The Apostle said, ‘He who is double-tongued in this world
will, in the hereafter, be made double tongued by God'.” The Apostle also said,
“The worst man is
the double-faced who meets one people with one face and
another people with another face.”
Al-Hasan al-Basri was
once told, “There are some who say-that they do not fear hypocrisy.” Thereupon
he answered, “By
God, I would rather be sure that I am
free of hypocrisy than have all the world’s contents
gold.” Al-Hasan also said, “Among the different kinds of
hypocrisy are the disagreements between the tongue and
the heart, between the secret and the public, and between the entrance and the
exit.”
A certain person
told Hudhayfah, “Verily I fear I am
a hypocrite.” To which Hudhayfah
replied, “Fear not. If you were
a hypocrite you would not have feared hypocrisy. Verily hypocrisy does not fear
hypocrisy.”
Ibn-abi-Mulaykah
said,“I have known one hundred and
thirty [and according to another version one hundred and fifty] of the
Companions of
the Prophet, all of whom feared hypocrisy.”
It was related
that the Apostle of God was once sitting with a group of his Companions who
were discussing a
certain man and praising him to the skies. Suddenly, while
they were in the midst of their discussion, the man himself appeared before
them with his face still wet with the water of ablution, carrying his shoes in
his hands and his forehead covered with dust from prayer. Thereupon they said
to the Apostle ‘‘Behold. This is the man whom we were
discussing.” The Prophet, turning to them, said, “I see
on his face the mark of Satan.”
Then the man arrived and, after greeting the group, sat in their
midst. The Prophet then addressed him and said, “Tell me, I beseech
thee by God, hast
thou not said to thyself when thou approached the group that there was no one
among them who was better than thee?” The man replied. “
O my God ! Yes, I have.”
In his prayer the
Apostle said, “ O God, I seek
refuge in thee against the evil of things I did and things I left
undone.”86 He was then told, “Art thou afraid O Apostle of God?” To
which he replied, “What could make me feel secure when the heart lie between
two of the fingers of the Merciful [God], and He doeth with them what He
willeth?"87 Said God, “And there shall appear to them, from
God, things they have never reckoned on.”S?rahXXXIX:48.
This was interpreted
in
commentaries to mean that men have done things which they
thought were good but [on the
day of judgment] these things appeared in the balance in the
scale of evil.
[Al-] Sari al-Saqati
once said, “If a person enters a garden containing trees of every
kind and on these are
birds of every kind, and then each bird calls to him in a different language
saying, ‘Peace be upon thee, O friend of God’, and as a result he feels very
well pleased and satisfied, he becomes a captive in their hands.” These
traditions and narratives reveal to you the gravity of the matter, particularly
because of the subtle nature of hypocrisy and hidden polytheism, and bring out
the fact that no one can be safe against them. This led ‘Umar ibn-Khatt?b
to ask Hudhayfah about himself-whether or not
he was numbered among the hypocrites.
Abu-Sulaym?n
al-D?r?ni
said, “I
heard a certain governor say something and I wanted
to express my disapproval of it but feared lest he order me
to be killed. And although I feared not death I was
afraid lest I
be tempted to boast before men when my spirit departs. For
this reason I
refrained from expressing my disapproval of the
governor’s words.
This kind of
hypocrisy militates against the truth, perfectness, and purity of belief,
rather than against its reality. For hypocrisy
is of two kinds : The one
results in parting with religion, pursuing infidels and joining the company of
those, who are deemed eternally to Hell fire;
the second leads the person to Hell fire for a certain
period of
time and puts him down from the lofty heights of Paradise (‘illiy?n)88
and denotes the saints from their
exalted ranks. It is a field
open to doubt and therefore it is desirable to resort to the use of
qualifications therein. This kind of hypocrisy
rises from the disparity and disagreement between the secret and the public,
from feeling secure from the deep counsel of God89 and from conceit
and other things from which only the saints are free.
The fourth reason for
the use of these qualifications arises also from doubt. It is the fear of the
end, for no one knows
whether or not
he will still have any belief at the hour of death. If he
should end with unbelief all his previous works would come to naught and fail,
because [the value of these works] depends entirely upon their good ending. Thus if
a fasting person were asked early in the day concerning the validity of his
fast and replied, ‘‘I am surely
fasting,” but later in the day he broke his fast, it would become evident that
he was lying since the validity of his fast depends upon the maintenance of the
fast until sunset at the end of the day. And
just as the day is the set
period for the fulfilment of fasting, so the lifetime is the
set period for the fulfilment of the validity of belief. To describe it as
valid before its conclusion simply because it has already been fulfilled in
part is very doubtful and its end is
frightful. It was because of the end that most of the [God-] fearing have wept.
For the end is the outcome of a pre-ordained event and the result of the
eternal will which does not become known except
when the pre-ordained event itself takes place and which no human being can
ever tell. The fear of the end is the result of the fear of that which was
pre-ordained and there may appear in the present a thing which will give the
lie to the words, [" I am a believer ”]. And who can be sure that he is
one of those for whom God has pre-ordained good things? Cf S?rah
XXI:101. It has been said that the words of God, “God the
stupor of death cometh upon him,”S?rah
L:18 mean that the pre-ordained thing [has been fulfilled] and made known. One
of the Fathers said that works would be judged by their ends. Abu-al-Dard?’
used to swear by God saying, “There is no one who feels safe in his belief who
is not
robbed of it.” It was also said that some sinful deeds were not punished
except by their sad ends. We seek refuge in God against such deeds and such
punishments. It has also been said that such punishments await those who falsely
claim sainthood and the gift of miracles (kar?mah).
One of
the gnostics once said, “If I were given the choice between
martyrdom at the outer gate of the house and death as a true believer at the
door of an inner room, I would, choose the latter because
I do
not know what might occur to me and divert my heart from true belief on my way
[from the inner room] to the outer gate of the house.” Another said, “If I had
known a certain person to have been a true believer for the last fifty years
and then, even though so frail a thing as a pole should hide him from my sight
before his death, I could not be sure thet he died
a true believer.”
According to one
condition, “Whoeversays, ‘I am a believer’, is an infidel; and whoever says, ‘I am
learned’, is ignorant.”90 In the
interpretation of the words of the God, “And the words of thy Lord are perfect in truth
and in justice,’’S?rahVI:115 it
has been said that ‘perfect in truth’ relates to those who died in belief
and‘perfect in justice’, to those who died in polytheism. God also said, “And
the final issue of all things is unto God.”S?rahXXIL:4.
No matter how little doubt may be in such cases
the resort to qualification is obligatory, since belief is a means of grace
for the hereafter just as fasting is a
means of grace for absolving the heart from guilt in this life. Whatever fast
is rendered void before sunset is no longer a fast and will not absolve from
guilt. The same thing is true of belief. In fact a person
may be asked about a previous fast concerning which there is no doubt. He will
be asked, “Have you
fasted yesterday?” and he will reply. “Yes, if it were the
will of God.” For genuine fasting is the only acceptable fasting and the
acceptable fasting is unknown except to God. For this
reason it is
desirable to use the qualification (istithn?),
if it be the will of God,
in
all the works of righteousness. This will imply doubt as to
their acceptance [by God], since such acceptance, despite the outward
fulfilment of all the prerequisites of validity, may be blocked by hidden cause
unknown except to God, the Lord of Lords of the mighty
majesty. Hence it is desirable to entertain some doubts concerning the validity
[of belief as well as all the works of righteousness].
These, therefore, are
the different reasons for the desirability of qualifying one’s assertion of his
belief, and with them we conclude the Book on the foundations of the Articles
of Faith.
Here ends the Book.
1. Literally
through ingress (hul?l) and
egress (intiq?l).
2.
Cf. al-Tirmidhi,
Jan?'iz:70. 3. [Cf. al-Tirmidhi,
Qiy?mah:14-15]
4 [Cf. a river in Paradise Cf.
S?rah CVIII]
5.
[Cf. al-Tirmidhi, Tafsir, S?rah
II:9]
6.
Y?nus al-?adafi, A.H.264/A.D 877-78. See Ibu Khallik?n, vol.III.pp.548-51.
7.
Al-Fihrist, P.120; al-Shahrast?ni, Kitab al-Milal w-al-Nihal,ed.William
Cureton(London,1842) pp.pp.19,63.
8. Abu ?Al? al-Hasan ibn-Muhammad
al-Sab?h, A.H.296/A.D.874. See ibn-Khallik?n, Vol.I.P.229;cf.al-Sam??ni,f.275a.
9. Abu ?Abdull?h al-H?rith ibn-Asad al-Muhasibi, A.H.243/AD 857. see
al-Fihirist,p.184: ibn-Khallik?n, Vol.I.p.224, Also Margaret Smith, An Early
Mystic of Baghdad (London, 1935).
10. The title of work in al Radd?ala-al- Mu?tazilah (On the Refutation
Of the Mu?tazilites) See Fihrist, p.184.I.17
11. A means
of purification which is a religious duty for every
Muslim who has attended
to the call of nature. It is elaborately described in
the tradition : cf.
al-D?irimi. Sal?h
; 10-13 ;
ibn-M?jah.
?ah?rah:
15-16
12.
cf
.al-Tirmidhi, Far?d'id:2;
ibn-M?jah,Far?‘id:1.
13.
Ibid.,VIII:44. 14. Ibid.,II:60.
15. Ibid.,XI:34.
16. Ibid.XXVI:22-29. 17. Ibid,XXI:22.
18. Ibid II:21.
19.
Ibid XXXVI:79 20. Ibid XVI:126.
21. Ar.
Yaum al-Jamal,
10 Jum?da II,
A H . 36 Dec. 4,
A.D. 656. The day when
-Ali won a decisive victory against the armies of ?alhah
and al-Zubayr, ‘?'isha,
who sided with the rebels against ‘Ali,
watched the battle on a
camel, hence the name of the day.
She was captured
but ‘Ali treated her with great deference. See ?abari,
Vol. I, pp. 3108-3233.
22. The
incident is related in full in
Hilyat al-Awliy?’.
Vol. I, pp. 318-20.
where the number of
those who surrendered
is given as twenty thousand.
23. The
Qadarites denied absolute predestination and believed
in free will (qadar-power). Cf
Sharast?ni.
pp. 29-31; 4-Baghd?di,
al-Farq bayn al-Firaq,
ed. Muhammad Badr (Cairo, 1910). pp. 18, 93 seq
; Mukhta?ar
al-Farq bayn Firaq,
ed. P. K.
Hitti (Cairo, 1924). pp, 95 seq; al-Nawbakhti,
Firaq al-sh?ah.
ed. H. Ritter (Istanbul, 1931). p.
5.
24.
Ibn-Sa'd, Vol.VII,Pt.2,p.152.
25. A
period after the conclusion of a bargain during which
either of the
parties may cancel the transaction. Cf.
ibn M?jah,
Tij?r?t:
13,18 ; at-D?rimi,
Buy?' :
16-18.
26. The Jerusalem
Epistle, so
called because it was written in
Jerusalem, comprises Section III
of this Book ;
see below, p. 53
27.
Printed in Cairo, A.H.1327.
28. What
the scholastic theologians call propensity the (i'tim?dat)
philosophers call tendency (may?),
both terms being loosely
used. See Dict,
of Tech. Terms.
29. Singular Kawn
30. Singular idr?k
31. Al-Tirmidhi, Zuhd
:9; aI-D?rimi,
Riq?q :
26; ibn-M?jah,
Zuhd : 19.
32. Cf.
S?rah
XVII : 87 ;
al-B?kh?ri.
Tafs?r S?rah
bani-Isr?'il :
12.
33. Cf.
IbnM?jah,
Intro.13:18-19.
34. Abu-al-Husayn
Ahmad ibn Yahya ibn-Ish?q,
one of the three arch-heretics of
Islam, the other two being abu-Hayy?n
al-Tawhidi and abu-al-'AI?'
al-Ma'arri. The date of al-R?wandi's
death is variously given in the sources but most probably
he died around A.H. 250/A
D. 864. Cf.
al-Fihrist, p.108;
al-Mas'?di,
Mur?j
al-Dhahab, ed. and tr. into
French by C.B. de Meynard and P.
de Courteille (Paris,
1866-77). Vol. VII.
p. 237; ibn-Khallik?n.
Vol. I, pp.
47-48 ; Shadhar?t
al-Dhahab. Vol. 11, pp. 235-36.
For his beliefs see al-Ash'ari, Maq?l?t
al-Isl?miyin
wa-Ikhtil?f al-Mu?allim.
ed. H. Ritter
(Istaubul, 1929-30). pp. 140-41,149,159-60,
352, 388, 422-24, 28, 445-46.
35. Al-D?rimi,
Sal?h; 72; al-Tirmidhi.Jum'ah;56.
36. The
verse is by abu-Tamm?m,
the great poet and anthologist;
d.A.H. 231/A.D.
845-46. See al-Agh?ni,
Vol. XV, pp.
100-108 ; ibn-Khallik?n,
Vol. I, pp.
214-18.
37.
The system of Muslim orthodoxy developed by abu
al-Hasan ‘Ali
al.Ash‘ari and hence the name.
Al-Ash‘ari died around A.H. 330/ A.D.
941 --42. For his life and
works al-Fihrist:, p.
181 ; ibn-Khallik?n,
Vo:. I, pp. 586-87.
For his system see al- Shahrast?ni,pp.
65-75.
38. Maq?l?t
al-Isl?miyia pp. 155-278
39. Words in brackets are in 'C' only
40. The poet is the famous
al-Akhtal. Ghiy?th
ibn-Ghawth, ca AH. 95/A.D. 714.
See all-Agh?ni.
Vol. VII, pp. 169-188; ibn
Qutaybah, al-Shi’rw al-Shu‘ar?
ed. M. J. de
Geoje. (Leyden. 1902-4), pp. 301-12 ;
Shi’r al-Akh?al,
ed, A Salh?ni
(Beirut. 1891), pp.
333-400.
41. Ibn-Marw?n ibn-al-Hakam. 'Umayyad
governor of al-Basrah and al-K?fah; ca A.H.75 AD 695. See
Ibn-Qutaybah, al-Ma'?rif.p.180; al-?abar?, Vol.II.p.852; shadhar?t al Dhahab,
Vol.I.p.83.
42. Shi'r
al-Akh?al, p.390.
43. The
S?bians. Ar.
al-S?bi’ah,
mentioned in the Qur’?n
three times (S?rahs
II: V: 73: XXII:
17). were identical with the Mandeans Judaco-Christian
seat who also called themselves Nasorais
d'Yaya, the Nasoreans
(ie.,the observants)
of St. John, and therefore became
erroneously known to
the modern world as the
Christian of St John (the Baptist). They practised the rite of
baptism after birth, before marriage,
and at various other occasions evidently Muhammad regarded them as
believer in the true God.
44. Al-Bukh?ri.
Man?qib a1- Ans?r
: 35 ; al-Tirm?dhi.
Fitan : 20.
45. A
very common tradition although it is not found in the
various collection of had?th.
46. Cf. S?rah
VII : 173-74. 47. Al-B?kh?ri,
Man?qib:25.
48. Al-Bukh?ri,
Bad’al-Khalq: 27;
al-Tirmidhi, Fitan : 21, 42, Qiy?mah:3.
49. Al-Tirmidhi.
Jan?'iz:70. 50.
Cf. al-D?rimi,
Isti’dh?n:10.
51.
Al-Tirmidhi, Jan?'iz:70. 52.
Muslim, Jannah:67.
53. The
reference here is to Shi‘ites
who reject the doctrine of election and hold that ‘Ali was clearly and directly
designated by Muhammad as his successor.
They find support in the hadith in which the Prophet tells
‘Ali that the relation
between them was the same as that which existed between Moses
and Aaron. See al-Bukh?ri,
Fad?’i
Ash?b
al-Nabi;10;
al-Timidhi. Man?qib
: 19-20.
54. The term
is used here in loose
application to the Shi‘ites
in general.
55. cf. ?ay?lisi
: 31.
56. Cf.
Al-M?wardi,
al-ahk?m
al-Sul??niyah,
ed. M, Enger (Bonn,1853),
pp. 3-7.
57.
Al-Bukh?ri, Ahk?m
: 2 : al-Tirmidhi,
Fitan : 49.
58. Cf.
Abu-??lib al-Makki, Q?t-al-Qul?b
(Cairo, 1351), Vol.
111, pp.183-205.
59. Al-B?kh?ri.?m?n:1.
These five are the witness (al-shah?dah),
Prayer (sal?h),
almsgiving (jak?h),
pilgrimage (hajj), and
fasting (sawm).
60.
S?rah XLIX
: 14. Cf. Al-?abari,
J?mi'
al-Bay?n,
Vol. XXVI,
pp. 89-91.
61.
Al-Bukh?ri, ?m?n
: 37. 62.
Al-Bukh?ri.
?m?n
: 37.
63. Al-Nas?'?,
?m?n:
7
64. Al-Nas?'?,
?m?n:
1,11
65. Al-Nas?'?,
?m?n:7
66. Cf.
Al-Bukh?r?,
?m?m:13:
al-Tirmidhi, Fitan:17.
67. The
Murji’ites’ fudamental doctrine consisted in the suspension (irj?')
of judgment against believers who commit sin. They
refused to declare a
person an infidel because, to them, the
fact that he was nominally a
Muslim sufficed. More specifically
they refused to see in the
suppression of religious
law by the Ummayad Caliphs a
justifiable cause for
denying that house the homage due them as
the de facto rulers of Ialam.
See Ibn- Hazam, at-Fa?t
fi al-Milat w-al Ahwd'w-al-Nihal(Cairo, 1347-48),
Vol. II, p.
89 ; Mukhsta?ar al-farq bayn
al Firaq, pp.
122-23.
68. S?rah XIX:72; see also J?mi'al-Bay?n, Vol.XVI.pp.81-87
69. Al-Bukh?ri,
Maz?lim:
31, Hud?d
; 1,19 ; ibn
M?jah, Fitan:
70. Ibn-M?jah,
Intro 9. ; cf. al-B?khari,
Im?n:33;
al-Tirmidhi, Im?n:6.
71. Cf.Al-Bukh?ri, Im?n:2; Ibn M?jah, Inrto.9.
72. Cf.
Al-Bukh?ri Riq?q
: 35, 51 ; abu-D?w?d,
Lib?s :
26.
73. Arabic ?awil,
lit. tall.
74. Ibn-Qays
AH. 62/A.D. 681-82. See
ibn-Sa‘d, Vol. 6, pp. 57-62.
75.
Muslim, Jan?iz;103,104. 76.
Unidentified
77. Cf.
Al-Bukh?ri,
?m?n:
2 ; ibn-M?jah.
Intro. 9.
78. Al-Bukh?ri,
?m?n:
24
79. Al-Tirmidhi, ?m?n:14
80. Unidentified 81. Unidentified
82. Unidentified 83. Unidentified
84. Al-?ay?lisi:410
85. Ibn-Y?suf
al-Thaqafi A.H. 95/A.D.
714, the great Umayyad governor. For his
life see Ibn-Qutaybah.
pp. 201-202 :
Ibn-Khallik?n
Vol.I, pp. 218-224.
86. Ibn-M?jah, Du'?':3; al-Nas?'i, Isti'?dhah:57:58.
87. al-Tirmidhi, Da'aw?t:88.
88. Cf. S?rah
LXXXIII: 18-19 ;
Geo. xiv : 18.
Evidently from Heb.
89. Cf.
S?rah
VII : 97.
90.
Unidentified.
Akh?al,
al-, Shi'r
ed. A. Salh?ni
(Beirut 1891).
Ash'ari,
al, Maq?l?t
al-Isl?miy?n
wa-Ikhtil?f al-Mu?all?m,
ed. H. Ritter
(Istanbul
1929-30).
Baghd?di,
al, al Farq bayn
al-Firaq,
ed. Muhammad Badr (Cairo 1910).
Bukh?ri,
al-,
Sah?h (B?l?q
1296).
D?rimi,
al-, Sunan
(Damascus 1349).
Hazm, ibn-, al-Fa?l fi'l-
Milal w-al-Ahw?
w-al-Nihal (Cairo 1347-49)
'Im?d
al-Hanbali, ibn-al, Shadhar?t
al-Dhahab
fi Akhb?r
man Dhahab (Cairo1350).
I?bah?ni,
al-,
Kit?b
al-Agh?ni
(Bul?q 1285).
I?fah?ni,
al, Hilyat
al-Awliy?'
wa-Tabaq?t
al-A?fiya' (Cairo
1351).
Khallik?n,
ibn- Wafay?t
al-A'y?n
wa-Anb?'
Abn?' al-Z?m?n
(Cairo 1299).
M?jah,
ibn-, Sunan
(Cairo 1349).
Makki, abu-T?lib,
al-, Q?t
al-Qul?b (Cairo
1351).
Mas'?di,
al-,
Mur?j
al-Dhahab, ed. and tr. into French by C.B.
de Meynard and P. de Courteille
(Paris 1861-1877).
M?wardi,
al-, al-Ahk?m
al-Sultan?yah,
ed. M. Enger (Bonn 1853).
Muslim,
?ahih (Delhi 1319).
Nad?m,
ibn-al, al-Fihrist,
ed. G. Fl?gel
(Leipzig 1872).
Nas?'i
al-, al-Mujtaba
(Delhi 1315).
Nawbakhti, al-, Firaq
al-Sh?'ah ed.
H, Ritter (Istanbul 1931).
Qutaybah, ibn, al-Shi'r
w-al-Shu'ar?' ed.
M.J. deGoeje (Leyden 1902-4).
---------
, Kit?b
al-Ma'?rif,
ed. F. W?stenfeld
(Gottingen 1850).
Ras'ani al-, Mukhta?ar
al-Farq bayn al-Firaq, ed. P.K. Hitti
(Cairo 1924).
Sa'd, ibn-, Kit?b
al-Tabaq?t
al-Kubra, ed.E. Sachau and others
(Leyden 1905-21).
Sam'?ni,
al-,
Kit?b
al-Ans?b, ed.
D.S. Margoliouth (Leyden 1912).
Shahrast?ni, Kitab
al-Milal w-al-Nihal, ed. W. Cureton (London1842-6).
Smith, Margaret, An Early
Mystic of Baghdad
(London 1935).
?abari
al-, J?mi'
al-Bay?n an
Ta'wil ?y
al-Qur'?n (Cairo
1323-30).
-----------, Ta'rikh
al-Rusul w-al-Mul?k, ed.
M.J.de
Goeje (Leyden1879ff.).
Tah?nawi,
al-, Kashsh?f
I??ilh?t
al-Fun?n (A
Dictionary of Technical Terms
used in
the Sciences of the Musalmans), Calcutta 1862.
?ay?lisi,
al-, Musnad
(Hyderabad 1321).
Tirimdhi, al-, Sunan
(Cairo 1290).
INDEX OF
ARABIC
TERMS
abadi
'Adam
ahal al-ahw?'
ahl al-b??in
ahl al-haqq
akw?n
'?lam
al-ghayb
'?lam
al-malak?t
'?lam
al-mulk
'?lam-al-shah?dah
'aqd bi'l-qalb
'arad
'?rif
a?l
a?lah,
al-
asr?r
azali
b?b
baq?
b?tin
bay'ah
daf'
dar?ri
duny?wi
fard
fard 'ayn
fard kif?yah
fas?d
al-wad'
f?siq
fitrah
fur?d
kif?y?t
hanif
harakah
hawd
hul?l
idb?r
idh'?n
idr?k
idr?k?t
ijm?'
ijtih?d
ikhtiy?r
iktis?b
'illiy?n
'ilm al-Far?'id
'ilm
al-kal?m
'ilm al-mu'?malah
'ilm al-muk?shafa
im?n
inqiy?d
intiq?l
iqb?l
ir?dah
istinj?'
istiqr?r
istisl?m
istithn?'
istiw?'
i'tim?d
i'tim?d?t
i'tiq?d
i'tir?f
bi'l-lis?n
jabr
jawhar
jih?d
jihah
jism
kab?'ir
kal?m
kar?mah
kasb
kasr
kawn
Kawthar, al-
khiy?r
kif?yah
madhhab
man'
mand?b
maq?m?t
maqd?r
maqd?rah
mayl
mazid
mi'r?j,
al-
miz?n,
al-
mu'?malah,
al-
mub?h
muj?hadah
m?jib
mujtahid
muk?shafah,
al-
muktasabah
munfarid
muqarrab?n,
al-
mutahayyiz
naqd
n?r
al-ba??rah
nuz?l
qadar
qad?m
qidam
qiy?s
qudrah
rub?biyah
r?h
al-
rukn
ru'yah
Sabab
S?biq
?amad
sam'?y?t
shah?dah,
al-
shah?dah
bi'l-lis?n
shar', al-
shirk
?ir?t,al
sirr
?uwar
ta'addub
tad?khul
ta'diyah
takbir
takl?f
talq?n
tanzih
taql?d
?aray?n
??ri'
tark?b
tasb?h
ta?diq
ta?d?q
bi'l-qalb
tasl?m
tazkiyat al-nafs
ukhrawl
ummi
w?jib
wara'
yaq?n
z?hir
zind?q
‘Abb?ss,
ibn-
‘Abd-al-A‘la, ibn-
Abraham
Adham, Ibr?him
ibn-
‘Aff?n,
Uthm?n ibn-
‘?‘isha
Akhtal, al-
‘Ali,
see ??lib, ‘Ali ibn abi-
‘Alqamah
‘Am?rah,
Yaz?d ibn-
Anas, M?lik
ibn-
Arabas
Ash‘ari, al-
Ash‘arites
Bakr, abu-, see
?idd?q,
abu-Bakr al-
Ba?ri,
al-Hasan al-
Bishr; ibn-Marw?n
Christians,
D?r?rni,
abu Sulaym?n al-
Dard?’,
abu-al-
Gabriel
Greeks
Haf?
al-Fard
Hajar al-Aswad, al
Hajj?j,
al-, see Y?suf,
al-Hajj?j ibn
Hanbal, Ahmad ibn-
Hasan a1 Ba?ri,
al-, see Ba?ri,al-
Hudhayfah
Hurayrah, abu-
iqit??d
fi al-I'tiq?d, al-
'Ir?q,
al-
Jahl, abu-
Kar?b?si
Kh?rijites
Kha???b,
‘Umar ibn-al-
Khudri, abu-Sa‘?d
Makki, abu-?alib
aI-
M?lik
ibn-Anas, see Anas,
M?lik
ibn-
Mas'?d,
‘Abdull?h ibn-
Moses
Mu‘?wiyah
Muh?sibi,
al-
Mulaykah, ibn-abi-
Munkar
Murji’?tes
Mu‘tazilites
Nak?r
Noah
Pharaoh
Quraysh
R?fidites
R?wandi,
al, al-
Ris?lah
al-Quds?yah,
al-
??bians
Sa'id, abu-, see Ba?ri,
Ha?an
al-
Saqa?i,
al-Sari al-
Sh?fi'?,
al-
?idd?q,
abu-Bakr al-
Sufy?n
al-Thawri, see Thawri,
Sufy?n,
al-
??lib,
'Ali ibn-, ab?-
Thawri, Sufy?n
al-
Tutari, al-
'Uthm?h,
see 'Aff?n,
'Utbm?n
ibn-
Waqqas, Sa'd
ibn-abi-
Yaman, al-
Yawml Jama1
Y?suf,
abu-
Y?suf,
al-Hajj?j
ibn
Za'far?ni,
al
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