

The Authenticity of the Works Attributed to al-Ghazālī

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1. THE PROBLEM AND ITS IMPORTANCE

BEFORE the invention of printing, when copies of a book were few, it was common to find works falsely attributed to an author. The person of unorthodox opinions, like the Pseudo-Dionysius, assigned his works to someone of unimpeachable reputation in order to avoid censorship or other obstacles to circulation. Or a man might insert heretical material into a rival's book to discredit him. Of al-Ghazālī's *Maḍnūn* (? *aṣ-Ṣaghīr*), D. B. Macdonald wrote :—

"Of course it is quite possible and in accordance with the rules of Muslim polemic that there should also have been in circulation a false *Maḍnūn* teaching these heretical doctrines. Many such cases occur. A book against the belief in saints was ascribed to Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī (d. *cir.* 290–320) . . . and, it was suspected, falsely, in order to bring him into discredit. The same thing happened to ash-Sha'rānī. One of his enemies obtained a copy of his *Al-Baḥr al-Mawrūd*, left out parts and inserted others of a heretical nature, and then spread it as the original work. In defence ash-Sha'rānī was compelled to lay before the 'Ulamā' of Cairo his original copy signed by themselves, and so demonstrate the spuriousness of the other. Again, ash-Sha'rānī had to defend Ibn al-'Arabī against a similar injury. Some hostile theologians interpolated his *Futūḥāt* with heresy. Even Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī suffered from this ; and there were enough such cases for 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Miṣrī to make up a list of them. So we need not be at all surprised if this befell al-Ghazālī also . . ." ¹

Goldziher and Miguel Asin also have helped to make the West aware that not all the works attributed to al-Ghazālī are genuine. In *Le Livre de Mohammed ibn Tournert* Goldziher argued against the authenticity of *Sirr al-'Ālamayn*.² Miguel Asin's list of works "apocryphal or of doubtful authenticity" at the end of his

*Espiritualidad de Algazel*¹ contains, in addition to the *Sirr*, five other writings, namely, *Ad-Durrah al-Fākhīrah*, *Minḥāj al-'Ārifīn*, *Mukāshafat al-Qulūb*, *Rawḍat al-Ṭalībīn*, *Ar-Risālah al-Ladunīyah*. I tried to show lately that the closing section of *Mishkat al-Anwār* is spurious.²

Further study of the writings of al-Ghazālī has convinced me that there are many additions to be made to Asin's list. Indeed nothing short of a radical examination of the whole Ghazalian corpus is a prerequisite of any advance in our understanding of that great Muslim thinker. Of each work as a whole we must ask : Are we certain that this is a genuine work of al-Ghazālī ? And the discovery by Goldziher of an interpolation in the *Iḥyā'*³ shows that we must always reckon with the possibility that there are spurious passages and sections in otherwise genuine works.

A detailed re-examination of all the chief manuscripts and printed editions of al-Ghazālī's works would be a colossal undertaking. Let us hope that it may be possible for scholars to reach a wide measure of agreement on what is authentic and what spurious without too much tedious labour on minutiae. The present article, at least, has the limited aim firstly of setting out some general principles on which a critical examination of this sort could be based, and, secondly, of showing the results attained from the broad application of these principles to some of the more accessible of the works attributed to al-Ghazālī.

On the solution to the problems of authenticity depends the answer to several questions of interest, such as whether in his closing years al-Ghazālī altered his attitude to Neoplatonism. Ibn Rushd claimed that he did so, or rather that he vacillated ; and many have been inclined to follow Ibn Rushd's opinion. If it can be established that the most thorough-going Neoplatonic passages ascribed to al-Ghazālī are not authentic, then the charges against him of Neoplatonism and inconsistency will fail. It will then also be possible to form a more adequate conception of how al-Ghazālī developed in his later years and whether he inclined to more pantheistic and theosophical forms of mysticism.

2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

In a critical examination of the kind necessary, the first essential is to get solid ground under our feet, that is, to find works whose

¹ *The Life of al-Ghazali*, *J.A.O.S.*, 1899, pp. 71–132 ; quotation from p. 131.

² p. 18 f.

¹ Vol. iv, 385–390.

² *JRAS.*, 1949, 5–22.

³ *Streitschrift*, 16.

authenticity is undoubted, so that from these we can form some preliminary ideas about al-Ghazālī's attitude and the course of his thought. The books which spring to mind are the *Tahāfut*, the *Ihyā'* and the *Munqidh*. Other early dogmatic works may also be accepted, notably *al-Mustaḥṣirī* and *al-Iqtisād fi 'l-Itiqād*. (The *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah* is authentic but does not give al-Ghazālī's own views.) In the later period my criticisms of the final section of the *Mishkat* tend to imply that the rest of the work is genuine.

Here then we have a working basis, namely, acceptance of the authenticity of the books named. We must still proceed with caution. We must be careful, for instance, not to place too much emphasis on an isolated passage, in case it should prove to be an interpolation. Again, we must not set up criteria which beg some of the questions at issue; thus, we cannot at this stage say that anything which is Neoplatonic is *ipso facto* unauthentic. As far as possible we must eschew the use of subjective impressions and of estimates in which there is a large subjective element; it is not enough to say, "This passage does not sound to me like al-Ghazālī"; there must be something more objective. Questions of dating are involved in the discussion of authenticity, and it is well to keep in mind the possibility that some of the dates commonly assumed may have to be revised. (More will be said about dating later in this article.)

I pass on to consider three points which, I claim, provide three criteria of the authenticity of the works attributed to al-Ghazālī:—

(1) One of the prominent ideas of the *Munqidh* is that there is a sphere above the sphere of reason, namely that of prophethood or revelation, and that from the standpoint of this higher sphere some of the assertions of reason may prove to be false, just as from the standpoint of reason some of the deliverances of sense are false. Closely linked with this conception is that of the three stages of a man's religious development. At first he naïvely accepts the beliefs of parents and teachers without question; this is the stage of "faith" (*īmān*). Later, however, perhaps after a period of doubt, he can give a rational account and defence of his position and has advanced to the stage of "scientific knowledge" (*ilm*). Beyond this again is the stage of "immediate experience" (*dhawq*), at which a man knows intuitively what he has previously known discursively and inferentially. The third stage is pre-eminently that of the prophet and saint, but other men can share in it to

some extent according to the purity of their lives. The prophet, it should be noted, is able to apprehend matters beyond the ken of reason, such as the qualities of the different hours of the day which makes a different number of *rah'ahs* appropriate in worship.

Thus there are two triads: sense, reason, prophetic faculty; and faith, scientific knowledge, immediate experience. These triads do not correspond throughout, though the upper members correspond. Both are found in the *Mishkat* as well as in the *Munqidh*; in the *Mishkat* the former is expanded into five "spirits", the sensuous, the imaginative, the rational (*'aqlī*), the discursive (*fikrī*), the transcendental prophetic (*qudsī nabawī*).

Now, so far as I have been able to discover, the word *dhawq* is not used in this special sense in the *Ihyā'*. Not merely is the word absent, but underlying what is actually said there is a different conception. Certainly, the idea that man may have a direct intuition of religious truth is present, but it is always assumed that the results reached by intuition are *identical* with those reached by reason. There is no suggestion of an opposition between intuition and reason, and the intuitive "spirit" or faculty is regarded as parallel to reason, not superior. Thus in the second-last book of the *Ihyā'* dealing with *tafakkur* he applies a commercial metaphor to man's religious development and says: "the knowledge of the method of employing and profiting from (sc. such knowledge as one already has) sometimes comes through a Divine light in the heart arising from the natural disposition (*fiṭrah*), as in the case of the prophets . . . and sometimes—and this is more usual—comes from study and discipline."

Since the *Munqidh* is subsequent to the *Ihyā'*, it must be presumed that al-Ghazālī advanced from the thought of the parallelism of reason and religious experience to that of the superiority of religious intuition to reason. Having made this advance, he can hardly have forgotten all about it again in the short period between the composition of the *Munqidh* and his death. Even had his views changed he would not have passed over in silence the points which in the *Munqidh* are explained by the superiority of religious intuition. Therefore it may be concluded that, where a work mentions reason as the highest faculty (as does *Mi'rāj as-Sālikīn*), and makes no attempt to deal, for example, with those qualities of particular things apprehended by the light of prophecy and not by reason, then that work is not subsequent to the *Munqidh* and *Mishkat*.

The possibility should not be overlooked that al-Ghazālī may have had a "Neoplatonic period" immediately after his flight from Baghdad and prior to the *Ihyā'*. This swing to the opposite extreme, as it were, would be plausible psychologically, and the resulting conception of al-Ghazālī's development would be coherent. But in the works where reason is given primacy there is usually some other point which makes the early date unlikely. I therefore conclude that the evidence for such a period of "Neoplatonism" prior to the *Ihyā'* is not yet sufficient.

The first criterion is thus the place assigned to reason. It is definite and clear cut; since in his latest period al-Ghazālī believed in a sphere above reason and a faculty superior to reason, no work ascribing primacy to reason can belong to that period. The criterion is limited, however, since it cannot exclude the possibility that the work belongs to an earlier period.

(2) Another point—and one much used by Asin—is that al-Ghazālī arranges his works in an orderly and logical fashion. The way in which the genuine part of the *Mishkat* carefully prepares for the consummation, the interpretation of the light-verse, is a good example of this; but it can be observed in all the works whose authenticity has been assumed as our starting-point.

We have here, then, a second criterion. Like the first it is definite but limited. We find works that are a cento of varied materials, put together without any clear principle; and we can say at once "these were not put together by al-Ghazālī". However, the question is sometimes a little complicated. In some works ascribed to al-Ghazālī we find sections whose internal arrangement is clear and logical, but which have no close connection with the rest of the work. All we can say in such a case is that the work as a whole did not receive its present form from al-Ghazālī, although some of the separate sections may be genuine.

The fact is that we find authentic Ghazalian material embedded in works of the cento class, and this increases our difficulties. However, the criterion of orderly and logical arrangement helps here too. Where a passage that occurs in two works has a clear and logical connection with the context in one instance and not in the other, we can be sure that it has been inserted in the second work by someone other than al-Ghazālī. This is especially so when the wording is identical or is only slightly altered. Mere repetition, on the other hand, is not an argument against a passage,

since al-Ghazālī frequently repeats himself, sometimes in nearly the same words and sometimes with variations; instances of this are the description of the birth-charm at the end of the *Munqidh* and in the "Refutation of the Ibāḥīyah", and the descriptions of the formal Worship in the *Ihyā'* and the *Bidāyah*.

It is hardly necessary to add that a book or passage may be spurious even though it possesses clear and logical arrangement. A work of the "cento class" may contain a passage written by al-Ghazālī which does not occur in his authentic writings; yet since the work as a whole is suspect, the passage cannot be used to build up our view of al-Ghazālī until there has been a special justification of its genuineness.

(3) The third point which offers a criterion is the attitude towards orthodox dogma and practice. As D. B. Macdonald remarked in his *Life of al-Ghazālī*,¹ his "conversion" to mysticism did not mean that he ceased to be a follower of al-Ash'ari. In the *Munqidh* he makes it clear that he still accepts the main points of his criticism of the Neoplatonists in the *Tahāful*. In the *Mishkat* his zeal for orthodoxy extends to advocating the literal observance of the precept not to keep a dog in the house. Throughout the works assumed above to be authentic he appears anxious to be regarded as orthodox and is careful (as a lawyer) in his application of the terms *mu'min*, *muashrik*, *kāfir*, etc.

Since this concern to be orthodox is found in both the *Munqidh* and the *Mishkat*, it is almost certain that he retained it to the end of his life. There is no good evidence of any abrupt change in the last year or two. Even if there were a change we should be justified in ascribing it largely to senility, since there is no account of his having given a reasoned defence of his abandonment of the positions he had held all his life; thus, although this is abstractly possible, there seems no need to consider it seriously. Hence we can say that any work where the author is not aiming at orthodoxy or where he criticizes the Ash'ariyah, cannot belong to al-Ghazālī's latest period. On the other hand, the possibility of its belonging to the period immediately after his departure from Baghdad cannot be excluded; this theory of an anti-orthodox phase has a certain plausibility, and would fit in with the hypothetical "early Neoplatonic period", but once again the evidence so far collected is not sufficient to establish it.

¹ p. 121.

This third criterion, the attitude to orthodoxy, is of little use by itself, since it is often difficult to find statements from which a clear inference can be drawn; but it can give useful support to the other criteria.

These then are three criteria which may help us to distinguish between al-Ghazālī's genuine and spurious works. Making use of them and of any other particular matters I happened to notice, I have roughly examined those works of al-Ghazālī which were easily accessible to me, and noted some of the salient points which make for authenticity or the reverse. The separate discussion of each book is relegated to an appendix, and I pass to consider the broad results of the examination.

3. PROVISIONAL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The number of books or sections of books to be rejected as spurious, or at least as of very doubtful authenticity is surprisingly large. First of all there is Asin's list of six, which I endorse (though in the case of the third and the sixth, as I have not had the actual text in my hands, my only basis has been his description): *ad-Durrah al-Fākhirah*, *Minhāj al-ʿArifīn*, *Mukāshafat al-Qulūb*, *Rawḍat al-Ṭalībīn*, *ar-Risālah al-Ladunīyah*, *Sirr al-ʿĀlamayn*. To these may be added the work rejected by Macdonald which I shall call the Hebrew *ʿAwwibah*. Then there are the following works: *Kīmīyāʾ as-Saʿādah* (Arabic), *al-Maḍnūn aṣ-Ṣaghīr*, *Minhāj al-ʿĀbidīn*, *Mīrāj as-Sālikīn*, *Mīzān al-ʿAmal*; I have not been able to consult the text of *Maʿārij al-Quds*, but from Asin's description it appears to belong to this group. Finally, there are the following sections of books; the third part of the *Bidāyah*, the definitions in the *Imlāʾ*, and the "veils-section" of the *Mishkat*. That makes in all thirteen complete works and three considerable sections.

The first criterion also makes possible a rough arrangement of the authentic works in periods, as follows: (1) early dogmatic works, that is, where there is no mention of the *Ihyāʾ*; (2) the *Ihyāʾ* and works expressing similar ideas; (3) later dogmatic works, in which the *Ihyāʾ* is mentioned but the conception of a sphere above reason and the technical term *dhawq* are not present; (4) works in which the conception of *dhawq* is found. These periods are partly distinguished by subject-matter, and therefore may overlap one another in time, though a study of the references to other works will show that there cannot be any great overlap.

- (1) *Maqāṣid*, *Tahāfut*, *Mīyār*, *Mustazhiri*, *Iqtisād*.
- (2) *Ihyāʾ*, *Bidāyah*, *al-Ilkīmah fī Makhlūqāt Allah*, *Maqṣud*, *Imlāʾ*, *Maḍnūn*, *Jawāhir al-Qurʾān*, *Arbaʿīn*, *Kīmīyāʾ* (Persian).
- (3) *Qistās*, *Iḥām*, *Fayṣal*.
- (4) *Ayyuhā*, *Ibāḥīyah*, *Munqidh*, *Mishkat*.

In addition to these I have had before me the text of *Al-Adab fī ʿd-Dīn*, *al-Qawāʿid al-ʿAsharah*, *Risālat at-Ṭayr*, *ar-Risālah al-Wāʿiẓiyah*. These are probably genuine, but they are so slight and elementary that it seems better to omit them in this study. From Asin's description in his "Ghazalian chrestomathy" *Risālat al-ʿAqāʾid* and *at-Tibr al-Masbūk* closely resemble the *Wāʿiẓiyah* in subject-matter and are probably also genuine.

Such are the results of a rapid preliminary survey of the field. Yet even when the superficial character of the examination is taken into account, the mounting evidence of unauthenticity within the Ghazalian corpus is impressive. I would not claim to have definitely established the spurious character of all the works in the list of those to be rejected, but I do claim that there is at least a *prima facie* case against their authenticity and that, if anyone wants to make statements about al-Ghazālī on the basis of any of these works he must first do something to justify his use of such material.

A little additional light on these questions of authenticity may come from further detailed studies, especially from the discovery of parallel passages. But much more is to be expected from an attempt to give an account of al-Ghazālī's intellectual and religious development as a whole. If the above theory of what is and what is not authentic can become the basis of a more coherent account of al-Ghazālī's development than any alternative theory provides, that will go a long way to vindicate it. Al-Ghazālī may have been inconsistent with himself in minor points, as Professor Massignon notes¹—what great thinker is not—but in fundamental matters he must have adhered to his position, or at least modified it only in an understandable way. Such is my conviction, and such I would maintain, ought to be the working assumption of the student of al-Ghazālī (as of any other leader of human thought) until his radical inconsistency has been proved.

At the moment what is most needed is a study of his attitude to Neoplatonism during the various phases of his career. Clearly he

¹ *Recueil* 93.

learnt much from it, even if he never accepted the heretical doctrines he criticized in the *Tahāfut*. A study of his doctrine of man, including his use of such terms as "heart" and "soul" should be important.

The picture of al-Ghazālī that emerges from the above results is somewhat different from the one commonly given. Most of the "high mysticism", to which he is supposed to have turned in his later years, has disappeared. Instead he seems to have been chiefly busied with dogmatic and speculative theology, and on mystical questions not to have moved far from the position of the *Ihyā'*.

To reject certain works as spurious does not deprive them of all value. Some of them will still be of interest as illustrations of the attempts to acclimatize Neoplatonism and Greek mysticism within the House of Islam.

APPENDIX A. DISCUSSION OF INDIVIDUAL WORKS

(1) Works rejected by Asin or Macdonald

AD-DURRAH

(*Kitāb ad-Durrah al-Fākhirah fī Kashf 'Ulūm al-Ākhirah*, ed. Gautier, Leipzig, 1877.)

"Its authenticity is very doubtful; the editor bases it on a single citation from *Ihyā'* on p. 27, but al-Ghazālī does not mention it as his in any of his books, and the eschatological doctrine which it contains—a poor resumé of the last tractate of the *Ihyā'*—offers nothing to justify the supposition that this devout compendium is the work of al-Ghazālī himself." (Asin, *Espiritualidad*, iv, 385.)

It is inconceivable, I would add, that al-Ghazālī could express himself about death as the *Durrah* does, since he so regularly preaches a *præparatio mortis*. The story of the ascent to heaven on pp. 11–15 (tr. 9–12) is in strong contrast to the tradition of Mu'adh in the *Bidāyah*. The first encourages the man who performs the external duties of a Muslim to expect a hearty welcome in heaven, whereas the latter gives the warning that even men of outstanding piety may be hardly treated hereafter if their intention also is not absolutely pure. The reference to the *Bidāyah* in one MS. on p. 20 (17) is probably a gloss. If not, it is very like a deliberate attempt to conceal the difference between the *Durrah* and the *Bidāyah*.

MINHĀJ AL-ĀRIFĪN

(*Kitāb Minhāj al-Ārifīn*, in *Farā'id al-La'ālī*, Cairo, 1343, pp. 101–120.)

"This consists of twenty-eight very short articles on hackneyed themes of asceticism and mysticism which do not justify the title of the work. It has no prologue in which the author sets forth in the customary manner the occasion of the book, nor any mention of the

other works of al-Ghazālī. For these reasons its authenticity is very doubtful." (Asin, iv, 385.)

I agree with this judgment.

MUKĀSHAFĀH

(*Kiṭāb Mukāshafat al-Qulūb*, Cairo, 1300.)

"The editor publishes it without the author's name, although asserting that it is a compendium of a book of the same title by al-Ghazālī. I do not think it is authentic, since in none of his books does he mention it as his. Moreover, it is a cento of anecdotes, traditions, and maxims from various authors on religious themes. Among the authors mentioned are (p. 26) al-Qurtubī, who belongs to the thirteenth century A.D., and so is later than al-Ghazālī!" (Asin, iv, 385 f.)

I have not seen the text of this work, but the conclusion appears to be sound.

RAWḌAḤ

(*K. Rawḍat al-Tālibīn wa-'Umdat as-Sālikīn*, in *Farā'id al-La'ālī*, Cairo, 1343, pp. 121–261.)

"It consists of forty-three chapters. This likewise is not by al-Ghazālī in view of the lack of order in the material (an incoherent mixture of dogmatic and mystical themes) and because it includes whole chapters of his *Maḍnūn Ṣaghīr* (pp. 173–9), and of his *Maqṣad* (pp. 193–9) without saying that they are taken from these books of his. Moreover on p. 606 (sc. 206) he quotes a passage of the *Qāḍī Iyād* of Cordoba, his contemporary, without saying it is *maghribī*, as he said in his *Maqṣad* in quoting Ibn Ḥazm." (Asin, iv, 386.)

I agree with Asin. As will be seen below, I regard *Al-Maḍnūn as-Ṣaghīr* itself as spurious; all its conclusions are contained on pp. 173–9, but some of its arguments are omitted. While this *Maḍnūn* is more philosophical (i.e. Neoplatonic) than al-Ghazālī, other parts of the *Rawḍah* seem to come from an orthodox theologian less intellectualist than the Ash'ariyah; thus on p. 203 the Ash'ariyah are distinguished from Ahl al-Haqq, with whom the writer appears to identify himself. The work is a cento, not put together by al-Ghazālī, but some sections of it besides those so far recognized may come from his genuine or spurious works.

RISĀLAH LADUNĪYAH

(*Ar-Risālah al-Ladunīyah*; numerous editions; I have quoted from one in thirty-one pages in *Al-Uqūd al-La'ālī*, Cairo, n.d.; translation by Dr. Margaret Smith in *JRAS*, 1938, pp. 177–200, 353–374.)

"I do not believe that this work is by al-Ghazālī, since the text coincides exactly with a large part of the *Risālah fī 'n-Nafs wa-'r-Rūh* of Ibn 'Arabī of Murcia, edited and translated in my study, *La Psicología segun Mohidin Abenarabi* (Congres XIVe International des Orientalistes, vol. iii). There are in fact two passages literally identical in both *Risālahs*; the second *faṣl* of that of al-Ghazālī coincides with part of *faṣl* 1 of the *Risālah* of Ibn 'Arabī; *faṣl* 4 is identical with *faṣl* 5 in

various passages. In my edition and translation of the *Risālah* of Ibn 'Arabī referred to above it can be seen how the terminology and ideology of that are the same which Ibn 'Arabī employs in other works which are indisputably his." (Asin, iv, 388.)

The above coincidences in themselves are sufficient to show that it cannot be an authentic work of al-Ghazālī. On the basis of the principles set out above the following confirmatory point can be added.

"The knowledge of the Unseen produced by revelation is stronger and more perfect than acquired knowledge (sc. scientific and historical)" (p. 23). In one respect this tallies with the conception of *dhawq* in the *Munqidh*, but it omits the most characteristic aspect of that conception, namely, the contrast and opposition between prophetic and rational knowledge. This omission, too, is not accidental, but fundamental, since "it is the overflowing of the Universal Reason (*al-'aql al-kullī*) which produces revelation" (p. 24). Thus there is no question of a sphere above reason. According to the first criterion, then, this work cannot belong to the latest stage of al-Ghazālī's life, where it is commonly placed by those who accept its authenticity.

Moreover, the whole tenor of the work is different from what we should expect of al-Ghazālī at an earlier period. However, since such subjective impressions are not always reliable, let one simple point be made. In *Ar-Risālah al-Ladunīyah* a distinction is drawn between what prophets come to know by revelation (*wahy*) and what devout persons come to know in their religious experience by "inspiration" (*ilhām*); the former comes from Universal Reason, the latter from Universal Soul; and it is the latter which produces the *'ilm ladunī* from which the work receives its name. Now, if al-Ghazālī had once been so interested in this distinction, it is strange that he should ignore it so completely in the *Munqidh* and *Mishkat*, even if he had abandoned his supposed belief in Universal Reason and Universal Soul. From this point alone there is a strong presumption that the work cannot belong to any stage prior to that of the *Munqidh*.

The case against *Ar-Risālah al-Ladunīyah* is thus very strong, and it is difficult to see how anyone can maintain its authenticity.

SIRR

(*K. Sirr al-'Ālamayn wa-Kashf mā fi 'd-Dūrayn*, Cairo, 1328, 111 pp.)

I have not seen the text of this work but merely repeat the remarks of Goldziher, *Le Livre de Mohammed ibn Tūmert*, pp. 18 f., and Asin, op. cit., 389 f. The following are the chief points.

(1) The personal details in the introduction, purporting to connect al-Ghazālī with Muḥammad ibn Tūmart, are spurious.

(2) There are chapters dealing with magic, alchemy, talismans, etc., which it is highly improbable that al-Ghazālī would have written.

(3) "The disorder and lack of system which prevail in the distribution of the material and which are contrary to the mentality and the usual manner of al-Ghazālī" (Asin, 390) are likewise suspicious features.

(4) Besides quotations from genuine works—*Iḥyā'* on p. 103 and

Qawā'id al-'Aqā'id on p. 104—there are others from apocryphal or unknown works: *Najāt al-Abrār* (p. 104), *K. Maḡhāyib al-Madhāhib* (p. 105), and *K. Nasīm at-Tasīm* (p. 107).

The work as a whole thus appears to be unauthentic.

AJWIBAH (Hebrew)

(*Abhandlung des Abū Hāmid al-Ghazzālī, Antworten auf Fragen die an ihn gerichtet wurden*, ed. H. Malter, Frankfurt-a-M., 1896.)

This is a little tractate in a Hebrew translation. It contains extracts from the *Maqāṣid* and from the Astronomy of al-Farghanī; the eternal pre-existence of matter and time is distinctly taught. D. B. Macdonald, on whose description in his *Life of al-Ghazālī* (131 f.), I am entirely dependent, concludes: "These extracts are put together very clumsily (see especially pp. 7 and 16), and this alone, to my mind, would prevent the ascription of the book to al-Ghazālī; I doubt even if it were ever current among Muslims. Certainly if he, after writing the *Tahāfut*, had wished, even in a secret tractate, to draw back from the position there assumed, he would have taken a little more care in what he wrote, and not simply thrown together passages from one of his former works and extracts from a handbook of astronomy."

(2) Other works which appear to be unauthentic

KĪMIYĀ' (Arabic)

(*Kīmīyā' as-Sa'ādah*, in *Al-Jawāhir al-Ghawālī*, Cairo, 1343, pp. 5-19;

Asin, *Espiritualidad*, iv, 118-19, has conveniently numbered the paragraphs, beginning with *Faṣl fī ma'rīfat an-naṣf*, and making the previous paragraph the "Prologue". This Arabic book is not identical with the Persian and Urdu works with the same title.)

On the question of authenticity the following points are to be noted:—

(1) This book bears no resemblance to that mentioned in the *Munqidh*, which refutes the doctrines of the Ibāḥīyah.

(2) The highest or "angelic" part of man is identified with reason, 'aql (paragraph 9, last line; cf. remark in paragraph 21 that the soul is like a horse and reason the rider). The use of *dhawq* towards the end of paragraph 16 in a sense not unlike that found in the *Munqidh* does not contradict this primacy of reason. Hence the work cannot be from al-Ghazālī's latest period.

(3) The thought is confused and there is no clear line of argument running through the work. Thus, in paragraphs 8 and 9, happiness is made to consist in virtue, whereas in paragraphs 4 and 18 it consists in the knowledge of God, and there is no indication of how these two conceptions are to be reconciled or combined.

(4) Comparison with *The Alchemy of Happiness*, the English translation of parts of the Urdu version (by Claud Field, London, 1910, Wisdom of the East Series), shows that the Arabic *Kīmīyā'* is roughly parallel with the Introduction and first chapter of the Urdu, but each contains long passages which are not in the other. After carefully

noting what is omitted and what is inserted, I have no doubt that the original of the Urdu is genuine and the existing Arabic spurious. The argument of Chapter I of the Urdu is clear and orderly, in contrast to the obscurity and confusion of the Arabic. The Arabic indeed appears to be an attempt to construct a treatise on Platonic psychology (as expounded in the *Republic*), round some of the bones of al-Ghazālī's discourse on the soul. There are numerous Platonic elements in what is said in the Urdu version, and these serve as foundation, but there are also other points which have to be omitted, such as that about the power of certain souls over other persons by miracle or sorcery (p. 25). As a whole, however, the Urdu is not Platonic but Islamic and this explains some of the difficulties and confusions of the Arabic, e.g. the conception of happiness as virtue mentioned above does not occur in the Urdu; again, there is a clear tripartite division on p. 20 of the Urdu, animals, devils, and angels, but chaos ensues in the Arabic when the Platonizing reviser introduces a fourth element, predatory animals, to represent the middle or "spirited" element in the *Republic*.

(5) It has already been seen that the Arabic *Kimiyā* cannot belong to al-Ghazālī's latest period. The interest in philosophy, which is very noticeable, especially when the Arabic and Urdu are compared, does not fit in with an earlier period of his life, such as that immediately following his departure from Baghdad. I have no doubt that the printed Arabic work is spurious.

MAḌNŪN ṢAGHĪR

(K. *al-Maḍnūn aṣ-Ṣaghīr*, also known as *Al-Ajwibah al-Ghazālīyah fī 'l-Masā'il al-Akhrāwīyah*, published along with K. *Iljām al-'Awāmm*, Cairo, 1309.)

I consider this spurious for the following reasons:—

(1) Its authenticity was denied by Ibn 'Arabī, who said (*Muhādarah*, i, 90) that it was by Abu 'l-Hasan 'Alī al-Musaṣfir, a *ṣūfī* connected with Ceuta (I quote from Asin, *Espiritualidad*, iv, 164).

(2) The criticism of the Ash'ariyah on p. 6 is very suspicious. The author has been saying that the Prophet forbade the revealing of the nature of the spirit and merely said, "The spirit is *min amr rabbī*," because the minds of the common people cannot appreciate such things; the Karrāmiyah and Ḥanbaliyah consider God a body; those a little superior denied corporeality but affirmed direction (? = position); "the Ash'ariyah and Mu'tazilah advanced still further beyond these ordinary men and affirmed an existent which had no direction. Question: Why may not this mystery (sc. of the spirit) be revealed to such people? Answer: Because they hold that these attributes can belong only to God; if you mention this (point) to some of them they regard you as an infidel and say you are characterizing yourself by an attribute which is peculiar to God, and that you are claiming Divinity for yourself." There is no evidence from admittedly genuine works that al-Ghazālī ever to this extent dissociated himself from the Ash'ariyah.

(3) In the above quotation and throughout the work true belief is distinguished from inferior varieties by rational criteria, which

imply that reason is regarded as the supreme faculty. In view of his struggles with the problem of *dhawq*, al-Ghazālī could not have written in this way during the *Munqidh* period or subsequently.

(4) The work could not have been written by al-Ghazālī during the *Ihyā'* period since he does not there regard the attribute *qayyūm* or *qā'im bi-nafsi-hi* as constituting the essence of God. Moreover, in the creed at the beginning of Book II of the *Ihyā'* he says that God is "distinct (*bā'in*) from His creatures through His attributes", which directly contradicts one of the main themes of *Al-Maḍnūn aṣ-Ṣaghīr*, namely, the analogy and similitude between God and man. The same contradiction appears when the interpretation of man's being in the image of God (or of the Merciful) in the *Mishkat* (34 f., tr. 75 f.) is contrasted with that on p. 9 of this *Maḍnūn*.

(5) Thus this work could not have been written by al-Ghazālī during the *Ihyā'* period, nor during the *Munqidh* period nor after the *Munqidh*. And there is no place for it either prior to the *Ihyā'* or between the *Ihyā'* and the *Munqidh*. It must therefore be spurious.

(What D. B. Macdonald says in his *Life*, 129 f., appears to refer mainly to this book.)

MINHĀJ

(K. *Minhāj al-'Abidin*, Cairo, 1313, 81 pp.; in *Une Introduction Musulmane à la Vie Spirituelle (Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique*, iv, 1923.) Asin Palacios translates the whole of the Prologue and summarizes the following chapters.

I believe this to be spurious for the following reasons:—

(1) In *Muhādarah*, i, 90, Ibn 'Arabī denies its authenticity and says it is by Abu 'l-Hasan 'Alī al-Musaṣfir, to whom he also ascribed *Al-Maḍnūn aṣ-Ṣaghīr*. (I quote from *Espiritualidad*, iv, 193 ff.; cf. Macdonald, *Life*, 107.)

(2) It cites as the author's the following six works which are not otherwise referred to al-Ghazālī: *Al-Qurbah ila 'llah* (3, 10, 35), *Al-Ghazāt al-Quswa* (10), *Akhlaq al-Abrār* (14), *Tanbih al-Ghāfilīn* (55), *Asrār Mu'āmalat ad-Dīn* (26 ff., 30, 33, 35, 62), *Talbīs Iblīs* (19). The citations of *Ihyā'* do not prove authenticity.

(3) The phrase "sons of God", which one would not expect from al-Ghazālī, occurs on p. 4 (according to the translation).

(4) The work is carefully arranged, but many things are put in a different way from that normal to al-Ghazālī.

MIR'ĀJ

(K. *Mi'rāj as-Sālikīn*, in *Farā'id al-La'ālī*, Cairo, 1343, pp. 1-99.)

The following considerations show that this work is spurious:—

(1) On pp. 75, 96, the writer quotes as his own a book entitled *Risālat al-Aqtāb*, which is not known as a work of al-Ghazālī's.

(2) On p. 70 he refers for fuller treatment to *Mishkat al-Anwār*, but the interpretation of the light-verse on p. 69 f. is quite different in its higher stages from that in the *Mishkat*, 43 f. (tr. 84-6). The latter mentions five "spirits": *al-hassī*, *al-khiyālī*, *al-aqlī*, *al-fikrī*, *al-qudsī*

an-nabawī; but in place of these the *Mi'rāj* has: *nafs, qūwah khiyāliyah*, 'aql, 'aql fa'āl. Thus this is a misleading reference which attempts to cover over a real difference of teaching.

(3) Besides the replacement of the "prophetic spirit" by the 'aql fa'āl just noted, other passages make it clear that the *Mi'rāj* is based upon belief in the primacy of reason; e.g. the section describing the group of people above the ordinary believers says they have perfect certainty and that this comes from demonstration (*burhān*). Thus the work cannot come from al-Ghazālī's latest period.

(4) Suspicious also is its conjunction in the Cairo edition with two works which Asin admits to be spurious.

MĪZĀN

(*K. Mīzān al-'Amal*, Cairo, 1328.)

This is perhaps the most important book to be discussed. The following arguments show that it cannot have been given its present form by al-Ghazālī, although there may be Ghazālīan material in it apart from the passages to which I have noticed parallels in the *Ihyā'*.

(1) In most of the book the primacy of reason seems to be accepted without question. Thus in the Preamble (p. 3) he distinguishes three stages: acceptance of authority (*taqlīd*), clear apprehension (*wuḍūh*), and demonstrative knowledge (*burhān*); and the last of these is higher than the other two. On p. 19 the perfection of man in the Sufi view—and on p. 164 the book is said to be an exposition of the Sufi standpoint—is held to consist in apprehending the true nature of 'aqlīyāt. On p. 33 f. reason or intellect ('aql) is described as a king with reference to the other faculties. There is frequent mention of the "nobility of reason" in pp. 137 ff. Even where he says that the highest degree is that of the prophet (p. 29), there is no hint of any contradiction between prophetic knowledge and rational knowledge; the suggestion is rather that the former is the highest type of the latter. None of these passages could have been written by al-Ghazālī after the conception of *dhawq* had occurred to him; and therefore the *Mīzān* cannot belong to the closing stages of his life.

(2) The argument of the book is extremely confused, and it is difficult and indeed sometimes impossible to say what its standpoint on any particular question is, since one passage appears to be contradicted by another. For instance, what is the relation of 'ilm to 'amal and their relative importance in the attainment of happiness?—the answer is sometimes that of a philosopher, sometimes that of an ascetic. In the Preamble (p. 2 f.) there is set out what appears to be the plan of the book: "(a) slackness in seeking happiness is folly; (b) the only way to happiness is by 'ilm and 'amal; (c) knowledge and the method of attaining it; (d) the 'amal which gives happiness and the method of attaining it"; now these four headings seem to correspond to the chapter titles on pp. 2, 17, 53, 74 (Chs. 1, 3, 9, 14, in the French translation), but the matter of the intervening chapters often does not fit into the scheme, and from p. 137 onwards there is a discussion of 'ilm with little reference to 'amal. Thus by the second of the above general criteria the book falls under suspicion. This suspicion will

ripen into certainty of its unauthentic character when two passages of the *Mīzān* are compared with two passages of the *Ihyā'* with which they are parallel; indeed, it will become clear, I hope, that the *Mīzān* is an unintelligent compilation from very varied sources.

(3) Ch. 27 (= pp. 148-178), describing the duties of pupils and teachers is a close parallel to *Ihyā'*, vol. i, book 1, *lib* 5. Sometimes they correspond word for word, mostly they are very similar, but occasionally there are notable differences. The most important of these is probably in the allegory of the slave performing the pilgrimage (in the Tenth Duty of Pupils in the *Ihyā'* and in the Ninth in the *Mīzān*). In the *Ihyā'* this is an excellent illustration of the point to be made. A slave is promised freedom and an estate if he makes the pilgrimage to Mecca; if he actually sets out but, through no fault of his own, fails to complete the pilgrimage, he will receive freedom but no estate. Now there are three stages: (1) preparing what is necessary for the journey; (2) the actual journey; (3) performing the various rites of the Hajj. To these correspond three types of knowledge: (1) those concerning the welfare of the body in this world, such as medicine and law; (2) knowledge of the improvement of character, together with the practice of it; (3) knowledge of God and all that is comprised in 'ilm al-mukāshafah. All who start to improve their characters obtain salvation; those who reach the third stage attain the summit of happiness. This is excellent as an illustration, in al-Ghazālī's usual manner. The *Mīzān* has the story in much the same words (except that it says "wealth" instead of an "estate"), but draws quite a different lesson from it. The pilgrimage itself is the perfection of the soul by purity of character; the wealth is death, whereby the veil is removed and man sees the beauty of his soul, and rejoices; the journey is the improvement of character; the preparations are the legal and linguistic sciences which prepare for the speculative sciences (*al-'ulūm an-naẓariyah*). This interpretation is clumsy; the three stages are not three members of one species, but are quite disparate; nothing is made of the distinction between receiving freedom and receiving wealth over and above that. I have no doubt that this interpretation is spurious, the work of a forger who objected to something in the interpretation of the allegory in the *Ihyā'*; the passage must therefore be subsequent to the *Ihyā'*.

(4) The other passage to be discussed is the autobiographical one on p. 44 of the *Mīzān*. No previous writer appears to have noticed that pp. 44-8 of the *Mīzān* (beginning at the top of p. 44 and a little before the actual "autobiographical passage") is closely parallel to *Ihyā'*, iii, Book 2, *bayān* 8 f., pp. 17 f. and 19 f. The two passages are not identical, but for the most part they have the same form of words with only slight grammatical changes, such as from the third person to the second or first. The most important difference is that the words which make the passage autobiographical do not occur in the *Ihyā'*. The *Mīzān* runs: "... when a man is for God, God is for him; so that, at the time when I truly desired to walk in this way, I took counsel from a distinguished Sufi about constantly reciting the Qur'an, and he forbade me and said, The way is to sever your connections with this world..." The *Ihyā'*, however, simply says: "... when

a man is for God, God is for him; and they consider that the method in that is first of all the severing of connections with this world." About the relation of these two passages to one another various theories are possible. (a) The passage in the *Mizān* may be genuinely by al-Ghazālī, since he may have written the same thing at different times in slightly different words and with slight omissions. Since the passage goes on to speak of the practice of constantly repeating the word "Allah", and in the *Mizān* apparently approves of Sufism and of this practice and in the *Ihyā'* disapproves, I think that this passage, if genuine, must be earlier than the *Ihyā'*; one can imagine a man in the first flush of a new enthusiasm adopting such a practice, and later deciding that it was not so beneficial as he thought at first, but it is more difficult to imagine al-Ghazālī, when the ardour of his "conversion" had cooled, adopting this practice despite his disparagement of it in the *Ihyā'*. D. B. Macdonald in his "Life" (*JAOS*, 1899 p. 89) describes an early but abortive attraction to Sufism, to which this might refer: "he took part in *dhikrs* . . . but did not attain what he sought . . . so he went back to his worldly studies." If the thesis is accepted that the *Mizān* is not a unity, then we need not consider how the priority of this passage to the *Ihyā'* affects the dating of the *Mizān*, since the passage may have been incorporated in the *Mizān* at any of a number of dates. I do not see how the autobiographical passage can belong to the original genuine stratum of the *Mizān* which I postulate. (b) The other main possibility is that the actual autobiographical words are a fraudulent invention, and that the whole passage has been copied from the *Ihyā'* with slight modifications. In view of what the rest of the *Mizān* is, I think this is most probably the case.

(5) It is possible, I think, with some degree of probability, to extract from the *Mizān* as it is printed the original form of a genuine work of this title by al-Ghazālī. The genuine work is comparatively short but it has supplied the framework of the existing work; all sorts of extraneous matter has been inserted bodily into the genuine work, so that only close examination can bring it to light, and that not always with complete certainty. I give this attempted reconstruction of the genuine *Mizān* in Appendix C.

For these reasons the *Mizān* as it stands at present cannot have received its form from al-Ghazālī himself, and it contains much material that cannot be his.

(3) Parts of works to be rejected

BIDĀYAH

(*Bidāyat al-Hidāyah*, Cairo, 1353/1934, 47 pp.)

The closing section, entitled "The Discourse on the Rules for Companionship and Association with the Creator . . . and with Creatures" (pp. 40-7), is spurious in the sense that it was not part of the original work although it contains some Ghazālīan material. The rest of the book is genuine, being a short account of some of the fundamentals

of the *Ihyā'*. The main reasons for rejecting the closing section are as follows.

(1) The final sentence of the genuine part reads like the conclusion of a work: "This is all the Guidance to the Beginning of the way in respect of your dealings with God most high by performing what He commands and avoiding what He forbids" (39 f.). This corresponds to the closing words of the Introduction: "... the Beginning of Guidance is outward piety and the End of Guidance is inward piety . . . Piety designates carrying out what God most high commands and avoiding what He forbids, and thus has two parts. In what follows I expound to you briefly the outward aspect of the science of piety in both its parts" (p. 4). The book does in fact consist of two such parts, arranged neatly and logically in al-Ghazālī's usual manner. The plan is complete without the closing section. Moreover, the closing section is not so neatly and logically arranged, and has no clear connection with what goes before.

(2) The tone of the closing section is very different from that of the main part of the book. The latter is prescribing what is best described as a semi-monastic life, whereas the former is, at least superficially, rather worldly.

(3) There are the following parallels with the *Ihyā'* so far as I have noticed. For convenience I designate the parts of the closing section by the letters A to I. A—companionship with God (p. 40); see below. B—duties of 'ālim and muta'allim (40 f.); no parallel noticed. C—duties to parents (41); does not correspond to section on rights of parents in *Ihyā'*, ii, 169 f. D—distinction between intimates, acquaintances, and strangers (41); does not correspond to distinction in *Ihyā'*, which are between blood-relations, neighbours, etc. E—conditions of intimacy (41-3); some parts are summaries of the conditions set out in *Ihyā'*, ii, 136-8, but the details do not correspond. F—rights of intimates (43 f.); much abbreviated from *Ihyā'*, ii, 138-153. G—acquaintances (44-6); no parallel noticed. H—miscellaneous duties of social intercourse (46 f.); repeats *Ihyā'*, ii, 153 f. with slight omissions (the closing section of *Al-Adab fi 'd-Din*, pp. 27-9, is similar with a few more omissions). I—conclusion (47).

Now the early part of the *Bidāyah* shows that al-Ghazālī is capable of repeating himself in slightly different words or of summarizing briefly. What is suspicious here is that along with some close parallels we find palpable differences, as in D. Indeed the whole looks like the centos which constitute several of the spurious works.

(4) The opening paragraph (A) of the closing section is liable to attack on special grounds, and may even be a later insertion within the "closing section". The immediately preceding sentence, which I hold to be the first of the spurious part, speaks about "rules of conduct whereby you may keep yourself right in your intercourse and companionship with the servants of God most high in this world" (p. 40); there is no mention of companionship with God. The transition to paragraph (B) is likewise abrupt and awkward, whereas the first words of that paragraph, "if you are a scholar . . ." would follow the sentence just quoted quite naturally.

Moreover, the conception of companionship with God is in itself suspicious. The *Bidāyah* is in general an abbreviation of some of the chief parts of the *Iḥyā'*, but there is no section in that work dealing with this idea. Dr. Margaret Smith, who is interested in the idea (cf. *Al-Ghazālī the Mystic*, 95, 98), mentions, besides the present passage, only a brief anecdote from the *Iḥyā'*, where the idea of companionship is incidental to the main point, and where the word used is *jalīs* and not *ṣāhib*. If al-Ghazālī had been interested in this idea, its influence would surely have been seen elsewhere, e.g. in his planning of his day; but the governing thought there is not the seeking of companionship but the fulfilling of commands.

These reasons seem to make it necessary to regard the closing section of the *Bidāyah* as spurious.

IMLĀ'

(*K. al-Imlā' fī Mushkilāt al-Iḥyā'*, on the margin of *K. al-Ithāf* of Sayyid Murtada, vol. i, pp. 41-252, Cairo, 1311; most is also found in the text of *Ithāf*, ix, 392-449.)

I have found no reason for doubting the authenticity of the greater part of the text of this work, but the Introduction, consisting of a list of Sūfī terms, is suspect on the following grounds.

(1) It does not appear to have any close connection with the rest of the *Imlā'*. As the text in any case is in disorder, some extraneous matter could easily have been slipped in. So far as I have observed, there are no instances of the use of some of these Sūfī terms by al-Ghazālī.

(2) These definitions constitute the *matn* amplified and commented on by Ibn 'Arabī in his *Futūḥāt*, ii, 191-237. Ibn 'Arabī would hardly have found the definitions so much to his liking had they represented the ideas of al-Ghazālī himself. They must therefore either be wrongly ascribed to al-Ghazālī, or else be a purely objective account of current usage. In either case they give no indication of al-Ghazālī's views.

MISHKAT

(*K. Mishkat al-Anwār*, various editions.)

I have already argued elsewhere that the concluding part of this work, the "Veils Section", is spurious—*A Forgery in al-Ghazālī's "Mishkat"*? *JRAS.*, 1949, 5 ff.

(4) Notes on some works accepted as authentic.

AYYUHĀ

(*Ayyuha 'l-Walad*, Beirut, 1933, photographic reproduction of a manuscript along with a translation by Dr. G. H. Scherer.)

This work consists of elementary advice in the sphere of ascetic theology. Most of it is consonant with al-Ghazālī's views in the *Iḥyā'* period, e.g. the emphasis on working and not simply knowing. The reference to Sūfīs in paragraph xvi is superficially at variance with praise of certain Sūfīs later, e.g. in xviii, especially p. 68 (tr.). There is appar-

ently a beginning of the technical use of *dhawq* in xvi, where Dr. Scherer renders it "experience".

There is a high probability that this work is authentic.

MAḌNŪN

(*K. al-Maḍnūn bi-hi 'ala ghayr Ahli-hi*, Cairo, Maymūniyah, 1309.)

I accept this as authentic because within the framework of an orderly arrangement there occur a number of typically Ghazālīan thoughts. These are not repeated word for word, but vary somewhat, as is to be expected when a writer uses a similar illustration on different occasions.

(1) The treatment of symbolism in i, ch. 4, resembles the *Mishkat* the mention of the Sun and Moon as symbols of the Sultan and Vizier on p. 5 is parallel to *Mishkat*, 32 (tr. 73).

(2) Towards the end of i, ch. 7 (p. 13), it is maintained that revelation contains nothing contrary to reason in the sense of being self-contradictory, but does contain some things which reason cannot appreciate; he uses the example of fire which is also found in the *Munqidh*.

(3) The idea in i, ch. 10, that God is *bāṭin* because He is so extremely *zāhir* is similar to *Mishkat*, 26 (tr. 67 f.).

(4) In iii, ch. 1, after saying that there are three ways of interpreting miracles, sensuous, imaginative, and rational, the *Maḍnūn* adds that all three must be accepted; this is parallel to the insistence in the *Mishkat* on observing both literal and metaphorical meanings.

These typical thoughts are more important than the mention of his brother Aḥmad in the Prologue and Epilogue, since the word "Aḥmad" might be a gloss on "akhi", originally understood in a general sense.

It is worthy of note that in iv, ch. 2, he mentions both *mutakallimūn* and *falāsifah*, and argues against the latter that no discussion of the movements of the spheres can affect the question of the Last Judgment, since God may have decreed that there is to be a movement completely different from all previous ones which will lead to a complete change of all existing things. Thus, while his thoughts are moving towards the position of his latest works, he is still sharply opposed in certain respects to the *falāsifah*.

In general it does not appear to be necessary to discuss the case for the authenticity of those works which I accept as genuine.

APPENDIX B. NOTES ON CHRONOLOGY

The chief attempt so far to date the works of al-Ghazālī is that of M. Louis Massignon in *Recueil*, p. 93. Goldziher has some useful remarks (*Streitschrift*, p. 27, n. 3; p. 28), but has not noticed that the *Qistās* is mentioned in the *Fayṣal*. The following list agrees in the main with that of M. Massignon, but a division of his last period is possible through the use of the *dhawq*-criterion. The list of citations was mostly taken in the first place from Asin, *Espiritualidad*, iv, but has nearly everywhere been checked: I have not, however, been able to find the alleged reference to the *Maḍnūn* in the *Fayṣal*.

EARLY DOGMATIC WORKS

Maqāsid

Tahāfut: mentions *Mi'yār* (17, 20, 213), but text doubtful in each case; *Qawā'id al-'Aqā'id* (78), to be written—probably not identical with the opusculum of this title, nor with Book II of *Ihyā'*.

Mi'yār: M. Massignon places this after the *Ihyā'* period, which is possible if the above references are later glosses.

Mihakk: usually mentioned along with *Mi'yār*.

Mustazhiri (Leiden, 1916): refers to *Tahāfut* (see Introduction, p. 28).

Iqtisād (Cairo, n.d.): mentions *Mustazhiri* (107).

"IHYĀ'" PERIOD

Ihyā' (Cairo, 1316): mentions *Iqtisād* (i, 84; iv, 201); *Mustazhiri* (i, 32); *Mi'yār* (i, 45); *Risālah Qudsiyah* (i, 84; given *in extenso*, i, 90–100).

Bidāyah: mentions *Ihyā'* (14 f., 28, 33, 39).

Hikmah: Asin says (*Esp.* iv, 80) that this is promised in *Ihyā'*, iv, 90.

Maqṣad:

Imlā': reply to attacks on *Ihyā'*.

Maḍnūn: mentions *Ihyā'*; mentioned in *Arba'in* (? in *Fayṣal*).

Jawāhir: mentions *Risālah Qudsiyah*, *Iqtisād*, *Tahāfut*, *Mustazhiri*, etc., *Mihakk*, *Mi'yār* (all on p. 21); *Ihyā'* (23 f.).

Arba'in (Cairo, 1328): an appendix to *Jawāhir* (2, 351); mentions *Maqṣad* (14, 27); *Ihyā'* (26 f., 352); *Iqtisād* (27); *Maḍnūn* (28); *Bidāyah* (32).

Kīmīyā' (Persian).

LATER DOGMATIC WORKS

Qistās (Cairo, 1318): mentions *Ihyā'* (65); *Mustazhiri* (58); *Mihakk*, *Mi'yār* (69, 74); *Iqtisād* (95); *Jawāhir* (63, 65, 83, 94, 98, 100); etc.

Iljām (Cairo, 1309): mentions *Qistās* (44).

Fayṣal (Cairo, 1343): mentions *Qistās*, *Mihakk* (96); ? *Maḍnūn*.

"DHAWQ" PERIOD

Ayyuhā (Beirut, 1933): mentions *Ihyā'* (tr. 63, 76).

Ibāhīyah (Munich, 1933): *ahli dhawq* mentioned in Persian text, p. 25, 7.

Munqidh (Damascus, 1358/1939): mentions *Tahāfut* (95 f.); *Fayṣal* (98); *Qistās* (115 f., 119, 154); *Mustazhiri* (119); *Ihyā'* (135).

Mishkat (Cairo, 1322): *Ihyā'* (9); *Mi'yār*, *Mihakk* (10); *Maqṣad* (19).

The list of citations shows that for the most part only comparatively slight changes are possible in this chronological table. The "Later Dogmatic Works" must be later than nearly all the works of the "*Ihyā'* Period" since *Qistās* mentions *Jawāhir*, but one cannot state definitely that they are prior to those of the "*Dhawq* Period" (apart from the *Munqidh*). The citations leave a wide margin for the *Mishkat*, but its contents indicate a late date.

APPENDIX C. RECONSTRUCTION OF "MIZĀN AL-'AMAL"

The studies on which this article has been based have led to the conclusion that the existing *Mizān al-'Amal* consists of a great deal of non-Ghazālīan matter built into a genuine framework. Moreover, in principle it looks as if it should be possible to effect the separation. The Preamble (p. 2 f.) gives what may be regarded as the plan of the original work. The problem is therefore out of the mass of material of the printed book to produce a logically coherent argument which fits the four heads of the plan. It is conceivable that some part of the original has been omitted, as in the printed Arabic text of *Kīmīyā' as-Sa'ādah*, though perhaps not much. The following is a provisional list of genuine passages.

pp. 2–3: Introduction; states what the four chapters are.

I. *Slackness in seeking happiness is folly.*

3–5: wisdom causes men to make sacrifices for lesser goods, how much more for eternal happiness; but there is a lack of belief in its existence.

5–17 (except 8, lines 10–16): lack of belief only leads to slackness in pursuing happiness where one is negligent; different groups are considered.

II. *The way of happiness is knowledge and action.*

17–19, 4; 20, 7–21, 4: the above proposition is to be accepted because of the agreement of the first three groups on it, in the same way as one follows the treatment about which doctors agree; or it may be known to be true by personal insight, as when a patient attains to medical knowledge.

(21, 5–22, 9; 23, 12–14; 27, 10–31, 13, are perhaps genuine: the knowledge required is of the soul and its purification; the soul has practical and reflective powers.)

III. *Knowledge and the attainment of it.*

53, 2–55, 11: knowledge is either reflective or practical; the latter is threefold.

(67–70 perhaps: it is possible to change a person's moral character.)
70–74: good and bad qualities of character are formed gradually by the repetition of acts.

IV. *The action which leads to happiness.*

74–77: the virtues which lead to happiness.

77–82: the method of improving one's character.

83–103 (probably): the cardinal virtues.

103–109: conclusion; the highest happiness is closeness to God.

About the beginning and end of this list I feel tolerably certain; the middle, especially Chapter III, is not so clear. The work as a whole thus becomes an attempt to expound and justify the Aristotelian principle that virtue is a mean. This would give a good meaning to the title, and explain the connection in al-Ghazālī's thought with his expositions of Aristotelian logic in the *Mi'yār* and *Mihakk*.