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Al-Ghazālī's *Mishkāt al-Anwār* and the Ghazālī-Problem.

By

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The *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, numbered No. 34 in BROCKELMANN (vol. I p. 423), had not been printed when the *Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur* was issued, but since then has been printed in Cairo in two separate editions ¹⁾. Owing to its great intrinsic interest and the fact that it from the first excited the curiosity and even the suspicion of Mohammedan critics, it would seem to be worthy of particular study at the present time, when Gh.'s works are attracting so much the attention of students of Islam, and when the problems of his peculiar psychology are being investigated with such special interest.

Though we have, as yet, no way of fixing precisely the date of *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, we shall not be wrong in placing it among the works which represent his most developed sūfistic thought, — therefore among his latest ones ²⁾. It certainly contains very advanced teaching, — teaching which, as the exordium shows, was not to be given to those unprepared for it. As we shall see indeed, some have believed that the book was never intended for publication at all, but have averred that it represents Gh.'s most esoteric teaching, and that it even introduces ideas contradictory of his professed beliefs and subversive of Muslim orthodoxy. This one fact renders the special study of the book an important and inevitable task.

The opusculum is a disquisition on the mystical meaning of the word Light (*nūr*), with special reference to the great Light-verse in the *Qur'ān* ³⁾, and to the *Hadīth* hardly less celebrated, about the

¹⁾ Cairo: (a) maṭba'at aṣ-Ṣidq, 1322; (b) maṭba'at as-Sa'āda, 1325 (the latter in a collection of five opuscula of Gh. under the title of the first of them, *Faiṣal et-Taṣriḥ*). The page references in this study are to (a).

²⁾ It is later than the *Mi'ār al-'Ilm*, and the *Mahakk an-Nazar* (see p. 10); than the *Maysad al-Asrā* (p. 19) and *Ihyā al-'Ulūm* (p. 9).

³⁾ Sura XXIV. 35. For notes on the origin and progress of the conception of Allāh as *nūr al-anwār* see KREMER, *Ideen* p. 133.

Seventy (or Seventy Thousand) Veils. It is divided into three sections. The first of these (p. 3) expounds the mystical meaning of light and graduates the divine Lights, whether on the earthly or the heavenly plane, until they culminate in their fountain and creative source, Allāh. The second (p. 27) expounds the Qur'ānic Light-verse, after an introduction in which the principles of symbolic exegesis are laid down. The third (p. 47) expounds the Veils-tradition.

It is this last section, and more particularly the close of it, that forms the subject of the present study, for it is here that the interest of the book culminates. Here we find a sort of Ghazālīan philosophy of religion in brief. Here too we are given some hints as to the lines along which his thought developed after his adoption of the Šūfī life. And here, finally, we come upon a passage which excited attention and suspicion within the century which succeeded G h.'s death.

I.

The Veils-Ḥadīth: al-Ghazālī's Philosophy of Religion.

In expounding the tradition of the Seventy (Thousand) Veils with which Allāh has veiled Himself from the vision of man, G h. finds opportunity to graduate various religions and sects according as they are more, or less, thickly veiled from the light; i. e. according as they more or less nearly approximate to Absolute Truth (*al-Ḥaqq* — the Real, — Allāh). The veils which veil the various religions and sects from the Divine Light are conceived of as twofold in character, light veils and dark veils, and the principle of graduation is according as the followers of these religions and sects are veiled (a) by dark veils, (b) by dark and light mixed, or (c) by light veils only. The recital closes with a short passage which tells us that the Attainers (*al-wāṣilūn*) have had the last veil taken away, and have immediate vision of *al-Ḥaqq*. Here we have the Šūfī doctrine of *kashf* in its most explicit and striking form.

(a) Those veiled by pure darkness, called here the *mulhida*, or those who deny the existence of Allāh and of a Last Day. They have two main divisions, those who have enquired for a cause to account for the world and have made Nature that cause; and those who have made no such enquiry. The former are clearly the Naturists or *dahrīya*¹⁾ who were the very abomination of desolation to G h. It is curious that nothing further is said of their evil conduct, and

¹⁾ See DE BOER'S *Philosophy in Islam* p. 80.

it is entirely characteristic of mediaeval thought that the deepest damnation is thus reserved for false opinion, rather than for evil life. Evil-doers form the second division (which however is not definitely said to be higher than the first), composed of those who are too greedy and selfish so much as to look for a cause, or in fact to think of anything except their vile selves. These we might style the Egotists; they are ranged in ascending order into (1) seekers of sensual pleasure, (2) seekers of dominion, (3) money-grubbers, (4) lovers of vain-glory. In the first he has the ordinary sensual herd in view, as well as the philosophers of sensualism; their veils are the veils of the bestial attributes, while those of the second are the ferocious ones (*saba'iya*). The denotation of the latter class is quaintly given as »Arabs¹⁾, some Kurds¹⁾ and very numerous Fools«. The third and fourth subdivisions do not call for comment.

Mounting from these regions of unmitigated darkness we come to

(b) Those veiled by light and darkness mixed. G.h.s idea of the dark veils, in general, may be gathered from a comparison of this and the previous section. In this section the dark veils are shown to be the false conceptions of deity, which the human mind is deluded into making by the gross and limited elements in its own constitution, namely (in ascending order) by the Senses, the Phantasy or Imagination (*φαντασία*, *khayāl*), and the Discursive Reason (*διάνοια*)²⁾. The dark veils of the previous section were the unmitigated egotism and materialism which employed these faculties for self and the world alone, without a thought of deity. The light veils, accordingly, are the true but partial intuitions whereby man rises to the idea of deity, or to a something at least higher than himself. These intuitions are no more than partial, because they fix upon some one aspect or attribute of deity, — majesty, beauty and so forth, — and believing it to be all in all proceed to deify all majestic, beautiful etc., things. Thus they half reveal, half conceal, Allāh, and so are literally veils of light. — These general remarks will give the clue to the extremely interesting subdivisions of this section, which begins with Hellenic polytheism, continues through various degrees of dua-

¹⁾ Here speaks G.h. the Persian.

²⁾ What is actually said is *Muqāyasāt 'aqlīya fāsida* 'false syllogisms of the intellect', an expression which interferes with the psychological character of the enumeration. Probably he hesitated to say *al-'aql* outright because he has already said (p. 10) that it is pure light and incapable of error unless it is deceived by the Senses or the Imagination. Perhaps what he has in mind is the Discursive as opposed to the Intuitive Reason. On p. 40 the latter is called *ar-rūh al-'aqlī* the former *al-rūh al-fikrī*.

lism and Parsiism, and ends with various sects of Islamism which in their literalising or their rationalising went astray.

He divides those who fall under this section into three classes according as their error was occasioned by Sense, Imagination, or Discursive Reason. The first of these subdivisions include Polytheists and Dualists. He enumerates (α) Image-worshippers, those who do not look outside the world of sense for their deity; who worship beautiful objects of sense, fashioned from the finer metals or stones, their light-veil being the attributes of majesty and beauty. We might identify these with Polytheists of the Hellenic type. (β) Worshippers of animate objects of beauty, whom he identifies with some of the most remote Turks. Their light-veil is also the attribute of beauty. (γ) Fire-worshippers pure and simple; their light-veil, glory. (δ) Astrologizing star- and planet-worshippers of various sorts; their light-veil, potency and might ¹. (ε) Sun-worshippers; their light-veil, pride. (ζ) Light-worshippers, — and with them we come to the pure Zoroastrians with their dualistic doctrine of Ormuzd (Yazdān) and Ahrimān. The darkness of all of these consist in their taking an object of Sense for their god.

In the second subdivision the darkness is occasioned by the *Phantasia* or Imagination, that faculty half-way between gross sense and fine intellect according to the old psychology. With this we first arrive at Monotheists (muslim), those who conceived indeed of a one supersensible God, but whose conception was vitiated by their «imagining» Him as still spatially limited. The grossest of these he says are (α) the Corporealists (*mujassima*), those extremists who dogmatically asserted that the anthropomorphisms of the *Qur'ān* must be taken literally. Then (β) various sects of Karrāmites the anthropomorphic sect founded by Ibn Karrām (d. 286). Then (γ) those who asserted that to Allāh must be attributed *jihad*, but only *jihad fawq*: in other words He must be conceived as literally «above», for to deny this would be to reduce Him to nonentity. — We have here a clear allusion to the Hanbalites, not excepting (in this particular matter) their great leader himself ²).

¹) Star worshippers existed in Mesopotamia well into Islamic times: C. DE VAUX, *Avicenne* p. 65.

²) This was the position of all the Hanbalites and of Ahmad himself: see G. H., *Faiṣal et-Tajriqa* p. 10 where he says that Ahmad allowed himself to bring a *ta'wil* for three Traditions only, and that had he allowed himself greater intellectual latitude he would have brought a *ta'wil* also for *jihad fawq* as asserted of Allāh [i. e. he did not do so]. Ibn Rushd in his opusculum *al-Kashf 'an manāhiḡ al-adillā* not only ascribes this doctrine to the *Qur'ān* and the early fathers, but implies that the early Ash'arites also used to hold it

The third subdivision, he tells us, contains those thinkers the darkness of whose errors he traces to the false inferences of the Intellect. They are not named by him and we have again to identify them by his description of their tenets from which it appears that they are various types of *mutakallimīn*. He mentions two classes (a) the extreme literalists, who differ from those mentioned last in the preceding section in that they do not attribute direction (*jīha*) of any sort to Allāh; but err in conceiving His hearing, knowing, and the rest of the Attributes as comparable with ours, and particularly in their doctrine of Allāh's *kalām*, of which »some perhaps said outright that it has letters and sounds like ours«. We have here another section of the Ḥanbalites and the early Ash'arites (*Vorlesungen* pp. 120, 121 and esp. 116). (b) »Perhaps higher than these« says G h. tentatively, are those who said that Allāh's *kalām* is not letters and sounds, but is like our mental speech (*ḥadīth an-nafs*). But when challenged to show the reality (*ḥaqīqa*) of the Attributes, he complains that they virtually reverted to anthropomorphism (*at-tashbīh*), though they disclaimed it with their lips¹). This, he says, was because they never

(ed. MÜLLER p. 65, Cairo ed. p. 54), for he says that it was al-Juwainī ('Imām al-Ḥaramain', G h.s. teacher) and the later Ash'arites, who denied *jihat jawq* to

Allāh المعالي كافي الاشعرية متأخرو (The whole passage is quoted by an-Najdī on ibn Taimīya [in *Maḥmū'a mushtamila*, Cairo 1329 pp. 259 seqq.], and affords a view of the position of later Ḥanbalites, like ibn T., upon the question.) It is true that al-Ash'arī and the early Ash'arites had in many respects divested themselves of but little of their Ḥanbalitism (GOLDZIEHER, *Vorlesungen* pp. 120, 121), and it is possible that ibn Rushd therefore is correct in the above insinuation. But it chiefly imports us here to notice that G h. was apparently unaware of such a thing: for in *Faiṣal*, where the reciprocal attitude of Mu'tazilites, Ḥanbalites and Ash'arites is gone into in some detail, no hint is given of this. On p. 10 he observes that the Ash'arites were nearest to the Ḥanbalites

واقرب الناس الى الخنابلة في امور الآخرة الاشعرية ونقيم الله ذاتهم قروا وفيها أكثر الظواهر الا يسيرا but the clear implication of the passage is that they did not follow A ḥ m a d in his failure to apply *ta'wīl* to this particular matter: which conclu-

sion is borne out by another passage *op. cit.* p. 5 زاعماً انه كذب والخنابلي يكفر الاشعرى

الرسول في اثبات الفوق لله تعالى . . . والاشعرى يكفره زاعماً انه شبه الخج. The short creed by al-Ash'arī himself (transl. D. B. MACDONALD, *Muslim Theology*, pp. 293—299) is silent on the point.

إذا طولبوا بحقيقة السمع والبصر والحياة رجعوا الى 1) M. p. 53. انكروه instead of reading التشبيه من حيث المعنى وأن انكروه باللفظ انكروها in the printed text.

understood what was really meant in predicating these *ṣifāt* of Allāh, and their misconception led them to call His will (*irāda*) originate (*ḥādithan mithla irādatinā*) and mere purpose, like our own.

The passage is a puzzling one, for the allusion to *kalām naṣī* (*ḥādith an-naṣ*) seems to fix its reference to the Ash'arites, while on the contrary the assertion that the doctors in question declared the will of Allāh to be *ḥādith* does not at all fit the Ash'arite theologians. The reference cannot be to the Mu'tazilites, for the theologians alluded to throughout the whole section accept the *ṣifāt*, and moreover the doctrine of the *ḥādith an-naṣ* was especially elaborated by al-Ash'arī and his successors to confound the Mu'tazilites¹).

(c) Those veiled by pure light. In this category we find three classes, of which the first is rather sharply distinguished from the other two. Actual darkness has now disappeared; the conception of Allāh is entirely purged of anthropomorphism. Yet all three classes are represented as falling short of the truth, the shortcoming being their conception of the Deity's relation to the universe of the Spheres. Only a fourth and supreme order have experienced the complete Revelation and have attained unto the Real.

1. The first class is composed of those who, unlike the faulty thinkers of the last division, understand that the characterising of these *ṣifāt* of Allāh by the expressions Word, Will, Power, Knowledge etc. is unlike the characterising of mankind by these expressions, and therefore have avoided defining Him (making Him known, *ta'rīfihī*) by these attributes; and "made Him known (*'arraḥūhu*) by the relation to (His) Creation, as did Moses in answering Pharaoh's question²) 'What is the Lord of the World?'; and said that 'The Lord, whose holiness transcends (*al-muqaddas 'an*) the connotations (*ma'ānī*) of these Attributes is the mover and orderer of the Heavens'". The first half of this paragraph seems to allow that the most careful and orthodox of the *mutakallimūn* are not excluded from this division; but the second half shows that Gh. has rather in mind those who have steered as clear as possible from *kalām*-theology in every shape and form, and have contented themselves with asserting the divine creator-

¹) Al-Fuḍālī in his *Kitāb Kafāyat al-'Awāmm fī 'ilm al-Kalām*, proof of Attribute no. 13. See MASSIGNON, *Kitāb al-Ṭawāsīn* p. 128 note 1. The reference from al-Fuḍālī shows that the doctrine was not peculiar to the early Ash'arites. He finds it necessary however to guard against this very *tashbīh*-objection advanced here by Gh. It is to be noted that the doctrine was as objectionable to the Ḥanbalites as to the Mu'tazilites: see MACDONALD *Muslim Theology* p. 273. — The *ta'wīl* about the *kalām naṣī* was started by al-Ash'arī himself: *Vorlesungen* p. 115.

²) p. 54 of M.: cp. p. 31: and Sūra XXVI. 24.

hood and providence¹⁾. But the way in which this is expressed is remarkable. The actual words of the *Qur'ān*, which were kept in the parallel passage of M.²⁾ are significantly changed, and Allāh's act in moving the Heavens is made the centre of interest. And in the remaining classes it is the attitude of each to just this aspect of the divine action that is made not only the centre of interest but also the graduating test. For we might well ask in what point this first class fell short, and why it is not assigned the highest place among the Light-veiled, if not the Unveiled? The sequel gives the answer:

2. "The second class have mounted higher than these (*tarāqqau 'an*), in respect of the fact that they have perceived that there is a plurality in the Heavens, and that the mover of each Heaven severally is another Being called an Angel, and that these make a plurality . . . Moreover it was perceived by them that these Heavens are enveloped by another Sphere, by whose motion all they are moved once in every day and night; because plurality is negatived of Him (*manfiya 'anhu*)."
In other words, class no. 1 was indiscreet in talking of *muḥarrik as-samāwāt*. The unity of The Lord was better maintained by class no. 2, which limited His action to the moving of one (namely the outermost Heaven)! But this is not all.

(3) The third class who "mount higher than these" again, accept (apparently) the whole of this schematism of Spheres and their angelic Motors, except that they put in a supreme Angel in place of Allāh. The moving of the Spheres must come (such, we are told is what this class alleges, *za'ama*) "directly" from this Angel acting in obedience to the command of The Lord the Worlds. Evidently, then, he takes the place of The Lord in moving the outermost Sphere, the rest of the celestial mechanism remaining as before. He reflects the full glory of the Sun, the source of Light (Allāh), and is compared to the moon which is supreme among the luminaries of the heavens by night. The Lord is thus found to be the "Mover of all, not directly, but by way of command"³⁾. This matter of this divine motion-creating command contains great obscurity, says G h. and is "too difficult for most intelligences and beyond the scope of this book".

¹⁾ i. e. by a reference to the divine acts rather than the attributes: cp. Moses' answer to Pharaoh (*M.* p. 31) *لَمْ يَجِبْهُ إِلَّا بِأَفْعَالِهِ . . . فَقَالَ رَبُّ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ . . .*

²⁾ See preceding note, and contrast the phrase quoted there with the significant *مُحَرِّكُ السَّمَوَاتِ وَمَدِيرُهَا* of this passage.

³⁾ بطريق الأمر لا بطريق المباشرة

But not yet have we arrived at a view of the heavenly Spheres in relation to Allāh which is free of all objection on the score of trenching on the divine Unity. The absolute Unity has not yet been conserved. And therefore all these classes are said to be light-veiled and only those who Attain (*al-wāṣilūn*) constitute a fourth class to whom the full truth has been revealed.

All the veils have now gone from the visions of these; as the sequel shows, we have here the mystics who see Allāh face to face. The consuming of these unveiled percipients by the radiance of Allāh's countenance, spoken of in the *Hadūth* on which all this is a commentary, is now definitely explained as the *fanā*-experience of the highest grade of these mystic Attainers, whom the "glories of His countenance consumed", obliterated, annihilated, so that all consciousness of not-Allāh having disappeared, Allāh was found alone.

But most remarkable is the differentia of these Attainers-to-Reality from the preceding class. They in turn accept the whole schematism of the universe ascribed to that class, with the sole exception of the part it assigns to Allāh, who was the Obeyed One (*al-muṭāʿ*) of that class. "They too have had it revealed to them that [according to the previous view] there has been attributed to the Obeyed One something incompatible with pure unity and ultimate perfection *by reason of a mystery the disclosure of which this book does not admit of.*" Not only is Allāh now denied to be the immediats efficient cause of the motion of the outermost Sphere, but — and this is startling — it is even denied that that Sphere is moved in obedience to His command. For even this supreme function is explicitly transferred from Allāh to a Being whose nature is left obscure, since our only information about him is that he is not (the) Real Being (*al-wujūd al-ḥaqq*). Allāh's relation to this Vice-gerent, the supreme controller of the whole Universe, is compared to the relation of the impalpable light-essence to the sun, or of the elemental fire to a glowing coal. Of this Absolute Being nothing is, because nothing can be, predicated. The information we are given about IT is purely negative, as will be seen from the brief but highly significant sentence in which the position of the Initiated, the Attainers, is summed up: "They turn away from the one who moves the heavens ¹⁾ and from the one who commands them to be moved ²⁾, and arrive at a Being transcending all that is apprehended by the perception or by the conception of all specula-

¹⁾ i. e. The Angel who moves the outermost Sphere in obedience to the Being called *al-muṭāʿ*.

²⁾ i. e. The Being called *al-muṭāʿ* himself.

tors (*nāzīrūn*), for they find Him absolutely transcendent of every attribution previously made by us" 1).

Yet, as appears from the closing paragraph of M., these *Ent-zückte* make the mystic leap whereby they know this Unknown, and are consumed by the Glory of this predicateless Being! And even these are divided into those who, in the annihilation of all save Allāh and the contemplating Soul, retain self-consciousness and contemplate the Soul in the beauty of Allāh; and those from whom even this self-consciousness is consumed away, and Allāh is left alone. These are the Élite of the Élite (*kharwāṣṣ al-kharwāṣṣ*); and of them some attain this experience by degrees, as Abraham, and some by a leap, as Muḥammad. And with this the section, and the book itself, closes.

II.

Some deductions.

It will be well, at this point, before going on to consider i b n R u s h d ' s criticism of this strange conclusion to this passage, to glance at this Ghazālīan philosophy of religion and see what light it throws upon the G h a z ā l ī problem.

1. The philosophic mildness of the tone is to be noted. Only of the naturists and sensualists does he speak severely. Various types of idolators and polytheists are enumerated with calm, and it is allowed that their creeds contain light mixed with their darkness, which is all that is claimed, indeed, for some reputable classes of Muslims. The hard-and-fast line between *kufr* and *īmān* thus seems somehow to have been softened, and the fierce dogmatism with which in some of his other treatises he speaks of *kufr* and its deserts 2) is entirely absent.

2. It is curious that he has not placed Jews and Christians in this graduation. Perhaps he found it particularly difficult to do so, for he is here discussing the creeds of men in their relation to Deity, not in their relation to Muḥammad and the Prophets. From the former

وصلوا انى موجود منزّه عن كل ما ادركه بصر الناظرين وبصيرتهم 1)

ان وجدوه منزّهًا ومقدسًا عن جميع ما وصفناه من قبل

2) See Tah. of G h. conclusion; *al-Iqtisād fil-i'tiqād* (Cairo edition 1327) pp. 6, 101,

من كذب محمدًا فهو كافر اى مخلد في النار بعد الموت ومستباح المال 102:

الحياة a condemnation which expressly includes the D a h r ī y a, the B a - r ā h i m a, the Y a h ū d, and the N a ṣ ā r ā.

viewpoint the placing of professed monotheists other than Muslims probably presented an embarrassing problem. From the latter viewpoint, he has, indeed, given us a graduation in his *Iqtisād fil-ʿitiqād*, where in we learn the relative depths of the unbelief of non-Muslims, viz. Naturists (most damnable of all); then Brahmins; lastly Jews and Christians¹). We shall therefore not be far wrong if we place Jews and Christians between the dualists and the anthropomorphizing Muslims in the class of those veiled by light and darkness mixed. Perhaps he could not make up his mind whether to place them in the lowest or the middle division of that class.

3. The low place assigned to the early Ashʿarites is notable: though the language he employs is in details obscure, the reference to them in the last section of the middle division is unmistakable; and, this being so, they, with the Ḥanbalites, are given no higher company than that of the Light-and-dark-veiled, which includes Parsis, Christians, Karrāmites, and various types of anthropomorphists.

4. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that all the *mutakallimūn* as such are placed in the class of the Light-and-dark-veiled. For when we pass upwards to the lowest division of the Light-veiled we seem to find the *mutakallimūn* as such deliberately excluded by the statement that the pietists of this division (evidently he has in view men of ash-Shāfiʿī's type) "avoided characterising Allāh by these Attributes" (*taḥāshau ʿan taʿrīfihi bi ḥādhihi-ṣ-ṣifāt*), i. e. avoided that which it was the chief business of the *mutakallim* to do. The utmost that can be allowed is that he has in mind men who, though possessed of a correct theology in respect of the Attributes, steadily refused to bring it out in discussion or to use its expressions in characterising Allāh. His dislike and suspicion of *kalām*, visible even in his earlier treatise *al-Iqtisād*, and undisguisable in his later work *Iljām al-ʿAwāmm*, seems here to reach its culminating point. The "science" had probably long ceased to interest him or concern him. He had already narrowed the scope of its possible utility down to vanishing-point²); and now, when speaking confidentially with the *khawāṣṣ*, he hints that even to use its cherished phrases is to draw a veil of darkness over the soul. He does not seem to have even thought it worth while to place the Muʿtazilites in this graded scheme, nor to

¹) op. cit. p. 101.

²) See especially *Iljām*, last Cairo ed. (undated) p. 21, older edition pp. 25—31. The scope allowed to the Science in the *Iqtisād* pp. 7, 8, is, it is true, hardly if at all wider. But the tone of the limiting passages is very different. See also *Jawāhir al-Qurʾān* p. 25.

keep the condemnatory allusions to orthodox and inorthodox theologians very distinct. It would indeed have been difficult for him, in the very passage where he is emphasizing his dread of limiting Allāh through His characterization by the seven *ṣifāt*, to have expressed any special condemnation of the Mu'tazilites, whose peculiar theology was the direct outcome of this very dread. Rationalizing and mysticizing sometimes lead to very similar positions¹⁾.

5. Definitively above all these savants come the believers whose watchward, like G h.'s own, was 'back to the *Qur'ān*'. The position taken by these corresponds exactly to that ascribed by G h. in *Iljām* ²⁾ to the Prophet, the Companions, and the Fathers, and praised accordingly as all-sufficient; namely, the steady refusal to argue, and the steady reference to every question to the text of *Qur'ān* or *Sunna* ³⁾.

It is not the mere *taqlīdī* believer that G h. has in mind in this section. For him he had a contempt which to say the least did not diminish with years ⁴⁾: it is the believer of real and deep religious experience that he means. When this is realised it becomes remarkable not that these are placed so high, but that they are placed so low. For above them come various classes of mystics differentiated on the curious basis which we have already seen. Clearly G h. gives us to understand here that not only the experience but also the theology of the *Ṣūfī* is on a higher place than that of the most pious and religious non-*Ṣūfī*.

6. Puzzling is it to find that a doctrine exclusively relating to the heavenly Spheres, and the part taken by the Deity in moving them, is made the test by which the highest four classes of saints and doctors are distinguished from each other. In *Tahāfut* days this matter had left G h. perfectly cold ⁵⁾. We can only infer that his mystic experiences,

¹⁾ The Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites are mentioned together, with approval, in the *Maḍ. Ṣagh.*, in connection with the very same subjects discussed in this M. passage:

وقد ترقى عن هذه العامية الأشعرية والمعتزلة فاثبتوا موجوداً لا في جهة (last Cairo ed.: p. 6 line 4). He has just mentioned the corporealist tendencies of the Karrāmites and Ḥanbalites, and the advance made by those who denied *jism* but asserted *jīha*. All this is so precisely like M. p. 53 that it either proves the genuineness of *Maḍ. Ṣagh.*, or that its forger had M. before him when he wrote. And there are other striking parallelisms.

²⁾ See especially the whole of *al-bāb ath-thānī* of that work.

³⁾ op. cit. p. 34 where ibn Mālik's well-known answer to those who heckled him on the *istiṭwā'* problem is commended as the model to follow in all cases.

⁴⁾ Contrast for example the early *Iqtisād* p. 6 with the late *Mizān al-'Amal* pp. 215, 216.

⁵⁾ See sec. III.

his meditations and long night-watches, had now invested the subject with extraordinary fascination and importance for him.

7. It is the *unity* of Allah that is the subject of the anxious care of G h. and of the high-grade believers to whom he alludes: but very surprising is it to note what are the dangers which seemed to him to threaten that unity. The danger of characterizing Allāh by the Attributes has been already mentioned. This was surprising, but more surprising is it to learn that the belief that Allāh moves the Heavens threatens the Divine unity because of the plurality of those heavens (p. 54); further, that the substituted doctrine (that Allāh moves the outermost Sphere only) is to be suspected — though G h. mysteriously declines to say why this is so¹): finally, that the again-amended doctrine (that Allāh only commands an Angel to move the outermost Sphere), also threatens the divine unity and perfection²); and that these are only preserved by relieving Allāh of all describable part or lot in this function, and ceasing to predicate anything whatever of Him or attribute anything whatever to Him. So agnostic is the thought-basis of Gnosticism. The divine unity becomes not to so much the Light of lights as HEGEL's "night wherein all cows are black".

8. The repeated mysterious allusions to something withheld in these last paragraphs is significant and suggestive. These allusions are concluded by the strangest of them all, namely that Allāh must not be thought of as either Himself moving the Outermost Heaven or commanding a Vicegerent to move it, "*because of a mystery the disclosure of which this book does not admit of*"³). It would go far towards the solution of the G h.- problem if we could come upon the book which did "admit of the disclosure of this mystery". Was the key to the mystery ever written? Was it in that unnamed book of esoteric teaching which G h. says he wrote⁴), but which *ibn Tufail* declared had never come his way⁵)? These questions are easier to ask than to answer. Yet the mere putting helps to make clear the nature of the G h. problem.

10. Attributeless and predicateless though the divine Being is,

في تفهيم ذلك الامر وماهيته غموض يقصر عنه الافهام ولايجتمله هذا¹

الكتاب (p. 55).

²) *ib.* lines 8 and 9.

³) نسري لا يجتمل هذا الكتاب كشفه

⁴) See *infra* sec. IV.

⁵) *Hayy*. ed. GAUTIER p. 15.

the mystics nevertheless make their inexplicable journey to IT; and gaze upon ITS face. On the agnosticism is reared an unintelligible gnosticism. Allāh's glory is said to consume and annihilate these enraptured saints¹⁾: yet at the very moment when the thought seems about to pass into pure pantheism it recovers itself. Somehow or other the individualities of these saints are preserved, not destroyed, just as "The Friend" (Abraham) remained himself after his attainment to the paradisaal vision, and the "Beloved" (Muḥammad) returned to earth after the supreme experience of the *Mirāj*. It was thought-habits rather than thought-exigencies that saved G h. from being a pantheist of the pantheists.

III.

Ibn Rushd and the *Mishkāt al-Anwār*.

The passage which has just been discussed attracted the notice of the great Ghazālī-critic, ibn Rushd, during the century which followed the publication of M. We must now examine his remarks on the passage, as in the course of them he makes an allegation which is of critical importance in relation to the G h. - question.

In the opusculum entitled "*Al-kafsh 'an manāhiḡ al-adillā*" he says:

ثم جاء في كتابه المعروف بمشكاة الانوار فذكر فيه درجات العارفين
الله فقال ان سائرهم محبوبون الا الذين اعتقدوا ان الله سبحانه غير
محرك انفسه الاولي وهو الذي صدر عنه هذا المحرك. وهذا تصريح
منه باعتقاد مذاعب الحكماء في العلوم الالهية وقد قال في غير ما موضع
ان علومهم الالهية هي تخمينات بخلاف الامر في سائر علومهم.

"Then he comes on with his book known as *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, and mentions therein the grades of the knowers of Allāh; and says that all of them are veiled save those who believe that Allāh is not the mover of the First Heaven, He being the one from whom this mover of the first Heaven emanates: which is an open declaration on his part of the tenet of the philosophers' schools in the science of theology; though he has said in several places that their science of theology (but not their other sciences) is a set of conjectures"²⁾.

The allegation thus casually made — that G h. really held the same metaphysical view as al-Fārābī and ibn Sīnā respecting the emanation of the highest grade of Being from the Absolute — is a most serious one; for G h. in his *Tahāfut* wrote whole pages (see especially

¹⁾ (p. 56) احرقتهم سبحانه وجهه . . وانمحقوا وتلاشوا في ذاتهم

²⁾ ed. MÜLLER p. 71, Cairo edition p. 59. The treatise was written before 575. cf. MACDONALD, *Muslim Theology* p. 255. Date of *Mishkāt* c. 500.

pp. 28—33) to demonstrate not only the inadequacy of the Philosophers' proof of the emanation theory, but also the damnable falseness of the theory itself. We must therefore ask two questions:

1. Does the doctrine of the Spheres and their Angels which is so clearly approved by G h. in *M.* indicate any desertion on his part of the views he held when he wrote the *Tahāfut*?

2. Was i b n R u s h d justified in ascribing to G h. an adherence to the emanation doctrine on the strength of this passage in *M.*?

I.

The *Tahāfut el-Falāsifa* is the book which, as G h. tells us in one of the last books he ever wrote, *al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl*¹⁾ represents the fruit of his special study and criticism of the Philosophers and their doctrines. In this book he made a complete exposition of his views about this matter of the Spheres; and in the *Munqidh*, which was written within seven years of his death (between 498 and 505), and which must therefore be nearly contemporary with *M.*, he gives us clearly to understand that he stands by every one of the vital findings of the *Tahāfut*.

With regard to the existence of the system of concentric spheres with their Primum Mobile, this was to G h. as to practically all of the ancients²⁾ a certainty of observation and a mere matter of astronomy (*muqaddama ḥissīya*, *Tah.* of G h. p. 57): and the fact that two great minds like G h. and i b n R u s h d regarded this construction of the heavens and earth as axiomatic is a striking instance indeed of human fallability.

With regard to the further doctrine, clearly visible in this *M.* passage, that these Spheres were animate beings (*ḥayawānāt*) the perfection of whose spiritual natures was manifested in the perfection of their motions, a belief held by the Philosophers but by no means confined to them, the position of G h. in *Tah.* is that this, if true, must be consigned to the province of revelation (*kashf*) not demonstration (*burhān*, *dalīl*). Theologically, he says, the belief is harmless, for Allāh is able to endow anybody with life, and there is no reason why the bodies of some living creatures should not be spherical just as well as the reverse³⁾. But, he says, all this cannot be demonstrated by the Aristotelian instrument of *dalīl*, as is claimed by his opponents el-Fārābī and i b n Sīnā etc. "Their doctrine in this question

¹⁾ *Munqidh*, p. 12 line 1, last Cairo ed.

²⁾ I b n B ā j a, d. 533, however, criticises this theory.

³⁾ *Tah.* p. 57.

is one of which neither is the possibility denied nor the impossibility asserted But we do assert that the Philosophers are unable to cognise it by demonstration of the reason; and that if it is true, then only the prophets are given to scan it by inspiration or direct revelation from Allāh. But ratiocination does not demonstrate it, though (it is true) some such doctrine might conceivably be demonstrated, if the demonstrative proof existed"¹). And, "the secrets of the Kingdom of the Heavens are not to be scanned by means of such fantastic imaginations as these; Allāh gives none but his *nabi's* and *wali's* to scan them, and that by inspiration, not by demonstration. Thus the Philosophers have been to a man unable to explain the cause of the direction of the celestial movements, or of the choice of that direction"²).

This position is borne out by the *Mun.* where he says³) that when these matters are treated as a branch of physics there is no reason to deny them absolutely; and that in his *Tah.* he pointed out the Philosophers' errors in these matters, which may all be reduced to one (a theological, not a physical one), viz: their denial of the doctrine that Nature is directly constrained to work (*musakhhkhara*) by Allāh, and that it does not act by itself but is set a-working (*musta'mala*) by its Creator, and that sun, moon, stars and elements are constrained to work by His command (*musakhhkharatin bi-'amrihi*), not one of them having any action in itself (*bi-dhātihi 'an dhātihi*).

Does the *M.* passage go beyond this position? It goes beyond it in this respect, that the doctrine which in *Tah.* and *Mun.* is coldly pronounced not-impossible seems in *M.* to be proclaimed with some enthusiasm, nay to be made the *differentia* of the 'arifina *billāh* from the mass of truly spiritual believers. The contrast of his attitude in *M.* with his attitude in its near contemporary the *Mun.* is particularly striking, as it shows how differently G h. was wont to express himself on certain points to the 'awāmm and the *khawāṣṣ*.

For we can scarcely doubt that G h. in *M.* does teach the doctrine of animation of the Spheres, when we consider how he associates them with angelic Intelligences. In this we merely have the theological as distinct from the philosophical way of explaining the doctrine. The assignment of an Angel as the movent of each Sphere, the graduation of these Angels under their mysterious Commander (*al-muṭā'ī*), is only the theological expression of the philosophic belief in the anima-

¹) ib. p. 57. *ṭahawāt*

²) ib. p. 60.

³) ed. cit. p. 11.

tion and the rationality of the Spheres. Gh. himself in the *Tah.* says that it is merely a question of terms how these Sphere-movements are called. "We have called It (i. e. the first of these Beings) the First Intelligence (*al-'aql al-auwal*), and we need not quarrel about names, be It called Angel, Intelligence, or what you will"¹⁾ (*summiya malakan aw 'aqlan aw mā urīd*).

¹⁾ *Tah.* p. 28.

This is borne out by the *Maḍnūn as-Ṣaghīr* and a little treatise on *an-Nafs* ascribed to Gh., found by the writer in Aleppo in a MS. in which it followed immediately on *Maḍ. Ṣagh.* Both treatises were without title. In the unpublished treatise he teaches that the Spheres have bodies and souls; for he lays it down that Sphere-soul (*nafs ḥalakiyya*) is finer than human souls (*nufūs bashariyya*): he has just previously said that the distinguishing mark of the soul (*nafs*) is that it has the faculty of perception (*idrāk*): further, the Angels are Intelligences (*'uqūl*): and (*Mish.* p. 54, *Maḍ. Ṣagh.* p. 9) they move the Heavens. Putting all this together we find that Gh. teaches (a) the concentricity of the Spheres, (b) that they are possessed of bodies, (c) that their bodies have souls, (d) that their souls have perception, that they are, therefore, angelic Intelligences: in other words the full-fledged teaching of the Philosophers, *apart from the doctrine of emanation.*

It is clear that the title "*al-Maḍnūn as-Ṣaghīr*" is unauthentic. The book has been known by several different names. Some consider the work itself spurious (Massignon attributes it to Abul Ḥasan 'Alī al-Muẓaffar, *Tawāsīn* p. 182 note 4), and they might, say the same of the companion treatise on *an-Nafs*. The argument is however of course, given for what it is worth. An argument for the genuineness of the latter treatise is perhaps the fact that though it reproduces some of the doctrines of the Philosophers', there is no hint of the doctrine of emanation. In the *Maḍnūn* also, as shall be pointed out, the use of the word *ḥalīq* is expressly dissociated from all suspicious connotation.

If the authenticity of the larger *Maḍnūn* is less suspect than that of the *Maḍnūn ṣaghīr*, it will be of interest to adduce two passages from the former, which point to a Ghazālīan doctrine of the animation of the Heavenly Bodies. In the section *ar-rukn ath-thānī* the following words occur يكون لبعض الملائكة بدن محسوس لما أن نفوسنا

غير محسوسة ولها بدن محسوس هو محل تصرفها وعالمها الخاص فكذلك
بعض الملائكة التي which informs us that the bodies of things are the place of their free action (*taṣarrufihā*) and that some angels have such bodies. Then in the next section (*ḥalīq*) we have the following و ملائكة السموات المدبرون المتمصرفون في اجرام السموات التي
 which, when compared with the previous sentence, indicates (though the argument is not syllogistically complete) that these *اجرام* are the *ابدان* of the angels who control them

(«المدبرون»). — The word *اجرام* itself points the same way, for *جِرم* is a synonym of *جسد* (LANE vol. II p. 413) and in all other connections denotes animate bodies.

The animation and rationality of the Spheres is clearly laid down in a treatise ascribed to Gh., edited by MALTER under the title *Die Abhandlung d. Abū-Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, Antworten auf Fragen, die an ihn gerichtet wurden*: see pp. XXXV seqq., transl. pp. 17 seqq. The editor avows his belief in the authenticity of this work (p. XII). But C. DE VAUX Emphatically rejects it (*Gazālī* p. 53 n. 1), and probably all would side with DE VAUX.

It would thus seem that G h. in his later mystical days gave in private to the doctrine of the Spheres a somewhat startling emphasis and prominence, while in public retaining the old cool, sceptical, reserve in regard to it). The point is of great interest biographically, but though it tells us something about his doctrine of reserve, it is not enough to convict him on any disloyalty to Islām.

The further point — whether G h.'s doctrine of the angelic Spheres in *M.* included also the emanation-theory of the Philosophers — brings us to the second main question: Was *ibn Rushd* justified in his gloss in the *M.* passage, namely that Allāh was *huwa-lladhī ṣadara 'anhu hādha-l-muḥarrik* (called *al-muṭā'*), and that G h.'s language in this passage amounts to a *taṣrīḥ minhu bi 'tiqādi madhāhibi-l-falāsifa*?

2.

The point is one of crucial importance, for it goes far to settle the question, one way or the other, as to whether G h. held any esoteric doctrine which was in flat contradiction to his teachings in his other books and which he, in those books, branded as *kufr*. If he can be acquitted on the charge so casually brought against him by *ibn R.* he may probably be acquitted from the general charge, for it is unlikely that a stronger case will be found elsewhere than that created by this passage in *M.* This great man's fundamental sincerity is, then, the issue of the present discussion.

But preliminarily it must be established that this question of emanation is crucial for the point at issue.

Turning to the *Tah.* of G h. (ed.cit. pp. 24 seqq.) we find that this is the theory which is definitely and explicitly contrasted with the true doctrine of Allāh as Creator (*fā'ilu-l-'ālamī wa ṣāni'uh*) and condemned as incompatible with it. The full statement of the emanational theory occurs on p. 28 of the work¹). The word for "emanation" there used is *fāda* (*inna-l-mabda'a-l-awwala fāda min wujūdihi-l-'aqlu-l-awwal*). But the word he uses more generally is the very one used by *ibn R.* in his comment on this *M.* passage, viz. *ṣadara*, e. g. on p. 30 of the *Tah.* where he starts an objection to the above doctrine by the words *kaiḥa ṣadara minhu etc.* Evidently the two expressions are practically synonymous, one meaning "flow over", the other "issue forth".

in this. It clearly teaches the philosophic *qidam al-'ālam* (pp. XLI seqq.; transl. pp. 23 seqq.). So then G h. was a hypocrite through and through! (p. XII). — DE VAUX appears to reject also both the *Maḏnūn's* (*Gazālī*, p. 53 notes), yet cites the greater *Maḏ.* as original on p. 107.

¹) See also *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*, Cairo 1st ed. pp. 219, 220.

The two words are brought together in a sentence on p. 51¹) (last two lines). And on the next page (52) he explicitly opposes the doctrine of *ṣudūr* to the only true and orthodox one of *ihdāth*. Thus we see that to Gh. the doctrine of *ṣudūr* was part and parcel with that of *qidām al-‘ālam*, which is the first of the three heresies, which alone he definitively damns as subversive of Islam and as meriting the penalty of death ²). We further note that on p. 51, line 5, the same doctrine is shown to be vitally connected with the second of the said heresies, viz. Allāh's non-cognisance of the particular. It would be easy to show further, that it underlies the third also, the non-resurrection of the body and the non-materiality of the Garden and the Fire. Trebly damnable, then, was the doctrine of *ṣudūr*, — the doctrine, nevertheless, which we are invited by ibn Rushd to consider as explicitly taught by “A b ū Ḥ ā m i d “ in the *Mishkāṭ al-Anwār* ³)!

There being then no doubt that this accusation respecting *ṣudūr* touches the heart of the question, we must now discuss the causes that might lead a reader, as apparently they led ibn R., to find the doctrine in *M.* in general and this passage in particular.

(a) The word *ṣudūr* does not occur in *M.* But the word *fāḍa*, which as we have seen had suspicious associations, is frequent. The angels, Gh. teaches in *M.* are lights (not have or convey light): the lower lights “emanate (*tafiḍ*) one from the other as light emanates from a lamp (p. 22)”, forming an emanational light-scale ascending by stages (*maqāmāt*) to Allāh as absolute light source (*ib.*). At first sight this looks like the naked emanation-theory of the Philosophers: but in fact it is not so. Gh.'s use of the word *fāḍa* is not simply *fāḍa min* . . . but *fāḍa min* . . . ‘*alā*. This shows clearly that the image in his mind involves not simply an emanating something, but also a something else, upon (‘*alā*) which falls the glory of that emanation, but which is other than it. See *M.* pp. 4, 14 (twice) and 30, where this point is made explicitly clear. In other words there is presupposed by

¹) . . . صدور الكل . . . فيضان الكل . . .

²) Conclusion (pp. 90, 91) of the *Tah.* The same explicit condemnation is found in *Faiṣal at-Tafrīqa*, and in the contemporary *Munqidh* (pp. 11, 12).

³) It should be noted here that ibn Rushd was himself quite cold towards the emanation-doctrine, which he says was grafted by al-Fārābī and ibn Sīnā on to the true philosophic (i. e. Aristotelian) doctrine of the heavenly bodies (*Tah.* of ibn R. p. 49, the very passage where he answers Gh.'s doctrine against the emanation-doctrine in his *Tah.*, p. 28). This is one of the many cases in which he complains that our author in condemning ibn S. condemned philosophy in general. It is therefore all the more surprising to find Gh. accused by ibn R. of endorsing ibn S. of all people, and the emanation-doctrine of all theories.

this simile a dark body, which becomes clothed, not with the essence of the Light-giver, but with the reflection of His Glory¹). This is the significance of his phrase "as the light emanates from the lamp", — not the flame itself, but the *light* which is the effect of the flame. Similarly for the expression *iqtibās* which occurs on p. 22, where he says that the "Spirits Prophetical are lit (*muqtabasa*) from the Spirits Supernal as a torch is lit from fire, and that these Supernals are lit the one from the other in an order which is an order of ascending stages (*maqāmāt*)"; this expression equally implies some sort of other substance which is merely lighted at and from the source of original flame. On pp. 31 and 32 moreover, the entirely harmless use of the word *fāda* is further proved by its being used for the emanation of a Sultan's authority on to his Vizier, so that the latter is invested with it. Obviously this is not to say that the Vizier emanated from the Sultan in ibn Sīnā's sense. This use of the metaphor is made very clear in the *Maḍnūn aṣ-Ṣaghīr*, where the following passage occurs:

"What is emanation? We must not understand from this explanation what is suggested to us by the overflowing (emanating) (*fayadān*) of water from a vessel on to the hand, for that is suggestive of a separation of a portion of the water from the vessel and its conjunction with the hand. But we must understand that which is suggested to us by the overflowing (emanation) of sunlight on to a wall: though here too some have gone wrong, and have supposed that a ray from the body of the sun becomes separated from it and is conjoined with the wall. Rather is it the sunlight the cause whereby something resembling it in luminosity is created . . . like the emanation of an image from some object on to a mirror . . . It is thus that the divine grace (*jūd*) is the cause whereby the light of existence is created in every substance that admits of existence: which is expressed by the word *jaid*."

So far from having here the metaphysics of the Philosophers, we have simply the metaphysics of the orthodox *mutakallimūn* served up with an analogy from nature. For this is but a picturesque statement of their theory of Necessary Being (*wājib*) and Potential Being (*mumkin*) — the latter being in the state of Not-being ('*adam*') until the attribute of the divine grace (*jūd*) invests it with the single attribute of Being (*wujūd*) and thus creates it. The Potential in the state of Not-being is compared to a dark body; necessary Being (Allāh) to the sun; the attribute of *jūd* to the ray, which alighting on the dark body invests it with the quality of existence, and it flashes into the light of Being. Compare with this a passage in the *Maḍ*. just before the one already cited, where the question is: "What is the cause of

¹) Cf the mirror-metaphor, *supra* p. 33. The passage in *Ihyā* III pp. 495—6, cited by KREMER in *Ideen* p. 72, shows the enormous importance attached by G h. to this conception of the reflector, especially as a defence against the assaults of pantheistic ideas consequent on ecstasy.

this kindling of the wick (i. e. the embryo) by the light (i. e. the spirit)?" and the reply is: "The cause is an attribute in the Maker and an attribute in the potential locus (*maḥallin qābil*). The former attribute is the divine grace (*jūd*), the well-spring of Being upon (*yanbū' al-wujūd 'alā*) all that is susceptible (*lahu qābil*) of Being (i. e. *al-mumkin*): for this grace is a self-emanation upon (*ḥayadān biḥālihi 'alā*) every hypostasis (*ḥaqīqa*) which it brings into existence. This attribute is expressed by the term Power and may be compared to the emanating of the sunlight upon all that is potentially illuminable (*qābil lil-istināra*) when the veil between the two is removed."

With this clear position the allusions in *M.* to the divine *ḥayadān* are in complete agreement. The metaphysic of G. h. the Ṣūfī was still that of *kalām*, not *falsafa*, just as much as in his pre-Ṣūfī days. The image of the passing of the divine Light by a series of refractions on to a series of dark objects, each reflecting, but more and more dimly, the light of the one before, is a favourite one with Ṣūfīs and is found in an important passage in *M.* (pp. 15, 16). If we are right in showing how harmless this doctrine of light-emanation was in itself, we may further conclude from this image of successive refractions, that the graded ranking of human and angelic spirits, up to one highest Being standing next to Allāh, was also a doctrine not in the least inconsistent with the orthodox doctrine of the eternal Creator and the contingent creation ¹⁾. These successive refractions are in the same section (pp. 15, 16) explicitly identified with these successive ranks of Spirits, the graduations of whom are further said to be a matter of *kashf*. According to this important section, it is clear that however mysteriously high and nigh the highest and nighest of these Beings is, and whether IT be called the Obeyed-one (as in our enigma-passage), or the Nighest-one (*al-muqarrab* p. 16), It nevertheless only differs in degree from all those who are lower down in the series. Thus, on page 16, "These four Lights [in the refraction simile just alluded to] are ranged one above the other and one more perfect than the other; and each one has a certain rank and proper degree which it never passes. I would have you know that it has been revealed to those who have Insight that even so are the Lights of the Spirit-realm ranged in an order;

¹⁾ And this would apply to the Spheres also, supposing them to be living Celestials. — G. h.'s idea as to who was *al-aqrab* seems to have varied. For it is worth noting that in *Fawā'id* r p. 13 he tells us that the Cherubim (*Karūbīyūn*) are the highest Celestials of all; but their function is entirely adoration, — they pay no attention to aught else [therefore are unconcerned with this matter of Sphere-turning] لا التفات (إلى غير الله تعالى الخ).

that the Nighest (*al-muqarrab*) is the one who is nearest (*al-aqrab*) to the Ultimate Light, (and thus the rank of Seraphiel may well be above that of Gabriel) ¹⁾; that among them is one who is the Nighest; . . . that among them is a Lowest; and (finally) between the two are grades innumerable." — The refraction-simile with which this section begins (p. 15) explains that the Nighest stands to the Light-source, Allāh, as the moon to the Sun, i. e. as the most brilliant of reflected lights to the primary, possessing therefore no more unity of essence or nature with the primary than any of the others.

Considering the total absence, then, of the words *fāqa* or *ṣadara*, or even their idea, from the *M.* passage under discussion, and the harmlessness of the Ghazālīan use of *fāda*, *ṣayaḍān*, *ṣaiḍ*, no justification can be found for i b n R.'s gloss on the passage. — But it has other features which made more readers than i b n R. suspicious (see *inf.* sec. IV).

b) In the schematization of the universe ascribed by G h. to the highest grade of the Light-veiled, viz. that immediately preceding the Unveiled, Allāh is compared with the sun, the source of light, and the Highest in his service with the moon. But in the schematism ascribed to the Unveiled, Allāh is compared with pure Light (*an-nūr al-mahd*) and his Vicegerent to the sun; or respectively the elemental fire (*jawhar an-nār*) and live-coal. Are we, then, to understand that no longer is the Vicegerent a mere reflector of an alien glory, himself essentially dark? but that he is the light-source relationally, and Allāh the light-source absolutely? Certainly this does look like the Philosophers' doctrine of the First-cause (*al-'illat al-ūlā*) and the First-caused (*al-ma'lūl al-awwal* or *al-'aql al-awwal* sc. The Demiurge):

¹⁾ The allusion to Seraphiel and Gabriel in the above quotation, though introduced in the curious tentative fashion sometimes affected by our author, tends to confirm the supposition that G h. the mystic had taken over very much of the Ṣūfī cosmology and angelology which is to a large extent common both to Jewish, Christian, and Moslem mysticism. These two names were not chosen at random. Seraphiel (*Isrāfīl*) was the Archangel of the highest Planetary Heaven (Saturn, *Zuḥal*) and Gabriel (*Jabrīl*) that of the lowest (the Moon) — as appears clearly in the myth of the "descent" of the *Qur'ān* from the Preserved Tablet to "the Lowest Heaven" (*as-Samā ad-Dunyā*), and its transference from thence by the Angel Gabriel to the prophet Muḥammad. Mikhā'il was the Archangel of the Mercury-sphere, Rafā'il of the Sun-sphere, and so forth (J. LÉPSIUS in *Das Reich Christi* XII p. 61: the names were taken over from the Aramaic astrologers). The Seven Archangels are not mentioned in *M.* But in the strange passage about the *mi'rāj* of an *Entzückter* on p. 30 we have a mention of Seven Stages (*ṣab' tabaqāt*), which in all probability is an allusion to the Seven Spheres. If so, we have here an indication that in G h.'s day Ṣūfīs related their Sevenfold Way to the Seven Spheres, as the modern Dervish-orders do (see "The Way" of a Mohamedan Mystic" by W. H. T. GAIRDNER, Harrassowitz 1911).

— the “sun” would then be the actualisation of uncognisable “light”, having emanated therefrom by a transcendental and unintelligible process. — Very significant is it that Gh.’s *al-muṭāʿ* is not called an Angel, and is unconnected with any Sphere; the next lower Being, an Angel, moves the *ḥalāk al-aflāk*. Exactly so “the First Intellect” moved no Sphere, but produced “the Second Intellect” who ruled the Outermost Sphere (*ḥaḥḥu minhu malak wa-ḥalāk*)¹.

But Gh.’s symbolism is not always consistent. On p. 23 of *M.*, for example, he says: “everything in existence is related . . . to Allāh as light to the Sun”²); but on p. 30 he says that the grades of angelical Light-essences³ (created, obviously) may be compared with the (created) sun, moon, and stars in the world of sight⁴). No argument therefore can be built on his symbolic comparison of the Vicegerential *Muṭāʿ* to the Sun, though under the circumstances it was an unlucky hit.

The passage on p. 30, in fact, which is an uncompromising demonstration of the creatorhood of Allāh and the creaturehood of all other beings, even the highest, gives the clue to Gh.’s mind in using this symbolism, and shows that so far from its expressing a singularly close relation between Allāh and his Vicegerent, it is intended to express the infinity of the gulf between them. After calling the Archangels Lords (*arbāb*) and comparing them to the sun, moon and stars, he introduces that artistic and beautiful passage in the *Qurʾān* where Abraham is depicted as tempted to worship these heavenly bodies successively, ending with the sun the most glorious of them all. As he sees each sag and set he exclaims, “I love not those that set”; until, when the sun sets also, he cries “Oh my people I am innocent of your polytheism: I have turned my face to (*waḥḥtu waḥḥi ilā*) Who created the Heavens and the Earth” (*Sūra VI*, 79) The italicised phrase is of first-rate importance in this connection, for it occurs again most significantly in our enigma-passage (*M.* p. 55) where the Unveiled (we are told) “turn their face from (*tawajjahū*) him who moves the Ultimate Sphere and him who commands it to be moved⁵), and arrived at (*waḥḥū ilā*) a Being transcending all” etc. — The essential unity of teaching as between the *Qurʾān* itself and this much-debated passage, and between the latter

¹) *Maqāṣid*, p. 220.

²) كل ما في الوجود فنسبته اليه في ظاهر المثال كنسبة النور الى الشمس

³) line 7: جواهر نورانية شريفة عالية يعبر عنها بالملائكة

⁴) line 10: يكون مثاليها في عالم الشهادة الشمس والقمر والنجوم

⁵) Respectively the Angel of the Highest Sphere, and the Vicegerent.

and Gh.'s uniform theological position, would thus seem to be fully established.

c) An apparent contradiction between the teaching of this passage and that of Gh.'s *Munqidh*, for example, is found in the explicit denial to Allāh of the supreme act of moving the outermost Sphere, and so the whole heavenly mechanism (p. 54 l. 15 compared with p. 55 l. 12), and the ascription of this function to the Vicegerent. Moreover, even the Vicegerent is too sublime to move that Heaven directly; he is an Obeyed-one who orders the moving of the Heavens (*alladhi ya'muru bi-tahrīkīhā*) and under Him is the one (sc. an Archangel) who actually moves them (*alladhi yuḥarriku s-samawāt*)¹. And as if to lose no opportunity of clothing this Vicegerent with an all-too-ambiguous preeminence he omits to call him either angel or creature (*malāk*, *abd*) though in the previous schematization the supreme Celestial was carefully designated by both of these terms (p. 55 lines 2, 3). Finally, Gh. throws some mystification over the reason which led him to deny this function to Allāh: it would, he says "negate the absolute divine unity and perfection because of a mystery, of the disclosure of which this book does not admit".

In the *Munqidh* on the other hand we find the very selfsame function, namely the ordering (*ya'mur*; see above) of the movement of the Heavens, which in this passage is denied to the Absolute Being and handed over to the Vicegerent, assigned to the Creator alone; an assignation which he there makes the test-doctrine of orthodoxy, damning the heretic philosophers who denied it. "Nature", he says "is set a working by its Creator, and sun, moon, stars and elements, are constrained to work by His command (*bi-amrihi*)".

What makes the contrast so glaring is the explicit denial of this very *bi-amrihi* to Allāh in the *M.* passage, and its ascription to a Vicegerent who is for this reason called *al-muṭā'*. The *Munqidh* position is in fact identical with that of the highest grade of Light-veiled, who ascribed this constraining of the heavenly bodies to the *amr* of Allāh and made Him the *muṭā'* (p. 55 lines 1, 2). Gh. is here indeed "plus philosophe que les philosophes". The latter, according to Ibn R.³) laid down that all orders issued by whatsoever commanders must be traced back to this First Principle (*al-mabda' al-awwal*, i. e. Allāh Himself, who is indeed called in this connection *al-āmir al-awwal*, the First Commander!

¹) *M.* p. 55.

²) Passage already alluded to above: *Munqidh*, ed. cit. p. 11.

³) *Tah.* of I. R. pp. 49, 51.

The matter does not lack in strangeness, and it certainly looks as if Gh.'s esoteric theory of the divine action differed considerably from his exoteric one¹). It also looks as if we shall never know the whole explanation of the matter. We have his own *ḥaveṭe lūnguis!* here; and, as we shall see, there was no key to the puzzle forthcoming in *ibn Tufā'il's* time²). The point is of high interest biographically and theologically, but not to the extent of proving Gh.'s infidelity to orthodoxy, as though he taught that this Vicegerent *emana**te*d from this First Cause.

For the passage itself when closely studied carries the refutation of such a charge. The fact that he does not happen to call the Vicegerent '*abd* or *malāk*' may be dismissed as an accident: probably Gh. mentally carried on the description of the Vicegerent in the previous schematization. The key to the orthodoxy of the passage we have already seen: — *tawajjahū* in l. 12, when compared with Abraham's "*wajjahtu wajhī lilladhī ḡafara-s-samāwāti wal-arḡ ḡanīḡan wa-mā ana mina-l-mushrikīn*", is conclusive. The word *tawajjahū* in itself negates the possibility of an emanation theory.

This becomes still clearer when we consider Gh.'s commentary on the above *Qur'ān* text (*M.* p. 32). It is on the strength of it that he justifies the hyper-transcendence of the Allāh of his theology. The relative 'Who' (in *lilladhī*) is, he says, purposely made as vague as possible; it is left without relation or analogue (*mithāl*), for Allāh transcends all relation (*taqaddasa 'ani-n-nisba*). He then goes on to quote Moses's refusal to define or to describe the quiddity (*māhīya*) of Allāh to enquiring Pharaoh, simply referring him to Allāh's works in creation and then stopping short (see *Sūra XXVI.* 24). It is clear that

¹) Something more will be said later about the extent or limitations of the Ghazālīan doctrine of economy, his "*ilhām*" of certain teachings from the "commonalty".

²) M. MASSIGNON suggests to me that the figure of the Vicegerent is really an obscure allusion to a high doctrine concerning the *Qulb* who rules and orders all things in both heaven and earth. In reference to the name *al-muḡā'* he cites the aphorism of Ibrāhīm Adham *من أطاع الله أطاعه كل شيء*. The extraordinary passage in *M.* p. 24 may be an other allusion to this all-governance by a supreme Ṣūfī. — It is true that virtual omnipotence, not only in matters earthly but also in matters heavenly, was ascribed by later Ṣūfīs to the *aqlāb*. Of the two *imām's* of the *qulb*, the "*imām* of the right" was definitely assigned the control of matters celestial: how much more then the *qulb* himself. But is this doctrine as old as Gh.; or, if so, was it reputable in his day? *Ibn Khaldūn* (III. 72 of QUATREVÈRE's text) traces it to the influence of Ismā'ilism on the later Ṣūfīs (*al-muta' akhkhirūn min as-Ṣūfīya*, p. 71), mediated by men like *ibn Sīnā*, in imitation of the *imām*-theory of the Ismā'ilites. Now Gh. was continually fighting the Ismā'ilites; he derided the *imām*-doctrine (see *Munqidh*); and he deeply suspected *ibn Sīnā*. Is he, then, likely to have adopted a high *qulb*-doctrine?

the obliterating transcendentalism of Gh.'s view of Allāh was intended by him to preserve just this creatorhood of Allāh. He probably clung to this last refuge of the Deist against an all devouring pantheism. Allāh, though "transcending every attribute given previously" ¹⁾, including the direct providential governance of the universe, was nevertheless the "one who created the heavens and the earth" and of course all that is therein, including the Vicegerent himself. How Gh. the orthodox was able to keep in view so definite an attribution as that of Creatorhood amid the Stygian darkness of his hyperagnosticism, is a question that can be asked but not answered. We touch here the bottom of the Ghāzālī-problem. Yet it is only the problem of every mystic who, while his philosophy and theology alike are hastening to blot out both subject and object, annihilating the created world and making God unknowable just because He is All, nevertheless clings to the fact that he himself, a creature, has made the mystic leap to God. And in fact, as we have seen, it is just this passage, perhaps the most agnostic one in Gh. (*M.* p. 55), that is closed by his description of the mystic leap taken by the Unveiled, and their ecstasy at the paradisaal vision (pp. 56, 57). The doctrine of creation (*iḥdāth*) was, then, to Gh. the last anchor of faith, thought, and experience. That he should exchange it for the sand-rope of emanation is inconceivable, and we have shown that in fact he did not do so. Ibn Rushd's casual accusation must be totally ruled out, and the sincerity of 'Abū Ḥāmid' to this extent stands vindicated.

IV.

Ibn Ṭufail and the *Mishkāt al-Anwār*.

But Ibn Rushd was not the only thinker who was puzzled by this passage in *M.* His contemporary Ibn Ṭufail in the introduction in his philosophical romance *Ḥayy b. Yaqzān* makes an allusion to the doubts it had occasioned, and takes occasion to make some arresting remarks concerning Gh.'s alleged secret doctrine in his esoteric books (*kutub maḍnūn biḥā*).

Ibn Ṭ.'s verdict, we may say at once, is that Gh. is indeed guilty of serious contradictions, but that these contradictions appear in his published books for all to see; that he had on his own showing a secret doctrine, but that in none of the books which had penetrated to the West was anything particularly significant to be found; and he there-

¹⁾ *M.* p. 55. مَنزُومًا وَمَقْدَسًا عَنِ كُلِّ مَا وَصَفْنَاهُ مِنْ قَبْلِ

fore rejects the dubious interpretations put by certain contemporary readers of *M.* upon this vexed passage. But, though he seems to recognize its obscurity, he does not favour us with its true interpretation. Here is his allusion to it ¹⁾:

وقد توهم بعض المتأخرين من كلامه الواقع في آخر كتاب المشكآت
أمرًا عظيمًا وقع [واقعه v. l.] في مهواة لا مخلص له منها وهو قوله بعد
ذكر اصناف للحجونيين بالانوار ثم انتقله الى ذكر الواصلين انهم وقفوا على
ان عذا الموجود متصف بصفة تنافي الوجدانية المختصة فاراد ان يلزمه من
ذلك انه يعتقد ان الاول للحق سبحانه في ذاته كثرة ما — تعالى الله عما
يقول الظالمون علواً كبيراً

"Some later writers ²⁾ have fancied they have found something tremendous in that passage of his that occurs at the end of *al-Mishkāt*, which (they think) impales al-Ghazālī ³⁾ on a dilemma which from which he has no escape ⁴⁾. I mean where, after speaking of the different kinds of the Lightveiled, and then going on to speak of the true Attainers, he tells us that these Attainers have discovered that this Existing One possesses an attribute which is negative of unmitigated Unity: insisting that it necessarily follows from this, that al-Ghazālī believed that the Absolute Being has within His Essence some sort of plurality: which God forbid!"

He goes on to express his emphatic belief that neither in this passage nor elsewhere would A b ū Ḥ ā m i d be found responsible for such a monstrous opinion; though he does not indicate explicitly where these "later writers" erred in their exegesis of the passage. A little study enables us surely, to indicate that error in a single word: — it must have been a very superficial reading of the passage that failed to discern that the Attainers denied, not asserted, the deity of the *Mutā*, and that just on the very ground that his identification with Allāh, or even the ascription to Allāh of the direct controlling of the Heavens, would lead to a pluralising of the godhead. The critics failed to see, in fact, that the Unveiled abandoned the

¹⁾ ed. GAUTIER (G. ¹) pp. 13—15: transl. GAUTIER (G. ²) pp. 12—14. Translated OCKLEY (O.) publ. EDWARD VAN DYCK, Cairo 1905, pp. 13. 14.

²⁾ Or "A later writer", for the word بعض even when followed by singular pronouns is ambiguous. If, as is very possibly the case, the allusion is to a single writer, can it be that we have here an allusion to his contemporary i b n R.'s critique on *M.*, the very one which we have just been discussing?

³⁾ واقعه. The dilemma is conceived as past, either from the point of view of that critic (*qad tawahhama*) or from the point of view of the dead G h a z ā l i.

⁴⁾ Both G. ² (p. 14) and O. (p. 14) seem to me to have mistaken the meaning here. It was al - G h a z ā l i, not his critics, who was supposed to find this opinion so disastrous in its consequences. The v. l. واقعه, makes this even clearer.

position of the last of the Light-veiled in just this respect, that the latter identified the *Muṭāʿ* with Allāh, while the perfected Attainers kept *al-Muṭāʿ*, with all his functions unchanged, but denied that he was Allāh¹⁾; and "turned from him" to the predicateless Absolute Being. The discovery of those 'latter-day' critics thus turns out to be a mares'-nest, as Ibn Ṭ. himself clearly deemed it to be.

Ibn Ṭ. has no doubt that Gh. had an esoteric doctrine, but he evidently considers that it would not be so very alarming, if known (perhaps Ibn Ṭ. however was not a very capable judge in such matters); if it had ever been committed to writing, then the books to which it was committed had never found their way to Andalusia. Of the books that had come to hand some, he says, were considered by their western readers to be esoteric. But he pooh-poohs the alleged esotericism of all these books, including our *M.* itself, *Muṭāʿ* and all. Ibn Ṭufail has no doubt that Abū Ḥāmid was one of the true Attainers and that he achieved the highest degree of felicity.

This implication of the legitimacy of having an esoteric, economized (*maḍnūn bihā*) doctrine is important. Gh., says Ibn Ṭ., made no secret of it himself. In his *al-Fawāhir*²⁾ he had openly avowed having written esoteric books³⁾ and in his *Mizān al-ʿAmal* he gives his ideas on the subject in very candid detail, namely that every "Perfect" (*kāmil*) has three sets of opinions (*madhāhib*): first, those of the environment in which he was born, brought up, and educated; second, what he teaches to enquirers, adapting and varying the same to their attainment and degree of perception; third, "what a man believes in secret between himself and Allāh, what he gives to no one to peruse save Allāh, and never mentions except in the company of someone who has been his fellow-student of the matter in question, or has reached a stage (*rutba*) that qualifies him to study it" ⁴⁾

It is undeniably startling to find a doctrine like this so candidly

¹⁾ I owe to my colleague the Rev. R. F. McNEILE the clear appreciation of this all-important point.

²⁾ i. e. *Fawāhir al-Qurʾān* (Cairo ed. 1329).

³⁾ op. cit. p. 30. But Ibn Ṭufail has not noticed an important point here: on page 31 of *Fawāhir*, Gh. seems clearly to say that he had put all his esoteric teaching into one book: *ḥarāmūn ʿalā man yaqāʿu dhālik al-kitābu biyadihi an yuḥirahu*. To which the editor adds (in the index, *Fawāhir* p. 189) *wa laʾallahu mā yusammā bil-ʿMadnūn bihi ʿalā ghairi ahlihi*". The contents of this esoteric teaching are defined by Gh. to be the Acts of Allāh; His Attributes; His Essence; and, *ʿilm al-ākhira*, which includes 'the relation of the creature to Allāh according as he is certified by knowledge or veiled by ignorance' (notice the *Mishkāt* terminology). (*Fawāhir* p. 30.)

⁴⁾ *Mizān* p. 214.

stated by G h. h i m s e l f, and to the modern mind such an attitude seems suspicious to a degree. Some will no doubt say that anything might be true of the doctrines of a man who confesses to such suppleness as this. Would it (they might ask) be surprising after this to find the doctrine of emanation, or any other doctrine, in that unknown book of esoteric wisdom if we had it?; while as for studying the books which have his imprimatur, this cannot on the face of it, and on his own confession, lead to any certain results in regard to his innermost thought; so why waste time on so futile a proceeding?

It is probable nevertheless that these considerations, while certainly complicating the G h.-problem, only lend it a more piquant interest. Our author is not silent on the rationale and method of this economy of teaching. In regard to *kalām* indeed his method of economy, which was substantially that of the older though not more recent *mutakallim*'s, is to be found fully expounded in his treatise *Iljām il 'awāmm 'an 'ilmi-l-kalām*¹). It is true on the other hand that he is nowhere so explicit about his method of economy in regard his esoteric mysticism²), and that here Muslim mystics were indubitably treading on more perilous ground. Time and again in *M.* as we shall see, he stops short at some exciting point and somewhat coyly gives the reader to understand that he could tell so much more an he would.

I b n T's position in regard to G h. is as follows: He considers that Gh.'s confession of his triple *madhāhib* accounts for the contradictions and inconsistencies to be found in his published works, such as (sic i b n T.) his damning of the doctrine of the immateriality of the resurrection in his *Tah.* and his approval of it in his *Mizān al-'Amal*³) where he himself differs from him is over the necessity for such caution. In the very last paragraph of *Hayy*⁴) he says that the time had come to "divulge this secret and to tear away the veil", leaving the true doctrine however with "a thin veil or cover over it, which may be easily rent by those who are worthy of it, but will be so thick to him who is unworthy to pass beyond that he shall be unable to penetrate it"⁵). The reason for this proceeding is stated to be the dangers some were

1) op. cit. passim see also *al-iqtisād fil i'tiqād* pp. 6—8, and *Jawāhir* pp. 25.

2) In *Jawāhir* pp. 29, 30 he tells as something about the necessary propaedeusis to his reserved teaching.

3) This opens up a tempting subject which is beyond the scope of the present enquiry. The reference in Gh.'s *Tahāfut* is pp. 90, 91 (the concluding paragraph); in *Mizān, al-'Amal*, pp. 7, 8. I b n R. in his reply to the *Tahāfut* notices the same inconsistency (see the section on eschatology in his *Tah.*, concluding paragraph, p. 135.

4) G.¹ p. 118, G.² p. 117.

5) O. p. 69.

in of reading false and corrupt beliefs into the secret so jealously guarded by his predecessors; — he is quite aware that he is almost entirely reversing their policy in this matter.

But among the most prominent of these predecessors was G h. himself. Now it is true that i b n T. on his own shewing had no authentic knowledge of the esoteric teaching of G h., for he felt sure (he says) that he had never come across the esoteric book or books mentioned by his predecessor in his *Ḥayy* ¹). But it is pretty clear from a survey of the whole passage in *Ḥayy* that i b n T. believed that G h.'s esoteric teaching, if it could be got at and unveiled, would not be found to differ from his own position, so candidly set forth in *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡṣān*. He even says he won his way to that position through his study of G h.'s "other (published) works and those of Shaikh Abū 'Alī (i b n Sīnā), which I read and compared with the opinions of the present philosophers, until I at length came to the knowledge of the truth" ²). Al-Ghazālī and i b n Sīnā! — a truly remarkable juxtaposition!

I b n T. may of course be wholly wrong, and *Ḥayy* may be a total misrepresentation of G h.'s inner teaching. Certainly it strikes one on reading it as having far more Abū 'Alī in it than Abū Ḥāmid: more, on the whole, of the ideas attacked in the *Tah.* than of the ideas which the *Tah.* was written to vindicate. But the speculation suggested by these hints of the i b n T. cannot be followed out here, though it is far too important a one to be ignored by anyone who purposes to make an exhaustive study of G h.'s innermost theological conceptions. It only comes within the scope of this study to see what light, if any, *Ḥayy* throws on the ideas set forth in *M.* and especially on the enigma passage at the end; neither defending nor opposing i b n T.'s claim to be in line with G h.'s own thought.

We are disappointed indeed at the very point where we most

¹) The works of G h. mentioned by i b n T. as having been studied by him are: (1) *Tahāfut*, (2) *Mizān al-'Amal*, (3) *Munqidh*, (4) *Ḥawāhir al-Qur'ān*, (5) *al-Ma'ārif al-'Aqlīya*, (6) *an-Nafkh wa-t-Taswīya*, (7) *Masā'il*, (8) *al-Maqṣad al-Asnā*, (9) *Mishkāt al-Anwār*. Of these all except (5) and (7) are in print. I b n T. says of (5), (6) and (7) that they contain hints of esoteric teaching, but not noticeably more than is contained in *Ḥayy kutubihī l-mashhūra*. No. (6) is to be identified with the book known as *al-Maḍnūn as-Ṣaghīr* (= *al-Ajwiba al-Qur'ānīya* Brock. No. 18, see I p. 425 n. 3). It is odd however that when he is confessedly casting around for what he calls *kutub maḍnūn bihā* he should make no mention of the book now well known as *al-maḍnūn bihī 'alā ghairi ahlihī*. Clearly it cannot have "come to Andalus" in his day. Can it be the incommunicable "book" alluded to by G h. in his *Ḥawāhir*?

²) G. I pp. 98—100.

need and most expect information, viz. the nature and functions of the *Muṭāʿ*. *Ḥayy* only tells of the Nine Spheres (the Seven Planetary, the Fixed-Star Sphere, and the Primum Mobile) ¹). Beyond this he brings us to Absolute Deity. Thus he is silent as to any Intermediate such as the *ʿaql al-awwal* or the *maʿlūl al-awwal* of ibn Sīnā or the *Muṭāʿ* of *M.* Herein he resembles al-Fārābī rather than ibn Sīnā ²). His description of the immaterial Celestial Essence (*dhāt*) who indwells, or is, the Highest Sphere has indeed much in common with the *Muṭāʿ*, whose action however has no immediate relation to even the *ḥalak al-aflāk* in *M.*

In this remarkable passage (pp. 98—100) we have a strong reminder of the image of the successive reflectors in *M.* ³) the importance of which in determining Gh.'s notion of *ḥayādān* has been already pointed out. The essences of the Intelligences of the Spheres are represented as the successive reflections of the Divine Essence. The highest of them "is not the essence of the One Real nor is he the Sphere itself, nor is he other than them both ⁴). It is, as it were, the image of the sun which appears in a polished mirror; for it is neither the sun, nor the mirror, nor other than them both". These reflecting mirrors are the bodies of the Spheres. This well represents Gh.'s light-emanation idea (*ḥayād*). And the inimitable 'hedging' "neither identical with nor different from the One Real" might very possibly have been welcomed by Gh. himself in his struggles to define the relation of the creaturely to the divine Intelligence. Certainly then, in this respect, *Ḥayy* is nearer the Ghazālīan *ḥayād* than the Avicennian *ḥudūr*. And it is the same when we consider the teaching of *Ḥayy* in regard to the nature of the reflectors whether heavenly or sublunary; for although he holds the balance quite even as between the theological doctrine of creation-from-nothing and the philosophic theory of mundo-eternity ⁵), he nowhere shows any inclination for the doctrine of emanation. The position of *Ḥayy* is in fact that of ibn R. as opposed to that of ibn S. and al-F. Ibn R. was also against the emanational theory ⁵).

Thus we have yet another endorsement of our previous conclusion

¹) Contrast the accounts of their respective emanation theories by DE BOER, *Philosophy of Islam* (Engl. transl. pp. 115, 136).

²) *M.* p. 15, see above section III.

³) G.¹ p. 98 *ليست هي ذات الواحد ولا هي نفس الفلك ولا هي غيمهما*.

Perhaps *ذات الواحد* should rather be translated the ONE itself.

⁴) G.¹ pp. 64—69: this mediating position is worthy of careful note.

⁵) See DE BOER *Die Widersprüche der Philosophie nach el Gh.*, p. 67.

that in regard to the charge made by *ibn R.* on the strength of the passage in *M.*, the Andalusian philosopher can hardly be acquitted of libel. We imagine that if there was one thing that Gh.'s *Tah.* did, it was to destroy this particular theory of emanation. Even an *ibn Tufail*, who has the fully developed doctrine of the Spheres which we find in the earlier Philosophers, is uncontaminated by that particular theory. The strong common-sense and vigorous dialectic of Gh. had simply killed it.

V.

Conclusion.

Whether Gh. in his later days and in *M.* itself found himself at the *Tufailian* position, that the Mutakallimite and Aristotelian metaphysic really amounted to much the same thing¹⁾, cannot now be discussed. One would think it very possible²⁾, even though he would continue to fight the philosophers as such because of the elements in their teaching which did seem him to be dangerous and destructive of religion. He himself has taught us not to consider all that he says in controversy as being a sure guide to positive truth; "This science (controversy) has for its end the protection of the ordinary believer from being upset by New Theologians (*al-mubtadi'a*); it is not entirely concerned with the disclosure of absolute truths (*al-haqā'iq*). A book of this class is my *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*"³⁾. Work of this sort, essentially rhetorical and academic⁴⁾ in character, would naturally partake of the weakness of the very *eidola* which were the objects of its iconoclasm: it communicated neither positive truth nor even the bottom convictions of the teacher⁵⁾. Already according to both *ibn T.* and *ibn R.*, Gh.'s real opinion on certain eschatological

¹⁾ HEGELS identification of Being and Not-Being would have eased a great deal of this travail. The Averroan doctrine of *hyle*, pure potentiality "near akin to nothing" (Hayy G.¹ p. 47), and the Mutakallimite assertion of the contingent (*munḥin*) — Not-Being only waiting to be invested with the one quality of Being in order to leap into existence — are surely very near each other.

²⁾ It is noteworthy that in *M.* we have the same image of the hand and its shadow (the hand prior to, and independent of, and transcending the shadow, and yet always accompanied by it) as is used by *ibn T.* to illustrate the Averroan doctrines of the dependence of the world on the Deity and (nevertheless) the *qidam* of the world. *Mishkāt* p. 27, Hayy (G.¹) p. 103.

³⁾ *Ḥawāhir* pp. 25, 26. His earlier *kalām* treatise *al-Iqtisād* is included by him in the same category (*ib.* p. 25).

⁴⁾ *ma yusāru bihi fī ta'limāt*, *Mizān* p. 212. *Ibn Rushd* is always complaining of the controversial, non-demonstrative character of the arguments of the *Tahāfut*.

⁵⁾ *ib.* 212, 214.

matters had come out in his *Mizān*, and it contradicted the position so ferociously contended for in the *Tahāfut*¹⁾. The present work, *al-Mishkāṭ*, gives plenty of indications that there was a great deal more behind which he did not care to set forth at that time. The nature of the human 'aql, and its peculiar relation to the Divine, are two of such secrets (*sirr*) (*M.* pp. 6, 7). Of the description of the mystic *ḥāl* (p. 20), which surely comes as close to pantheism as language is capable of, we are told that "behind these truths also lie secrets which it is not lawful to enter upon". The impropriety of making Allāh move the outermost sphere by His Command, the necessity of asserting His transcendence even of this and every other conceivable function or attribute, is another of these secrets (p. 55). The astonishing passage (p. 24), where to the supreme Adept of mysticism is ascribed features and functions of Deity, is introduced with a coy disclaimer (line 1), and it is hazarded that "perhaps" one might think that here we have the true explanation of Adam's being "in the image of the *Raḥmān*"; — but really there is an explanation, — only "I think good to draw rein to my exposition, for I do not think you can bear more of this subject than what I have said"! These hesitations and diffident adumbrations and "perhappses" and "perchances" from the fierce dogmatist of the *Tah.*, the perpetual layer-down-of-the-law, are very suggestive. Every *Ṣūfī* — every merger of the All in the One —, who goes as far as Gh. evidently had gone in his mystic experiments, must be perpetually trembling on the edge of the pantheistic abyss. He does not pretend to know intellectually. His experimental gnosis is an intellectual agnosis, and an agnosis which must seem to him continually oscillating between an extreme pantheism and an extreme deism. Now the waking and sober A b ū Ḥ ā m i d was and remained by bent and training a t h e o - l o g i a n. His own thought when not moving on the transcendental plane, and the thought of the 'awāmm who never moved on that plane at all, would inevitably be cast in the theological mould, and would equally inevitably be the thought of the right-centre in Islam. But may we not feel certain that in some directions, which it may never be wholly possible to define, those ten ecstatic years of spiritual pilgrimage, with the unfolding to him of the 'ālam al-malakūt, the world of Elements, and Spheres, and Intelligences, and ineffable Raptures to the dark glory of the Absolute, did not leave and cannot have left a l - G h a z ā l ī's thought without profound changes? May they not well have brought him, in particular, to see that between the Philo-

¹⁾ vide supra.

sophers and the Mystics there was a very essential bond; that though the claims of the former to demonstrate and therefore profanely to reveal transcendent mysteries must be lashed, yet the mystic ecstasy did bring the soul by a leap into a world that was wonderfully like theirs. The common Neoplatonic basis of both the *Ṣūfīs* and the *Philosophers'* systems makes such a conclusion in fact probable enough, however conscientiously G h. may have striven to conceal it from himself.

We are not finished yet with the G h a z ā l ī-problem. What was the absolute Islamic truth in his view? Was it the exotericism of the pious *'awāmm*? or the esotericism of the mystic *khawāṣṣ*? Or both together? And if the two were equally true, have we here to do with a *doppelte Wahrheit*? And if so, how does it compare with that of the more notorious Averroes?

Such are some of the questions that will long exercise students of "Algazal". They may ultimately prove insoluble. For are we likely ever to discover a book of his that enables us to penetrate them further than does this *Mishkāt al-Anwār*? Yet even this "Niche for Lights", as we have seen, does no more than dimly light our way up a path which leads up to a fast-closed door.