THE BOOK OF KNOWLEDGE
Being a Translation
with notes
of
Kitab al-Ilm
of
Al-Ghazzalis
Ihya Ulum al-Din
by
NABIH AMIN FARIS
SH. MUHAMMAD ASHRAF
LAHORE, PAKISTAN
SECTION IV
On
the reasons which induced men to pursue the science of polemics, and on
revealing the evils of debate and disputation as well as stating the conditions
which render them permissible.
You should know that after the death of the Apostle of
Allah, the caliphate was occupied by the orthodox and guided caliphs who were imams
of righteousness, learned in the science of Allah, His essence and His
attributes, versed in His statutes, and independent in handing down their legal
opinions and decisions. In this they did not seek the aid of jurisprudents
except in very rare cases in which consultation was indispensable. They devoted
themselves to the science of the hereafter and used to refer legal questions and
all that pertains to human affairs in this world to one another and with their
keenest effort, as the accounts of their lives reveal, they followed after
Allah.
When at their death, the caliphate passed on those who
occupied it without either merit or independence in legal opinion and decisions,
the caliphs were compelled to seek the aid of jurisprudents and to attach them
to themselves on all occasions in order to consult with them on the manner of
their judicial decisions. A few learned followers (tabiun),
however, who continued to emulate the orthodox caliphs and persisted in
conforming to the dictates of religion, and in following the way of righteous
Fathers, were still living. Whenever they were sought for appointment as judges,
they would flee, disdaining altogether such honour. Consequently the caliphs
were compelled to be insistent in their desire to appoint them as judges and to
delegate to them the power of government. Contemporaries were thus awakened to
the glory of the learned men who, while they paid no attention to the caliphs
and governors, were persistently sought by them. As
a result these contemporaries turned with their efforts towards knowledge which
they hoped to acquire in order to attain power and glory through the
solicitation of governors. They bent themselves to the study of the science of
legal opinions and offered their services to governors from whom they sought
office and rewards. In this some failed while others met success, but those who
were successful were not free from the obsequiousness of begging and the
servility of indebtedness. Consequently the learned men, after having once been
sought, have now become job seekers, and after having once been proud of their
indifference to the sultans, having now become obsequious by waiting upon them.
This is true of all except the few learned men of religion whom Allah has
blessed in every
All that time people addressed themselves the most to the science of legal opinions and decisions because of the pressing need for it in governmental affairs. Later on, however, there emerged some celebrities and princes who had heard the pronouncements of people on the elements of faith and enjoyed listening to their arguments, and consequently found themselves well disposed to debate and disputation in theology. Thus people pursued wholeheartedly the science of theology, composed many books on the subject in which they set forth the methods of argumentation and developed the principles of contradiction, claiming all the time that their sole purpose was to defend the religion of Allah, safeguard the Usage of His Prophet, and to uproot all innovators, just as the jurisprudents who preceded them claimed that they devoted themselves to the legal profession and took upon themselves the affairs of the Muslims simply out of pity for Allahs creatures and for the sake of giving them counsel and advice.
Subsequently, however, there appeared some distinguished men who deemed it improper to discourse on theology and start a series of debates therein because such a thing would lead to bloodshed and destruction. Instead they preferred to debate in jurisprudence and to point out the more important juridical points in the systems of al-Shafit and abu-Hanifah in particular.
Consequently men discarded theology and the
other disciplines of knowledge and pursued especially problems of disagreement
between al-Shafit and abu-Hanifah, while to those between Malik, Sufyan al-Thawri,
Ahmad ibn-Hanbal, and others, they paid little attention. Their purpose, they
claimed, was to elicit the abstruse points of the law, determine the principles
of the system, and prepare the bases of legal opinions and decisions. They
composed many works on the subject and elicited many points, setting forth
therein the different kinds of syllogisms of controversy and enumerating the
various works that pertain thereto. Furthermore they still continue to compose
at this present time; as to the future, however, we do not know what Allah has
ordained.
This, then, is what induced men to take up nothing but
controversies and debate. If, however, the rulers of this world had favoured
another imam or another science, men
would have done the same and would
have persisted in saying that they were employed in the science of religion and
that they had no other aim than that of drawing near to Allah, the Lord of the
Universe.
DETERMINING THE AMBIGUITY WHICH
EXISTS IN LIKENING
THESE DEBATES TO THE CONSULTATIONS OF THE
COMPANIONS AND THE COUNCILS OF THE FATHERS.
You should know that those who liken their debates to
the consultations of the Companions cajole men by saying that their aim in those
debates is to search after the truth in order that it may become apparent,
especially because the truth is much desired and any co-operation in examining
truth and the exchange of views therein is both helpful and telling.
Furthermore, such was the custom of the Companions in their consultations, as
for example, the time when they held a consultation on the case of the
grandfather and the brothers,1 the penalty for drinking wine,2
the obligation on the imam
1.
al-Bukhari, Faraid,
9: al-Darimi, Faraid,11.
2.
Cf. al-Bukhari, Hudud,1-4; al-Darimi,
Hudud, 9.
103
to pay an indemnity when he commits a mistake in his
interpretation as has been reported concerning the woman who had an abortion
because of the fear of Umar,1 and several cases of inheritance, as
well as what has been reported on the authority of al-Shafi-i, Ahmad ibn-Hanbal.
Muhammad ibn-al-Hasan al-Shaybani2 Malik, abu-Yusuf, and other
learned men besides. You will understand this ambiguity between debate and
consultation when I relate to you the following, namely, that co-operation in
the search after truth is a part of religion but has eight distinguishing
features and conditions.
These
are:
1.
Whereas debate as a means of
searching after the truth is one of the
fard
kifayah duties, no one who has not
yet fulfilled his fard ayn duties
should take it up. Thus whoever has a fard
ayn duty to fulfil, but addresses himself to the fulfilment of a
fard kifayah instead, claiming that he seeks thereby the truth, is a liar;
he is like the person who neglects prayer and traffics in weaving and tailoring
saying that his purpose is to cover the nakedness of him who prays naked because
he finds no clothes. Such a thing may occur and is quite possible just as the
occurrence of the rare cases which are the subject of research in those debates
is possible. Those who spend their time in debate neglect several duties which
are, by general agreement, fardayn
duties. Similarly, anyone who has been expected to return a deposit to its owner
at once, but, instead of so doing, seeks refuge in prayer which is the worthiest
of all obligations before Allah, transgresses because it is not enough that a
person be obedient and his works constitute acts of service unless he observes
therein the rules of time, condition and sequence.
2.
Debate as a means of searching
after the truth is justified provided the doer
is not confronted with a more important fard
kifayah duty.
Thus whoever finds an important obligation
waiting for him and turns to perform something else, transgresses. In fact he is
like
1.
Cf. al-Bukhari, Diyat. 24-25.
2.
A.H. 189/A.D. 804-5; see ibn-Khallikan, Vol II, pp.
2278.
104
a person
who comes upon a group of people and finds them, having been neglected, about to
die of thirst, but instead of saving them by giving them water to drink, buckles
down to study the art of bleeding, claiming that it is a
fard kifayah and that unless the town had a bleeder the people will perish.
On being told that a number of bleeders already exist within his region and,
therefore, there is no need for his services he insists that notwithstanding all
this, bleeding remains a fard kifayah. Likewise,
he who does this and neglects to give his attention to the calamity which has
befallen a group of thirsty Muslims is like the person who devotes his time to
debate while several fard kifayah duties
remain neglected in the town. Thus several have taken up the profession of law (fatwa)
while a number of obligatory duties remain neglected in every town and no
jurisprudent ever pays any attention to them. More specifically let me single
out medicine in which there is not, in almost all the land, a Muslim physician
whose word could be legally accepted in important matters. Nevertheless not one
of the jurisprudents has taken up medicine. The same is true of the Muslim
obligation to enjoin what is just and to forbid what is evil1 which
is a fard kifayah duty.
A debater might perhaps be arguing in the midst of a
hall draped with silk and among men apparelled with it, but would say nothing
about it and instead would debate concerning a hypothetical case which might
never come to pass, even if it should occur there would be several jurisprudents
ready to attend to it. All this time he claims that he desires to come nearer to
Allah through performing the fard kifayah duties.
It was related by Anas that the Apostle of Allah was once asked, When will
the Muslim obligation of enjoining what is just and forbidding what is evil be
neglected? To which he replied, When the best among you take to hypocrisy
and the wicked, to adultery; when government shall pass to the hands of the
least deserving among you and knowledge to those who are corrupt.
3.
The third condition which justifies debate is that the debater should
have the ability and right to form an opinion of his own (mujtahid),
and should be one who can give decisions on his own
1. Cf Surah IX: 72.
105
responsibility
without being bound be the opinions of either al-Shafii or abu-Hanifah or any
other imam, so that whenever he would
find that the school of abu-Hanifah is right on a particular point he would hand
down his opinion accordingly, just as the Companions and the imams
used to do, and would ignore what the Shafiite school holds on the
subject. On the other hand, he who lacks the right and the ability of
independent interpretation (ijtihad), as is the case
with all contemporaries, but would hand down his opinions on the authority of
his imam, would not be able to reject
the stand of another even though he should discover its weakness. Of what use to
him there is debate when his system is well-known and his opinions are bound to
conform to it? And whenever a doubtful point confronts him he would be compelled
to say that the founder of his school might have an answer as he himself was not
independent in interpreting the sources of the law. It would have been more
fitting for him if his discussions were on points which lend themselves to two
opinions, for then he might hand down his opinion in favour of the one and
against the other and become thereby more and more disposed to one view and
opposed to the other. Yet debates are not confined to this type of two-sided
questions; often these are ignored in favour of cases in which the points of
controversy have been fully discussed and decided.
4.
The fourth condition which justifies debate is that there should be none
except on actual cases or cases likely to be so. Thus the Companions held
consultations only as questions arose or were likely to arise, as for example
questions of inheritance. We do not, however, see debaters concerning themselves
with the criticism of cases in which the handing of opinions has caused
widespread tribulations. Rather they seek the spectacular cases which attract
attention and consequently, no matter what the nature of the case may be,
discussion of the issue becomes widespread. They may even ignore cases of
frequent occurrence saying that they are reported cases or rare events which are
not spectacular. That the aim of a debate should be the truth is nothing short
of a miracle. They would also drop a case because it has been reported although
the way to
106
truth is through such reports; or they might drop it
because it was not spectacular and would lend itself to little discussion.
Truth, however, aims at reducing debate and arriving at conclusions concisely
and not flatulently.
5.
The fifth condition which justifies debate is that it should be held in
private in preference to public meeting in the presence of celebrities and
sultans, because privacy is more conducive to understanding and its atmosphere
more suitable to clear thinking. Public meetings encourage hypocrisy and make it
imperative for the individual to defend himself whether he is right or wrong. It
is very well-known that these public meetings and assemblies are not promoted by
their devotees for the sake of Allah. One of them may be alone with his
companion for a long period of time but will not even talk to him because there
is no audience to applaud his rhetoric. He may at times try to start a
discussion but for the same reason gets no response. But no sooner someone makes
his appearance or a group assembles, than he will try his utmost to provoke a
controversy and then monopolize the discussion.
6.
The sixth condition which justifies debate is that the debater should
seek thereby the truth in the same spirit as that of the person who is searching
for a lost object: he does not mind whether the object is found by himself or by
his aides, regards his companion a friend not an adversary, and thanks him
whenever he points out a mistake to him and reveals to him the truth. Thus if he
pursues one way in his search for his lost object and his companion shows him
another and better way he will not criticise him but rather will thank and
honour him and rejoice with him. Such were the consultations of the Companions
that once upon a time, when Umar was addressing an assembly, a certain woman
interrupted him and pointed out to him his mistake. Thereupon he said, A
woman hath hit the mark while a man hath missed. At another time a certain
man asked Ali a question and, on receiving an answer, disagreed with him
saying that it was different; to which Ali replied: Thou art right while I
am wrong, Exalted over all is the Omniscient Allah. On another occasion,
abu-Musa, al-Ashari then the governor of al-Kufah, was asked
107
concerning
the fate of a man who had died fighting for Allah and replied that he was in
Paradise. Thereupon ibn-Masud contradicted abu-Musa and said that, in his
opinion, the man would be in Paradise if, at his death, he has been truly
sincere. Abu-Musa, concurring with the opinion of ibn-Masud said, What he
hath said is the truth. Ask not my opinion when in your midst you have such an
authority. Such should be the fairness and justice of a seeker after truth.
Should such a thing be mentioned nowadays to the most insignificant
jurisprudent, he would deny it and declare it to be improbable. He would also
say that there was no need at all for the explicit mention of sincerity since
everyone knows that it was a necessary requirement.
Compare, therefore, the Companions with contemporary
debaters, how the latter become embarrassed and ashamed whenever the truth is
determined by an adversary, and how they exert their utmost efforts trying to
deny the adversary his credit, malign those who refute their opinions, and
finally liken themselves to the Companions in respect of co-operation in
determining the truth.
7.
The seventh condition which justifies debate is that the debater should
not prevent his adversary from relinquishing one argument in favour of another
and one illustration in favour of a second, as the debates of the Fathers were
thus carried. The debater, also, should remove from his argument all the
unorthodox subtitles of dialectics whether they are relevant or irrelevant. Thus
he should not, for example, say that he was under no obligation to bring this up
or that such and such a statement was contradictory to your first assertion and,
therefore, unacceptable because going back to truth is in itself a refutation of
error and should be accepted as an argument. You also notice how all assemblies
are spent in defences and debates, so much so that a debater would deduce a
principle from all alleged causes, and when asked what proof he had that his
conclusion was explained by that cause, he would say that that was what he had
found and would tell his critic, If you should find anything clearer and
better, produce it so that I might examine it. The objecting critic would
then insist that such a thing has several meanings which he himself has always
known but need not go through them while the
108
debater would demand that they be discussed; but the
critic would persist in his refusal. The debating assemblies are taken up by
such questions while the poor debater does not realize that his saying that he
neither knows nor remembers, and that he has no need for this or for that, is a
lie against the law, because if he asserts that which he does not know simply to
incapacitate his adversary he would be a wicked liar disobedient to Allah, any
by his claim to knowledge he does not possess he would expose himself to the
wrath of Allah. He would also have sinned even if his claims were true because
he had concealed what he had known of the law. His brother Muslim had asked him
in order to have things explained and examined, so that if he were right he
would abide thereby but if he were wrong he would have his friend point out his
mistake for him and lead him from the darkness of ignorance to the bright light
of knowledge. No one will disagree that it is obligatory on the person to reveal
whatever knowledge he may possess of the sciences of religion whenever he is
asked about it. The meaning of his words, I am under no obligation to bring
this up, is that in the rules of dialectics, which have been developed
according to the principles of human curiosity and interest in the methods of
deception and battling with words, he was under no obligation to admit anything
unless it was obligatory by law. By his refusal to admit in the course of his
argument a point which has been brought up and which he knows is true he becomes
a liar and a villain.
Examine the consultations of the Companions and the
negotiations of the Fathers. Have you ever heard of anything like this in them,
or have you ever seen anybody who had been prevented from relinquishing one
argument in favour of another and one illustration in favour of a second, and
from citing as proof an event in the life of one of the Companions after having
drawn an analogy, or quoting a Quranic verse having related a tradition? On the
contrary all their debates were carried on in this manner: they used to set
forth and examine everything that occurred to them just as it occurred.
8.
The eighth condition which justifies debate is that one should only
debate with those from whom he expects to learn
109
something, people who arrive at their knowledge
independently. Usually, however, men nowadays avoid entering into a debate with
intellectual giants and celebrities for fear that their adversaries should
determine the truth. They would rather debate with their inferiors in the hope
of confounding them with falsehood.
Many other minute conditions, which make debate
justifiable, exist besides those already mentioned; but in those
eight conditions you will find how to distinguish between those who debate for
the cause of Allah and those who debate for some other purpose. But in general
you should know that he who does not struggle against and debate Satan while his
heart is subject to his most virulent enemy, the Devil, by whom he is being
continually dragged to his doom, but does instead debate with men in cases
wherein the mujtahid is right, or
shares with him who is right his reward, the same is a laughing stock of Satan
and an example for the sincere. Thus Satan rejoices when he throws him into the
darknesses of evil which we shall now enumerate and discuss.
ON THE EVILS OF DEBATE AND THE CHARACTER DESTROYING INFLUENCES RESULTING THEREFROM
You should know and be sure that debates which are
designed for the purpose of overcoming and silencing an opponent as well as for
displaying ones excellence and honour, bragging before men, boasting, and
being contradictory, or for the sake of winning popular favour, are the source
of all traits which are blameworthy before Allah and praiseworthy before His
enemy, the Devil. Its relation to the secret sins of pride, conceit, jealousy,
envy, self-justification, love of power, and others is like the relation of
drinking to the sins of the flesh such as fornication, foul play, and murder.
Just as the person who has been given the opportunity to choose between drinking
and the other sins, deemed the former harmless and took to it only to be led by
his drunkenness into committing all
the other sins, so is he who succumbs to the lures of overcoming and silencing
opponents in debate, and falls victim to the urge for power and boasting; these
things have led him to conceal all wickedness in his
bosom and stirred
110
in him all blameworthy traits. Proofs of the
blameworthiness of all these will be discussed in the Quarter on the Destructive
Matters in Life although we shall now allude to the major evils which are
enkindled by debate. Of these we may enumerate the following.
One is envy: The Prophet said, As fire consumes wood
so does envy consume good deeds.1 The debater persists in envy
because at times he overcomes his adversary and other times he himself is
overcome; at times his words are praised and at other times those of his
opponent are applauded; and as long as there remains in all the world one known
among men for his versatile knowledge and regarded by them more learned than the
debater and endowed with keener insight, the debater will inevitably envy him
and wish that the favours and admiration which that man enjoys might accrue to
him instead.
Envy is a consuming fire; its victim is subject to
torment in this world while in the world to come his torture will be more
intense and painful. For this reason ibn-Abbas said, Take knowledge
wherever ye may find it, but accept not the opinion of one jurisprudent
concerning another because they are as jealous of one another as the bulls in
the cattle-yard.
Another is pride and haughtiness: The Prophet said,
He who exalteth himself is humbled by Allah, and he who humbleth himself is
exalted by Allah.2 Said he again quoting Allah, Pride is my
mantle and grandeur, yea it is my cloak. I shall smite anyone who would contest
my sole right to them.3
The debater persists in exalting himself above his equals and peers and in claiming for himself a station higher than his worth to the extent that he and his colleagues fight over their seats in assembly halls and boast about the degree of their elevation or lowliness as well as their proximity to, or remoteness from the central seat. They would fight as to who should lead the way in narrow streets. Often the
1.
Abu-Dawud, Adab, 44; ibn-Majah,
Zuhd, 22:3.
2.
Cf. ibn-Majah, Zuhd, 16:3;
Matt, 22:12; Luke 14:11,18:14.
3.
See ibn-Majah, Zuhd,
16:2.
111
foolish,
deceitful, and insolent among them justify themselves on the ground that they
are thereby maintaining the dignity of knowledge because the believers has been
charged not to object himself. They thus consider humility, which Allah and his
prophets commended, abasement, and regard pride, which is reprehensible to
Allah, the dignity of religion. In other words they have altered the
signification of these terms for the confusion of people as they have altered
the signification of other terms such as wisdom, knowledge and the like.
Another is rancour from which a debater is hardly ever
free. The Prophet said, The believer is free from rancour. Several more
traditions have been related in condemnation of rancour and they are well-known.
Yet we do not know of a debater who, is capable of entertaining no rancour
against anyone who would nod his head in approval of the words of his adversary,
or who when the latter pauses in the midst of a sentence, would politely wait
for him. On the contrary he would, whenever he is confronted with such a
situation, entertain and foster rancour in his heart. He may attempt to restrain
himself hoping thereby to disguise his feelings; but, in most cases, he fails as
his feelings invariably reveal themselves. How can he refrain from rancour when
it is inconceivable that all the audience should unite in favouring his argument
and approve all his conclusions and deductions? Furthermore should his opponent
show the least sign of inconsideration about what he was saying, he would
entertain for him in his heart a hatred that would last throughout his life.
Another is backbiting which was likened by Allah to the
eating of carrion.1
The debater persists in eating carrion and is
continually referring to the words of his opponent and traducing him. Because he
endeavours to be right in what he says about his opponent, he inevitably cites
only what shows the weaknesses of his opponents argument and the flaws in his
excellences. Of such is traducing and backbiting, while lying is sheer calumny.
The debater, moreover, cannot keep his tongue from
attacking
1.
Cf. Surah XLIXL: 12
112
the
honour of anyone who turns away from him and listens to his opponent. He would
even ascribe to him ignorance, foolishness, lack of understanding, and
stupidity.
Another is self-justification; Allah said, Assert
not then your own purity. He best knoweth who feareth Him.1 A
certain wise man was once asked, What truth is reprehensible? He replied,
A mans praising himself [even though it be justified]. A debater is
never free from praising himself and boasting of his power, triumph, and
excellence over his peers. In the course of a debate he would repeatedly say,
I am fully aware of all such things, and I am versatile in science, of
independent judgment on question of law, and well-versed in the knowledge of
tradition,and many other assertions besides with which he would sing his own
praise, sometimes out of sheer arrogance and at other times out of the need to
render his words convincing. It is also well-known that arrogance and
self-praise are by law and reason condemned.
Another
is spying and prying into the private affairs of men. Allah said, Pry not.2
The debater always seeks to uncover the errors of his peers and continually
pries into the private affairs of his opponents. He would, when informed of the
arrival in town of another debater, seek someone who could reveal the inside
story of the man and would by means of a questionnaire attempt to bare his vices
in order to expose and disgrace him whenever the need should arise. He even
would inquire about the affairs of his early life and blemishes of his body in
the hope of discovering some defect or disfigurement such as scalp pustule and
the like. Should he fear defeat at the hands of his opponent, he would, in the
course of the debate, allude to these blemishes, especially if his opponent
should remain firm and stand his ground, and would not refrain from being
outspoken if he were given to insolence and scorn. Both of these practices are
regarded as clever ways of repelling the attacks of an opponent, as should be
seen by the accounts of the debates of some of the illustrious and celebrated
debaters.
1.
Surah LIII: 33
2.
Surah XLIX:12.
113
Another is to rejoice at the injury of others
and feel depressed when they are glad. Anyone who does not desire for his
brother Muslim what he desires for himself is far removed from the way of
believers.1 Thus he who prides himself by parading his excellence is
inevitably pleased at the injury of his peers and equals who vie with him for
glory. The hatred which exists between them is like that which exists between
fellow-wives. Just as the one wife would tremble and turn pale at the sight of
her fellow-wife so would a debater at the sight of another: his colour would
change and his mind become perplexed as though he had seen a mighty devil or a
hungry lion. How unlike the companionship and friendliness which used to exist
between the learned men of religion whenever they met is this, and how unlike
the brotherhood, the co-operation, and the mutual sharing which were
characteristic of them under fair and adverse conditions alike! Thus al-Shafii
said, Among the virtuous and wise, knowledge is like a bond of blood
relationship. I cannot, therefore, understand how some men, among whom
knowledge has engendered a deep-rooted enmity, have followed his rite. Or can
you ever imagine any spirit of friendliness prevailing among them when they are
concerned with achieving triumph and boasting of it? How unlikely! It is bad
enough that such an evil fastens on you the traits of the deceitful and robs you
of those of the believers and devout.
Another is deception, the evidence of whose
blameworthiness is well known and need not be enumerated. Debaters are compelled
to deception because when they meet their opponents, friends, or followers, they
find it necessary to endear themselves to them by saying nice things which they
do not mean, by feigning to have been anxious to meet them, and by pretending to
be impressed by their station and position, while everyone present as well as
the speakers and those to whom they have spoken to, know that the whole thing is
untrue, false, fraudulent, and wicked. They profess their love with their
tongues while their hearts seethe with hate. From it all we seek refuge in
Allah.
1.
Cf. al-Bukhari, Iman, 6
114
The Prophet also said, When people take to knowledge
and ignore works, when they profess love to one another with their tongue and
nurse hatred in their hearts, and when they sever the ties of relationship which
bind them, Allah will visit His wrath upon them and curse them, He will render
their tongues mute and their eyes blind. The truth of this tradition, which
was related by al-Hasan, has been verified as these conditions which it predicts
have been witnessed and seen.
Another is to resist truth and detest it and to persist
in disputing it so much so that the most hateful thing to a debater is to see
the truth revealed by his opponent; no matter what it may be, he would do his
best to refute and deny it and would exert his utmost in deception, trickery and
fraud in order to disprove his adversary until contention becomes in him a
second nature. He is thus unable to hear anything without immediately expressing
his objection to it. This habit of his would even drive him to dispute the
truths of the Quran and the words of tradition and would cause him to cite
the one in contradiction of the other. Furthermore wrangling even in opposing
wrong is prohibited since the Prophet called men to abjure it although they are
right in their contention. He thus said, Whoever was in error and should
abjure wrangling, to him Allah would build a dwelling in the confines of
Paradise; while whoever was in the right and should abjure wrangling, to him
Allah would prepare a habitation in the heart of Paradise.1 Allah
has also regarded as equal those who devise lies against Allah and those who
call the truth a lie. He said, But who acteth more wrongfully than he who
deviseth a lie against Allah, or calls the truth when it hath come to him, a
lie?2 and and again, And who acteth more wrongfully than he who
lieth against Allah and treateth the truth when it comes to him as a lie.3
Another is hypocrisy and flattering people in an effort
to win their favour and mislead them. Hypocrisy is that virulent disease which,
as will be discussed in the Book on Hypocrisy,4 leads to the
1.
Cf. ibn-Majah Intro, 7: 7.
2.
Surah XXIX:
68.
3.
Surah XXXX 33.
4.
See the Quarter on the Destructive Matters of Life, Bk. VIII.
115
gravest of the major sins. The debater wants nothing
but to put himself forward before people, and to gain their approval and praise.
These ten traits are among the greatest secret sins.
Others, who lack restraint may engage in controversies leading to the exchange
of blows, kicking, boxing, tearing garments, plucking beards, cursing parents,
denouncing teachers, and outright slander. Such people, however, are not
considered respectable human beings. The prominent and sober among them do not
go beyond the preceding ten traits. One may be free of this or that trait with
regard to his inferiors or superiors, whatever the case may be, or with regards
to people outside his community or his sphere of work. Yet in his attitude
towards his peers, who are equal to him in position, the debater is guilty of
all these traits. Each of these ten traits may give rise to ten other vices
which we shall neither discuss nor explain at the present time. They include
snobbishness, anger, hatred, greed, the desire to seek money and power in order
to attain triumph, boasting, gaiety, arrogance, exalting the wealthy and those
in authority as well as frequenting their places and partaking of their unlawful
riches, parading with horses, state-coaches, and outlawed garments, showing
contempt to people by being vain and ostentatious, meddling in the affairs of
others, talkativeness, the disappearance of awe, fear, and mercy from the heart,
absent-mindedness to an extent that the worshipper would no longer be aware of
what he had prayed, or read, or who had communed with him during his prayer,
nor, despite the fact that he had spent his life in the study of those sciences
which aid in debate but are useless in the hereafter, such as the embellishment
of diction and the knowledge of singular anecdotes, would he be able to
experience any feeling of humility in his heart.
These traits are common to all debaters although they
have them in varying degrees each according to his own station. But everyone,
even the most religious and the wisest among them, is subject to several of
then. Everyone, too, hopes to conceal them and, by self-mortification, to free
himself therefrom.
You should, moreover, know that these vices
characterize
116
those
employed in admonition and warning if their purpose is to be recognized and
establish for themselves prestige, or to obtain wealth and position. They also
characterize those who are working in the science of religion and legal opinions
if they ever hope to secure a position in the department of justice or become
trustees of mortmain properties (awqaf) or
to excel their peers. In general, these vices characterize everyone who, through
knowledge, seeks other than the reward of Allah in the hereafter.
Knowledge,
therefore, would either doom its possessor to eternal destruction or lead him to
life everlasting. For that reason the Prophet said, The most severely
punished of all men on the day of resurrection will be the learned man whom
Allah has not blessed with His knowledge. On the contrary how much better it
would have been if he had come out at least even. This, however, is very
unlikely because the dangers of knowledge are great, for he who seeks it seeks
the everlasting kingdom and the eternal bliss which he will either attain or
else be doomed to perdition. The seeker after knowledge is like him who seeks
power in this world: if he does not succeed in amassing a fortune he cannot hope
to be spared the humiliation of poverty. On the contrary, he will continue to
live in the midst of the worst conditions. To say that in encouraging debate
lies an advantage, namely, that of inducing people to seek knowledge since
without ambition for power and the rivalry which it provokes all branches of
knowledge would have vanished, is true in one respect but otherwise useless.
Thus had it been for their expectation of playing at the ball and mallet1
and with birds,2 the school would not have been attractive to the
boys. But this does not mean that the reasons for the schools popularity are
praiseworthy. Similarly in the case of ambition for power as the reason for the
preservation of knowledge: it does not mean that the ambitious one is saved. On
the contrary he is one of those whom the Prophet described when he said,
Verily Allah will establish this faith through men who have no faith.3
And again,
1.
Al-Kurah w-al-Sawlajan.
2.
Unidentified game.
3.
Hikyat al-Awliya, Vol. III, p. 358.
4.
Cf al-Bukhari,
Maghazi, 40:7; Qadar,5.
117
Verily Allah will establish this faith
through wicked men.1 The ambitious is personally doomed to
destruction although, through him, others may be saved, especially if he should
urge people to forsake the world and in so doing outwardly resemble the learned
Fathers while inwardly he conceals his ambitions. He is, in this respect, like
the candle which burns itself out in order that others may see: the good of
others lies in his own destruction. On the other hand if he should urge people
to cherish this world he would be like the fire which, besides consuming
everything, burns itself out as well.
The learned men are of three kind: First those who are
outspoken in seeking this world and in their devotion to it they destroy both
themselves and others. Second, those who call people to Allah in public and in
private; they bring joy and gladness both to themselves and to those whom they
call. Third, those who preach the hereafter, outwardly forsaking the world while
inwardly seeking the approval of men and wordly prestige; they save others but
destroy themselves.
Examine therefore to which of these three
categories you belong and to what end have you been preparing yourself, and do
not think that Allah would accept anything of knowledge and work which has not
been consecrated to Him. Any doubts which you may have in this regard will be
dispelled by the contents of the Book on Hypocrisy, in fact by all the contents
of the Quarter on the Destructive Matters in Life.2
1.
Cf. al-Bukhari,
Maghazi, 40:7, Qadar, 5.
2.
See Vol. III, Bk. III
118
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