THE STUDY OF AL-ĠAZĀLĪ

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The recently published books of Dr. Farid Jabre on al-Ġazālī, together with the posthumous 'essay' of Maurice Bouyges [1], once again direct the attention of students of Islam to this important Muslim thinker. There has been little detailed work on him since A. J. Wensinck's *La Pensée de Ghazzālī* (1940) and Dr. Margaret Smith's *Al-Ghazālī the Mystic* (1944). The reason is doubtless the somewhat daunting character of such an undertaking. There are few thoroughly reliable texts, and much work to be done on many manuscripts. There are problems about the authenticity of several works. Above all there is the richness, or as Wensinck called it the 'Protean character' of al-Ġazālī's thought. He was pioneering, constantly exploring the applicability of fresh ideas to a variety of subjects. To use a favourite metaphor of his own, his thought is a vast ocean in which all but the most skilled navigators are liable to lose their way. The present article contains some preliminary considerations about the navigation of this ocean.

§ 1. QUESTIONS OF METHOD

The methodological assumptions underlying Jabre's work are important, and worthy of fuller consideration than he himself gives them. Out of the large number of books ascribed to al-Ġazālī he regards a score as constituting a *textus receptus*, and makes these the basis of his study of al-Ġazālī's thought (which, as will be seen in § 2, he holds to be self-consistent throughout). The books included in this *textus receptus* (and

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[1] *La Notion de Certitude selon Ghazali dans ses origines psychologiques et historiques* (Études Musulmanes, VI), Paris, Vrin, 1958; *La Notion de la Maʿrifa chez Ghazali* (Recherches, VIII), Beirut, Lettres Orientales, 1958. (Referred to as *Certitude* and *Maʿrifa*). *Essai de Chronologie des Oeuvres de al-Ghazālī*. Beirut, 1959; edited by Michel Allard with notes on subsequent publications. The editor has earned the gratitude of scholars by his competent and painstaking work. This is not affected by one or two small slips; *e.g.* (p. 50 note) the translation by J. Robson is of the 10th principle of the second part of the *Arbaʿīn*; (p. 80 note) there seems no difficulty in supposing that a falsifier might quote the *Ihyāʾ*, and call it 'our book'.

placed in chronological order) are those whose authenticity is generally accepted. In thus selecting certain works for primary consideration and neglecting others Jabre intends to leave open the question whether the latter are authentic or not (*Certitude* 41); and remarks here and there suggest that his inclination is not to reject any work without much more conclusive proof of its falseness than can usually be given.

This method of beginning from a *textus receptus* appears to be the best way of dealing with the vast and amorphous *corpus Gazalianum*. A solid foundation is necessary from which to commence operations. If a body of accepted texts such as Jabre uses shows that al-Ġazālī's thought has a high degree of consistency and, even where it develops, has continuity within the development—and there is good reason for thinking this possible—then this will be a basis for dealing with questions of authenticity. Where a work claims to be by al-Ġazālī it must now be possible to show that the views expressed in it are somehow continuous with those in the *textus receptus*, even when there are superficial differences. Such a procedure admittedly presupposes consistency and continuity in al-Ġazālī's thinking, but the more this is shown to be present in the *textus receptus*, the more justification there is for assuming its existence throughout his genuine writing.

An illustration of this point may be found in Wensinck's treatment of the conception of *cabarūt*. First he quotes passages from the *Iḥyā'* and the *Imlā'* where the sphere of the *cabarūt* is described as being intermediate between those of the *mulk* and the *malakūt* (the worlds of sense and of thought) and corresponding to feeling in man [1]. But a few pages later (*Pensée* 98 f.) he quotes other passages 'where *malakūt* and *cabarūt* have changed places, so that the latter is the highest'; and he adds that this change in terminology is 'not surprising since the mutual relation of *malakūt* and *cabarūt* is not constant in al-Fārābī and Avicenna, authors from whom Ġazālī largely borrowed his cosmological terminology'. This is hardly adequate. If al-Ġazālī has anything approaching the consistency Jabre claims for him, he could not have executed such a *volte-face*. To maintain Wensinck's position on this point there would have to be much more discussion of the ideas underlying the terminology, and an attempt to show some continuity in these ideas despite the changes in the words used. If, as seems likely, no such continuity can be found, this would be

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[1] *Pensée* 83-85; there is a much fuller but essentially similar discussion of the point in his article *On the Relation between Ghazālī's Cosmology and his Mysticism*, Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeeling Letter-kunde, Deel 75, serie A (Amsterdam, 1933), 183-209 (= no. 6). Al-Ġazālī has a fuller account in *Arba'īn* (Cairo 1344), 49.

an additional reason for holding that *ad-Durra al-fāxira*, where the second set of passages is found, is not authentic.

Jabre does the present writer the honour of using an article on '*The Authenticity of the Works ascribed to al-Ġazālī*' to support the details of his *textus receptus* [1]. Since he proceeds, however, to say that questions of authenticity are left open, he is not in fact accepting the main arguments of the article but only the chronological list of works (based mainly on al-Ġazālī's references to previous works). The list has received further general confirmation from Bouyges' *Essai de Chronologie* [2]. This work was completed by 1924 but not published, perhaps because the author was not satisfied with it [3]. He had, however, made a careful study of many manuscripts, and his conclusions carry more weight than those based only on printed texts. The order of the main generally-accepted works of al-Ġazālī is thus fairly well established.

One point of Jabre's chronology calls for comment. He places the *Mustaẓhirī* first in the works he considers (*Certitude* 9), thus rejecting the view of Ignaz Goldziher that it contained a reference to the *Tahāfut* [4]. A brief justification of his dating of the *Mustaẓhirī*, though without any reference to Goldziher's arguments, is given later; but it is based only on subjective impressions of style, and does not give any solid reason for rejecting these arguments or any alternative way of explaining the correspondences between the *Mustaẓhirī* and the *Tahāfut* noted by Goldziher (*Certitude* 316, cf. 371). The comparative neglect of this point is unfortunate, for it is one of the chief supports of Jabre's final conclusions.

It is also strange to find him including a work by al- Cuwaynī in the *textus receptus* of al-Ġazālī. The reason is that this work, *al-ʿAqīda an-Niẓāmīya*, was transmitted by al-Ġazālī (*Certitude* 78, note). But this is no justification for including it among al-Ġazālī's own works, however

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[1] JRAS 1952, 24-45. In this article there was no mention of *Maʿāric al-Quds*, but reasons for holding it to be unauthentic are given by A. S. Tritton, in BSOAS, 22/1959, 353.

[2] The chief difference is the discovery that the *Ilcām* was apparently completed only a few days before al-Ġazālī's death and must therefore be his latest work. Jabre is aware of this dating and has accepted it (*Certitude* 374 note, 401), though he has not made the corresponding alteration in his opening list of al-Ġazālī's works. G. F. Hourani, in JAOS, 79/1959, 225-33, is also aware of the date of the *Ilcām*, but has unfortunately been overtaken by the much fuller work of Bouyges.

[3] His dissatisfaction was doubtless due to a realization of the vastness of the total task. This can be seen by comparing the relevant section of Bouyges with Fr. Meier's full treatment of *Naṣīḥat al-mulūk* and *at-Tibr al-masbūk* in ZDMG, 93/1939, 395-408.

[4] *Streitschrift . . . gegen die Bāṭinijja-Sekte*, Leiden, 1916, 28, 45 (referring to *Tahāfut*, ed. Bouyges, 260). Bouyges, *Chronologie* 32, accepts Goldziher's argument.

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close his relation to al-Ɛuwaynī may be. Actually the treatment of the relation between the distinguished pupil and his chief teacher is one of the weaker parts of Jabre's study, for once again he argues from subjective impressions; al-Ġazālī 'is visibly embarrassed by the scholastic presentation . . .' (80), and in the *Iqtiṣād* he 'finds himself the prisoner of a terminology and of a complex of ideas which do not satisfy him' (88; contrast al-Ġazālī's own favourable view of the *Iqtiṣād* in *Arbaʿīn*, 24; written after *Iḥyāʾ*).

Despite these weaknesses in matters of detail and despite the absence of a full justification of the procedure adopted, Jabre's method is a sound one and ought to lead to a decision of the question between him and the partisans of such a view as Wensinck's which accepts the existence of serious inconsistencies in the thinking of al-Ġazālī. If Jabre's method can show the existence of a large measure of consistency, it will be difficult to go on maintaining that al-Ġazālī was a completely inconsistent thinker.

§ 2. Unity and Continuity of Thought

Jabre tends to the view that there is an essential unity in al-Ġazālī's thought throughout the whole of his *textus receptus*; and it must be said that he has marshalled a vast amount of evidence to support this view. In the future all scholars who do not accept the unitary character of al-Ġazālī's thought have the onus laid upon them of demonstrating the contrary. In particular the view of Duncan Black Macdonald (cf. EI[1] s.v. *al-Ghazzālī*; also JAOS 20/1899, 71-132), the most widely accepted view at the present time, will have to be re-examined. According to this view al-Ġazālī's career falls into two distinct phases, one where he was a scholastic theologian and one where he was a mystic who had largely rejected scholastic theology. Jabre, after wide researches within the selected limits, gives it as his view that 'in the sphere of the truths of dogma, properly speaking, the master in his interpretations keeps to the Ašʿarite system in its broad lines' (*Certitude* 171. Cf. J.-M. Abd-el-Jalil, *Autour de la Sincérité d'al-Ġazzālī*, Mélanges Louis Massignon, Damascus 1956, 57-72, esp. 70). This is a point which must be taken seriously. It has now received powerful confirmation from the discovery by Bouyges of a date for the *Ilcām* which makes it the latest of all al-Ġazālī's works [1]; for the *Ilcām* is concerned with problems of *tašbīh*

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[1] *Chronologie* 80-82; there seems no good reason for rejecting this date. It requires a change in the position given to the *Ilcām* in the list in JRAS 1952, p. 44; but that list is not in strict chronological order, and such a change does not affect the principles on which it is based.

(anthropomorphism) which are essentially within the universe of discourse of scholastic theology. Thus, even if al-Ġazālī in 1095 abandoned his career to adopt a kind of monastic life, he did not cease to be a jurist and theologian. Though he permitted himself some freedom in speculation, he remained within the broad lines of the central Sunnite tradition.

It is important, however, to go on to ask whether this essential unity of al-Ġazālī's thought rules out all development. It might be expected that the crisis of 1095, not to mention the philosophical studies of the immediately preceding years, and the growth of the inner life in the years after, would lead to modifications in al-Ġazālī's intellectual position. Such modifications might be gradual, but they could hardly fail to come. Jabre, on the other hand, tends to disallow the possibility of such modifications (cf. *Certitude* 138: 'à ce point de vue, la pensée de Ġazālī n'a pas changé'). His method is to interpret al-Ġazālī by himself as far as possible, that is, to compare passages with one another[1]. This is in general, of course, an excellent method, but in his application of it Jabre seems to bring in a dubious assumption about the unitary and unchanging character of al-Ġazālī's thought. This may be illustrated from the conception of *dawq* or immediate experience (*sc.* of divine things) and from the closely related conception of a faculty above reason.

In the above-mentioned article on *The Authenticity of the Works attributed to al-Ġazālī* it was maintained that in the *Munqid* and the *Miškāt* al-Ġazālī asserted the existence of a sphere above the sphere of reason, which he called the sphere of *dawq*; this was the characteristic of prophets and saints but was shared in to some extent by ordinary men. In making this point I was primarily putting forward a criterion of authenticity (and not of chronology, though chronology was also involved), and claiming that a work like *Miʿrāc as-sālikīn* which speaks of reason as the highest faculty could not belong to the closing years of al-Ġazālī's life. At the same time I said that 'so far as I have been able to discover, the word *dawq* is not used in this special sense in the *Iḥyāʾ*,' and that the general view of the *Iḥyāʾ* was that the results reached by intuition were identical with those reached by reason, and did not belong to a higher sphere. In justification of this statement a passage was quoted from the second-last book of the *Iḥyāʾ*, *K. at-Tafakkur*[2]: 'the

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[1] *Ib.* 268. A complete understanding, of course, requires also a comparison with earlier Islamic thought. This is particularly illuminating in the case of al-Ġazālī, and the discussion of 'certainty' would have benefited from a study of the previous use of the word *yaqīn*. Jabre deliberately neglects the background; cf. his slip (p. 18) in attributing *Qūt al-qulūb* to al-Muḥāsibī.

[2] iv. 354 (363f.); another passage which might have been quoted is the definition of *ʿaql* in i. 73 f. (75f.), translated in *Certitude* 449 ff. (In references to the *Iḥyāʾ*

knowledge of the method of employing and profiting from (sc. such knowledge as one already has) sometimes comes through a Divine light in the heart arising from the natural disposition (*fiṭra*), as in the case of the prophets ... and sometimes—and this is more usual—comes from study and discipline'.

Jabre rightly calls attention to a number of passages prior to the *Munqiḏ* where *ḏawq* is used in the technical sense, and it is very useful to have this further material [1]. Part of the interest of this material lies in the way in which al-Ġazālī seems to be working gradually towards the 'technical sense' (as found in the *Munqiḏ*). In several of the passages in the *Iḥyā'* to which Jabre refers, *ḏawq* means 'immediate or actual experience' but is not restricted to mystical experience [2]. The threefold classification of the *Munqiḏ*, namely, *īmān*, *'ilm*, *ḏawq*, may be said to be implied in some passages of the *Iḥyā'*, and is explicitly stated in the *Arba'īn* (esp. *Iḥyā'* iv. 255 (265f.); *Arba'īn* 57; *Munqiḏ*, Damascus 1939/1358, 135). To the passages listed by Jabre might be added one from the *Maqṣad* where al-Ġazālī says that knowledge by *ḏawq* of God's essence is impossible (Cairo, 'Alāmīya n.d., 20 ff: *fann* 1, *faṣl* 4); this shows the complexities of the matter. Despite the existence of these passages, however, the usefulness of *ḏawq* (and the conception of a sphere higher than reason), as a criterion of authenticity in respect of books ascribed to al-Ġazālī's closing years, is not impaired. The only adjustment to be made is that the beginning of the '*ḏawq* period' has to be placed much earlier, and that there is a greater continuity in al-Ġazālī's thought than had been realized. To say this, however, is not to solve the problem completely, for the passages in the *Iḥyā'* which appear to be contrary to the conception of *ḏawq* have still to be explained.

Now Jabre also quotes the above passage from *K. at-Tafakkur* and agrees that in it no faculty higher than reason is attributed to the prophet; but he then goes on to argue that because of this the passages in the *Munqiḏ* and the *Miškāt* which speak of a faculty higher than reason cannot mean what they say—they only mean that prophets know by reason in its state of original purity. He goes so far as to assert that 'it is a fact that in the *Iḥyā'* al-Ġazālī affirms the reality of (types of)

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the first figure is that of the edition of Cairo, 1316, the second that of the edition used by Jabre, Cairo 1346 (i), 1352).

[1] *Certitude* 147, note; the second reference to the *Iḥyā'* should probably be to i. 18 of Jabre's edition (= 16 of that of 1316).

[2] *E.g.* iv. 67 (69) —a man may know by *tacriba* and *ḏawq* that it is possible to become so accustomed to things formerly unpleasant to one that one cannot do without them. Cf. *Iqtiṣād* (Cairo, Ticārīya, n.d.) 102; also *Tahāfut* 347.6; also Ibn Rušd, *Tahāfut at-Tahāfut*, tr. S. van den Bergh, London 1954, ii. 11 f.

knowledge reserved to prophets without in effect (*pour autant*) attributing
to the latter another faculty than that of reason' (*Certitude* 263). Yet
some pages earlier he has quoted a passage from the *Iḥyā'* in which he
uses the word 'faculty' (though it is only implied by the Arabic):

> ... reason grasps nothing of the domain of the Lord. What is in this domain
> is known by another light, nobler and higher than reason. This light rises in the
> world of prophethood and of friendship with God. It is to reason what reason is
> to imagination and to the sensuous, estimative faculty (*wahm*). (*Certitude* 185;
> *Iḥyā'* IV 98/100).

It is difficult not to conclude that Jabre has overstated his case and been
carried away by his theories about al-Ġazālī to such an extent that he
has failed to notice that there is at least a superficial contradiction which
may perhaps be explained away, but which certainly requires much
fuller discussion.—The matter is further confused by Jabre's use of the
term 'raison-instinct'; 'instinct' is a modern meaning for *ġarīza*, for
which Lane gives 'a natural or innate disposition, quality or property'
(cf. A.-M. Goichon, *Lexique de la Langue Philosophique d'Ibn Sīnā*,
Paris 1938, s.v.). Perhaps 'faculty' would be a better rendering, but
since al-Ġazālī also applies the word to 'life', the underlying *ma'nā*
requires in any case to be discussed.

The root of the trouble appears to be his assumption about the nature
of the consistency to be found in al-Ġazālī. He has taken it to be so
absolute a consistency that one passage can be interpreted by another
without regard for chronology [1]. Yet this is not the kind of consistency
which Western critics expect to find in great philosophers like Hume
and Kant (cf. Norman Kemp Smith's distinction between earlier and
later lines of thought in *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*,
London 1923). One of the marks of their greatness is that they do not
reach a facile unified system but, because they are aware of the com-
plexity of their problems, at different times pursue divergent lines of
thought which they never completely reconcile. This would see to be
the way in which to understand al-Ġazālī. The conception of a faculty
above reason was one line of thought which he followed in certain
contexts, and which in his last years was the dominant line. The contrary
conceptions emphasized by Jabre constitute at least one other line of
thought, and it is prominent in many parts of the *Iḥyā'*, though less
noticeable in later works. The conception of *dawq* seems to have grown
in attraction for al-Ġazālī during the composition of the *Iḥyā'*, which
must have occupied a considerable time, even if there were no breaks in

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[1] He admits changes in terminology and illustrative material; cf. *Ma'rifa* 92,
100.

the course of the work and no later revisions. Little would probably be gained by trying to distinguish between earlier and later parts of that work; but it is worth noting that *K. al-Arba'īn*, which may be taken as a brief expression of the views held by al-Ġazālī when he completed the *Iḥyā'*, follows mainly the *dawq* line of thought.

Another point at which Jabre seems to overemphasize al-Ġazālī's earlier thinking and to neglect his later views is the question of the central problem of his life and thought. For Jabre this is the question of *c e r t i t u d e* or how to attain certainty about the main truths of Islam. Now this was undoubtedly the central problem at the time of his first intellectual crisis, when for two months he doubted everything. But at the time of the second crisis in 1095, when he left Baghdād, the thought that was uppermost in his mind (according to his own later account in the *Munqiḏ*) was the avoidance of hell and the attainment of everlasting life. This was recognized by Wensinck: 'of Saul it was said that he went out to look for asses and found a kingdom; of Ġazālī it can be said that he went out to look for certain knowledge and found God' [1]. The quest for certainty marks a state of doubt and uncertainty, but when al-Ġazālī wrote the *Iḥyā'* and his later works there was no longer any doubt and uncertainty in his life. He did not doubt the truths of God, the Last Day and prophethood; his concern was to avoid God's condemnation and to learn how to 'come near' to him. On the intellectual side his concern was how to describe and explain the experiences of the ṣūfīs— *ittiḥād* (unification) and *ḥulūl* (inherence) were incorrect descriptions, but *qurb* (nearness) was permissible and adequate [2].

In the form, then, in which al-Ġazālī conceived his central problem there has been, as was only natural, a development in his thought, and Jabre has made the earlier thought the basis of his account. Some recognition of development would have produced a more satisfactory account of the thinker. In matters of this kind the truth is in the golden mean between absolute logical consistency and inconsistency without a trace of continuity. The aim of the scholar and critic should be to show that beneath differences of expression, of emphasis and even of view there is a discernible continuity. What was desiderated in the previous section was such a limited consistency which included the possibility of development.

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[1] *Semietische Studien uit de Nalatenschap*, Leiden 1941, 167; Wensinck thinks it was not so much fear of hell in the future that moved al-Ġazālī as a present sense of being abandoned by God (*ib.* 169).

[2] It is noteworthy that *qurb* does not occur in Jabre's 'Index Lexicographique' in *Certitude*.

§ 3. AL-ĠAZĀLĪ AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

Both in *La Notion de Certitude* and in his earlier article on '*La Biographie et l'Oeuvre de Ghazālī...*' (MIDEO 1/1954, 73-102) Jabre has valuable insights into the importance for al-Ġazālī's thought of the contemporary political movement of the Bāṭinites, Taʿlīmites or Assassins. In emphasizing how the need for countering this movement has helped to shape al-Ġazālī's conception of prophethood, and how he must have been shaken by such events as the assassination of Niẓām al-Mulk in 1094, Jabre has made a real contribution to our understanding. Once again, however, he allows his own ideas to run away with him so that he exaggerates unnecessarily.

One example of this, already mentioned, is the weakness of his justification for dating the *Mustaẓhirī* before the *Tahāfut*. Another, closely connected, is his contention that the philosophers were merely another facet of the Bāṭinite movement and that it was in order to refute the Bāṭinites that al-Ġazālī took up the study of philosophy (*Certitude* 291-3, 316f., etc.; on p. 371 the *Tahāfut* is said to be directed against a group of Bāṭinites). Now there were links between philosophy and Bāṭinism, and some persons connected with philosophical groups became Bāṭinites. But the main exponents of each type of thought must have remained distinct from one another. The men against whom the arguments of the *Tahāfut* were directed (and whose views are summarized in *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*) could hardly at the same time have held that ultimate truth was attained by resort to the infallible imām.

From insisting on the central place of al-Ġazālī's reaction to Bāṭinism Jabre goes on to suggest that his departure from Baghdād in 1095 was not due to 'an exclusively religious motive' as he himself claims in the *Munqiḏ*, but to a certain sense of political opportunism; to put it bluntly, he ran away to avoid being assassinated. Even if this hypothesis is to be replaced by another, 'the religious motive cannot be considered as the sole source of the master's decision in this situation; the real explanation must be sought elsewhere' (*Certitude* 388 f; cf. *La Biographie* 89 f). About this there are two points to be made.

The first point is that to speak of the 'real' explanation as being sought elsewhere than in the religious motive alone is to imply that the latter has a certain unreality—a lapse into 'positivistic interpretation' [1] which can hardly be Jabre's considered verdict on the matter [2]. Jabre's view is

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[1] Abd-el-Jalil (*Mélanges Louis Massignon* 72) pleads with scholars not to take away the religious content of al-Ġazālī's work by resorting to 'positivistic' interpretations.

[2] It contradicts his claim that the problem of certainty was central throughout al-Ġazālī's life.

just as one-sided as it would be to say that his own two books may be
dismissed as a study of al-Ġazālī, since they are 'really' a literary expres-
sion of Arab nationalism. His work is not free from this political influence,
but nevertheless it is worthy of discussion as a contribution to scholar-
ship—indeed it is one of the most distinguished contributions to Islamic
scholarship from the pen of an Arab during the last half-century. The
truth is that religion permeates the whole of life, even if the modern
West tries to think of it as a separate compartment. Every human
decision has its religious aspect, though in many cases this may be
unimportant and negligible. Sometimes there are grounds for disting-
uishing between what a man alleges his dominant motive to be and what
it 'really' is, though to make such a distinction is always a delicate matter.
The more a man's life is an integrated whole, the more he is conscious of
all that moves him to act and the more he sees everything in a religious
perspective. The religious aspect is not separate from the social, political
and economic aspects but is intertwined with them, sometimes as a
kind of resultant from the other factors, but at other times exercising
control over them.

From this first point follows the second—that it is not possible to
single out a small part of the political field and try to explain al-Ġazālī's
conversion by this alone. All the Islamic religious movements of previous
centuries had political aspects, even if it was only political impotence
in the face of 'Abbāsid, Būyid or Selcūq autocracy. Al-Ġazālī must have
been influenced by the political attitudes linked with the various move-
ments which went to his formation—theologians, jurists, philosophers,
Bāṭinites, mystics. Was Barthold right in speaking of the Bāṭinite
movement as 'the last struggle of the Iranian *Rittertum*' ? What was the
effect of the support of Ašʿarism by the Selcūqs ? Why was there a grow-
ing interest in ṣūfism among Ašʿarites and even Ḥanbalites ? Had it
something to do with the break-down of the power of the caliph ? If we
are to understand al-Ġazālī's views in the contemporary social and
political setting, an answer has to be attempted to all these questions
and many like them [1].

In the above remarks attention has been concentrated on one or two
fundamental points, chiefly of method, in Jabre's treatment of his subject.
There has been no attempt to summarize his argument in detail or even
to outline his main conclusions. So much ground is covered that any
such undertaking would be difficult. Let it suffice to warn the reader

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[1] Jabre does not consider the previous religious movements even in their intel-
lectual aspect. There is no mention of the use of *yaqīn* by ṣūfī writers. It is significant
that in his Bibliography (p. 18) he ascribes *Qūt al-qulūb* to al-Muḥāsibī.

that the treatment has been of this kind. What has been said, however, will make it clear that Jabre's strength is not in the presentation of a general view of al-Ġazālī, for his account is unsatisfactory in various respects. His two books are indeed most valuable, but it is for their collection and discussion of passages linked with the themes of *yaqīn* and *ma'rifa*. If there is one point that stands out particularly, it is al-Ġazālī's attachment to orthodox Islam to the end of his life. From now on all students of al-Ġazālī will have to pay careful attention to what Jabre says, and will have much to learn from him. They will also look forward to the publication of the *Lexique* on which he appears to be working.